UPCOMING From MER:    Feisal Husseini - Was He Killed?
 
 

MID-EAST REALITIES © - www.MiddleEast.Org - Washington - 7/04:
     Just what "cease-fire" is Sarid talking about?   And if he really wants a serious outside force, why is he not appealing to the U.N. under Chapter 7 and why are not the Arabs included?  True, the apocalypse approaches, but hypocrites like Sarid -- one of the original promoters of the "Oslo agreement" which fairly quickly unveiled itself as a duplicitous ploy that metasticized into neo-apartheid -- refuse to admit that it is partially they themselves who laid the groundwork for what is
now happening...even if unwittingly.  And even now they cry out in anguish for someone else to come save them from what they themselves are about to do, continuing to fail to understand their complicitous role, past and present, as well as their current responsibilities to truly atone for what they have wrought in a major way.
      Dr. Israel Shahak, who died yesterday on the verge of the coming calamity that he foresaw long ago and dedicated his life to trying to prevent, was a deeply courageous man of great conviction and strength -- the antithesis of a hypocrite.  But one will not read Israel Shahak's obituary in major newspapers around the world, nor see his picture flashed on television.   Few of his colleagues in Israel will even mourn his passing.   But those who knew Israel Shahak personally
were much affected by his conscience and his dedication; and clearly feel his lose.  His death comes ironically precisely at the time his predictions are coming true and when many more courageous souls like him are so desperately needed more than ever.
      First a tribute from American Jewish journalist Ellen Cantarow; then a prescient article written by Israel Shahak six years ago:
 
 

Dr. Israel Shahak, Professor Emeritus of Chemistry at Hebrew University, headed the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, was a ferocious and tireless critic of his country's policies, and wrote volumes of articles and other work including "Jewish History, Jewish Religion" (Pluto Press, 1994). As a young child he survived Hitler's death camp, Bergen-Belsen, with his mother, and arrived with her in Palestine around age twelve. (His father died in the holocaust.) He
grew up in Israel; served in the army; became a chemist; went on to the faculty of Hebrew University. He was a savage, unbending and courageous critic of his country's policies, denouncing its colonialist designs from earliest Zionism.

As head of The Israeli League for Civil and Human Rights he was instrumental in 1977 in persuading editors at The London Sunday Times to publish the first international exposure of Israel's torture of Palestinian prisoners. I was one of a group of US intellectuals who in the 1980s and early 90s received his invaluable monthly "Shahak Papers"- ten to fifteen single-spaced pages of translations from the Hebrew Press, headed by his commentaries.

I knew Dr. Shahak as a friend starting in 1979. He was a staggering intellectual with an encyclopedic erudition in world religions; the migrations of ancient peoples; archaeology; ancient and modern history, and more. He once lectured to me about the horse and its domestic use in early human history. In 1985, after I'd done a reporting stint in the Sudan, he told me details about the work of a heroic woman I'd met, prominent in the Sudanese Communist Party. He adored opera; on US speaking tours he brought tapes of his favorites and listened to them for relaxation. He was an ardent supporter of women's rights; he abhorred the denunciations of feminism usual among male intellectuals including his countrymen. When I became Senior Editor of *The Women's Review of Books*, he subscribed, and wrote me letters in which, predictably, his praise was leavened with criticism.

During my reporting trips to Israel and the West Bank in the 1980s he opened his small home to me. When I visited he'd always start by giving me his most recent Hebrew press "cuttings." His two-room apartment was always in breathtaking disarray - "cuttings" everywhere, piles of magazines and newspapers, no place to step, apparent chaos! Yet he could always find whatever was needed for his visitors. He lived a Spartan life with almost no furniture - a bed, a table, a lamp, a couple chairs. To many he seemed cold, abrupt, and a peculiar recluse. Once on his wrong side, you didn't easily regain his friendship, and it was often hard to know where you'd erred. Perhaps he saw me as a niece or little sister, for he showed me another side, gentle and compassionate.

In his ferocious denunciations of the occupation he was a "loyal patriot" not unlike his friend, the fiery Rabbi Yeshayahu Leibovitz. He was warm in his appreciation of his country's positive aspects (for example he treasured memories of his comradeship with ordinary men during his Army service.) A true friend of Palestine, he denounced not only his country's policies against it, but also PLO corruption and injustices within the Palestinian community (for example the "honor murders" of Palestinian women by male family members.) In countries like Israel and South Africa, people of Dr. Shahak's integrity, fearlessness and breadth of mind stand out against the background of their states' injustices as humanity's most shining gems. In any just world he should have received a Nobel Prize. I had hoped to see him once again and I write this with tears in my eyes and a very heavy heart.

           Ellen Cantarow
            American Jewish Journalist
 
 
 

  ----------- Israel Shahak writing 6 years ago -----------

          ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI POLICIES:

 THE PRIORITY OF THE IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR

                       By Israel Shahak

At the time of this  writing  the  end  of  the  "peace  process"
initiated in Madrid and Oslo is all too evident.  It  has  failed
primarily because the Israeli government did nothing to make  the
majority of the Palestinians in the Territories  support  it,  at
least temporarily, although it could have obtained their  support
without sacrificing any major imperial  Israeli  interests.  Many
commentators, including some well-intentioned ones, are  wringing
their hands  imploring  Rabin  to  refrain  from  taking  another
provocative step - e.g the further confiscation of land  in  East
Jerusalem as decided on April 30, 1995. Those  commentators  fail
to take into account that Rabin's policies have an internal logic
and consistency based on the consensus of Labor Zionism as formed
already in the 1920s. This report will describe  those  policies,
to conclude that their analysis and prediction are very  easy  to
make on the assumption that they constitute an application of the
Zionist   ideology   which   tends    to    override    pragmatic
considerations.  The  apparent  exceptions  to  this  rule,  e.g.
Israeli withdrawals from formerly conquered territories, are also
explainable in terms of idelogical factors, in this  instance  in
terms of the loss of Jewish lives in unsuccessful or inconclusive
wars and of the wish to avoid further losses of Jewish lives.

For instance, as pointed out by Tanya Reinhart  (Yediot  Ahronot,
May 1, 1995) in  all  Rabin's  interviews  to  the  Hebrew  press
published on the  Passover  Eve,  April  14,  he  reiterated  his
ideological commitment to the principle that only the Jews  "have
the right over the entire Land of Israel". Rabin didn't bother to
specify the exact borders  of  the  Land  in  question:  he  only
admitted that "it is also inhabited by  2  million  Palestinians"
who constitute "a problem" which only Labor knows how  to  solve.
This is a standard formula of  Labor  and  center  Zionism  which
hasn't changed for more than 75 years.

On the same day "a senior officer of the Central Command  of  the
Israeli  army",  which  is  in  charge  of  the  West  Bank,  was
interviewed by Nahum  Barnea  (Yediot  Ahronot,  April  14).  The
officer defined "the official  policy  of  the  Israeli  army  as
providing every Jew in every settlement, whether of the West Bank
or the Gaza Strip, with exactly the same degree of  security  and
well-being as Jews of Haifa and Tel Aviv have during  all  stages
of the peace process and afterwards". Needless  to  say,  nothing
was said about security of the Palestinians who, more than before
Oslo, are harassed by the settlers backed  by  the  army  and  by
Arafat's secret polices backed by the Shabak.  The  officer  also
singled out with pride the ever increasing number of  Palestinian
administrative detainees in the West  Bank  (3,600  according  to
him, more than 5,000 according to my sources), adding  that  "the
detention orders which in the past have been issued for only half
a year are now issued for an entire year". He promised  that  the
Israeli army will  soon  take  many  other  steps  such  as  "the
confiscation of property" of individuals considered to be  "Hamas
supporters" and as "decisive measures against  the  mosques.  Not
every mosque is affiliated with Hamas, but a mosque which we will
consider as so affiliated will be dealt with utmost firmness".

The plan  which  the  Israeli  army  already  implements  in  the
Territories (known as "Rainbow of Colors") was published  in  the
Hebrew press in November  1994,  but  its  crucial  feature,  the
"bypassing roads"  on  which  only  the  Jewish  settlers,  their
visitors and the Israeli army will be  permitted  to  drive,  was
discussed by the press already  in  September.  Reinhart  (ibid.)
notes that the plan had been "formulated  already  in  the  early
1980s" by the settlers, but  under  Likud  and  "national  unity"
governments nothing much was done to implement it.  "It  is  'the
peace  government'  which  opened  new  vistas  for  the   plan's
implementation". The annual cost  of  the  plan  is  one  billion
shekel [$330 million], to be continued for 3 years. Most  of  the
cost, as noted by Meir Shteglitz (Yediot Ahronot, April 9) Israel
expects to covered by the U.S. Relying on an interview  given  by
the commander of the Central Command, general Biran,  to  Haaretz
(April 28), Reinhart described the plan  as  "envisaging  maximal
defense of all existing Jewish settlements and the  partition  of
the West Bank into  enclaves  containing  Arab  localities.  Each
enclave is to be surrounded by bypassing roads,  settlements  and
Israeli army fortresses. The situation will be then the  same  as
in the Gaza Strip". (I will deal with the Gaza Strip later.)  "If
Israel ever decides to withdraw its troops from any downtown area
of an Arab city [of the West Bank], the plan is to guarantee that
the Israeli army will continue to rule that city  from  outside".
Indeed, "control from outside" is a favorite term  of  Rabin  and
other  Labor  stalwarts,  in  use  from  before  the  June   1992
elections.

Actually the plan was formulated already in 1977 by Ariel  Sharon
and it was then described in the Hebrew press in detail. At  that
time Sharon was still "only" an Agriculture minister.  Rabin  and
Peres, fresh from their  defeat  in  the  1977  elections  didn't
object to the plan, but  Begin  and  Weizman,  (Defense  minister
1977-1980) did, since they assigned  higher  priority  to  making
peace with Egypt. When Begin began to lose his sanity and  Sharon
became Defense minister, the highest priority was assigned to the
invasion of Lebanon. To the best of my knowledge, the plan  under
current implementation has since remained  the  Israeli  Security
System's "preferable solution" to "the problem"  of  Palestinians
in the Territories. According to the information available in the
Hebrew press, the plan began to be implemented in the Gaza  Strip
right after Oslo. Reinhart quotes press sources showing  that  in
the West Bank the beginnings of its implementation date from July
1994, when in an amicable meeting  Rabin  agreed  with  the  Gush
Emunim leaders "who explained to him  that  construction  of  the
bypassing roads lay in a common interest of  the  government  and
the Jewish settlers. And at the same time Rabin was told the same
by [the then Chief of Staff] Barak". The  plan  was  welcomed  by
Gush Emunim leaders in  their  internal  writings,  but  attacked
whenever they addressed the general public. According to  general
Biran (ibid.) the plan "was intended to  give  the  settlers  the
full opportunity to live a normal life. I take this  occasion  to
stress that no Jewish settlement whatsover will ever  be  removed
from its place. In order to achieve this goal the Israeli army is
now implementing a number of plans, such as the  construction  of
the bypassing roads and  of  a  separate  electricity  and  water
networks intended to guarantee that each Jewish  settlement  will
have maximum security and welfare".

Reinhart provides a sophisticated but  in  my  view  insufficient
explanation of why the apartheid-like "Rainbow  of  Colors"  plan
was welcomed by the "Peace Now" and by most of  both  Jewish  and
Palestinian "peace camp". All too clearly, the plan  favored  the
settlers and was intended to perpetuate the Israeli  conquest  of
the Territories more effectually than  before  by  "control  from
outside". Yet  "Peace  Now"  extolled  this  racist  plan  as  "a
positive sign of implementation of the peace  process",  and  its
leaders rushed to convince Arafat  in  Gaza  about  its  virtues.
Noting that the settlers and  all  the  right-wing  censured  the
"Rainbow of  Colors"  plan  as  "selling  out  the  Land  to  the
Gentiles", Reinhart observes that  "the  religious  settlers  and
Likud had long ago discovered a  panaceum  for  neutralizing  the
left. As soon as they attack the government, the doves of various
persuasions stand to  attention  ready  to  help  the  government
pursue the 'peace process'. The result is that the supporters  of
a plan devised by the settlers can pass for 'peace  lovers'.  The
more one insists that the government speeds up carrying out  this
plan in the whole of the  West  Bank,  the  more  reputation  for
'peace loving' he acquires. And whoever dares to oppose this plan
is instantly censured by the doves for 'sabotaging the peace' and
branded as one of those  'extremists  from  both  sides'  who  by
virtue of  opposing  Rabin's  policies  is  'objectively  against
peace'".

This explanation is correct  on  a  tactical  level.  It  clearly
points out how the Oslo process in effect advanced the  cause  of
the Israeli apartheid, by virtue of making it possible  to  brand
every Jewish or Palestinian  opponent  of  racism  as  "enemy  of
peace". Yet in my view Reinhart, like many other Jewish leftists,
misses the main point. I wholeheartedly agree with her  prognosis
of the effects of the "Rainbow of Colors" upon the  Palestinians.
She writes: "The meaning of the plan is that we  will  solve  the
problem  of  2  million  Palestinians  in  the   Territories   by
imprisoning them in ghettoes, starving them and turning them into
beggars. But instead of  calling  it  'an  occupation',  we  will
present it as a step toward a  Palestinian  state.  We  will  pry
Palestinian throats with our boots while smiling to them nicely".
[A clear allusion to Shimon Peres,  I.  Shahak.]  But  the  point
which Reinhart misses is that Labor's version  of  Jewish  racism
has always been much more hypocritical and hence  more  dangerous
than Likud's, but also more noxious in terms of actual oppressing
of its victims. I will return to this point below.

Meron Benvenisti's presentation (Haaretz, April 27) is similar to
Reinhart's. He also derides the Zionist doves who support Israeli
brutalities committed after Oslo in general and the  "Rainbow  of
Colors" in particular, while  reassuring  the  Palestinians  that
these are means conducive to the  Palestinian  state,  "at  first
only in the Gaza Strip". Benvenisti says that "far from promoting
justice, peace or progress, a world-view reduced to  establishing
a state as its single goal cannot but  be  empty,  deceitful  and
conforming  to  Israeli  interests.  Now,  when  the  Palestinian
Authority  already  has  an  autonomous  authority  in   domestic
affairs, its corruption  and  arbitrariness  in  the  Gaza  Strip
cannot stand in greater contrast from the ideals of human freedom
and dignity, and from the struggle  against  deprivation.  Hence,
even if Israel grants Arafat a semblance of a  state,  no  relief
can be expected in the  conditions  of  oppression,  control  and
exploitation. Such conditions were dictated by Israel  to  Arafat
in the Oslo and Cairo Accords. This is why no conceivable  change
of labels may prompt the Palestinian population to  ideologically
identify with Arafat's regime". Benvenisti says that  Israel  may
possibly agree to  Arafat's  statehood,  but  only  in  order  to
present it as a "seeming concession  enabling  Israel  to  demand
from  the  Palestinians  in   return   'more   flexibility',   in
acquiescing to the perpetuation of the Israeli colonial rule over
the Territories". I don't think the Labor  government  will  ever
agree to independent Palestinian state, even in  the  Gaza  Strip
alone. The talk about such a prospect was no more than a  typical
ploy by Shimon  Peres,  intended  to  extract  from  Arafat  more
compliance with Israeli demands. Had Labor intended to  establish
a Palestinian state, it would  have  exploited  it  in  the  fast
approaching Israeli election campaign. Moreover, Rabin would have
sought to justify it in his numerous Passover Eve interviews. Yet
the Israeli government has done nothing in order to  explain  and
justify such a policy change to the Israeli public.

To describe the  aims  of  the  "Rainbow  of  Colors"  apartheid,
Benvenisti speaks, in my view all too  cogently,  of  "conceptual
ethnic  cleansing  i.e.  of  erasing  the   others   from   one's
consciousness. It cannot be attributed to  chance  that  the  so-
called 'peace process with the Palestinians' is in Jewish society
accompanied by  an  unusually  high  incidence  of  ethnocentrism
approaching racism, of  tribal  forms  of  morality  and  of  the
failure to distinguish between the moral right to exist  and  the
moral obligation to behave decently". Among Benvenisti's examples
of such "incidence", a particularly outrageous (at  least  in  my
view)  was  the  imposition  of  a  round-the-clock   curfew   on
Palestinians of Hebron so  as  to  let  the  visitors  of  Jewish
settlers "hold a picnic", and roam around  the  city  in  perfect
safety. For a single day during the Passover week  the  city  was
for this purpose filled up with troops: a circumstance which  let
the picnickers exult over Palestinians confined in  their  houses
and throw stones at them, especially if their dared to  look  out
from their windows. The whole thing was intended as a  concession
of Rabin to Gush Emunim. It nevertheless failed  to  prevent  the
latter to use the day for the grossest forms  of  abuse  of  what
they  call  "the  government  of  wickedness",  including  public
prayers to God to "abolish it quickly".

Benvenisti concludes, rightly in my view, that "the Oslo process,
the resultant ideology of segregation and the resultant  security
considerations are intended to vest  [Israeli]  ethnic  cleansing
with an aura of respectability. Sure, my use of that term may  be
viewed as a manifestation of extremism compared to its usual  use
as an elegant term for expulsions and mass  murders.  But  in  my
view ethnic cleansing may also be more limited in time. A closure
of the Territories or a curfew intended  to  cleanse  the  public
space from the presence of "others" are perfect examples of  such
conceptual ethnic cleansing limited in time".

Danny Rabinovitz (Haaretz, April 25), whom I am  going  to  quote
extensively, tries to capture the difference between the  Israeli
right- wing and Rabin and his supporters. "The  right-wing  would
have liked that Israeli troops would have reentered Gaza  [Strip]
so as to let Israel itself deal with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.
In contrast, Rabin and his Jewish supporters are worshipping  the
Moloch of segregation  and  dream  about  creating  a  tough  and
sophisticated Palestinian Authority capable of eradicating terror
and thus letting the  Jews  live  in  perfect  security.  On  the
surface, these may seem two very different approaches, not merely
to the problem of terror but also to the solution of the  Jewish-
Palestinian conflict. On one side the nostalgic right-wing vision
of 'Greater Israel' and on the  other  'Pax  Israeliana'  of  the
humanistic and peace-loving left. On closer inspection,  however,
what may be called 'Rabin's vision' may make one  wonder  whether
the difference between the left and the right  on  those  fateful
issues is really that great. What will be the meaning  of  peace,
if Arafat accepts the current Israeli  proposals  and  becomes  a
guardian of security  of  the  Jews  by  successfully  trying  to
eradicate the extremists in the Gaza [Strip]? This was  precisely
the nightmare of  the  Palestinian  opponents  of  Oslo,  whether
religious or secular. They feared that what went under  the  name
of 'the peace process' was to be nothing more than  a  change  in
forms of the  Israeli  military  conquest  from  a  cruel  but  a
temporary regime, into a durable form of political  and  economic
enslavement, not only more oppressive but also more perpetual".

Let me omit Rabinovitz's historical analysis of Arafat's role  as
a linchpin in  the  long  succession  of  the  Ottoman,  British,
Jordanian and Israeli "mukhtars" [village headmen],  granted  the
security of tenure together with opportunities  for  exploitation
of others, in exchange for being responsible to "the authorities"
for  guaranteeing   good   behavior   of   people   under   their
jurisdiction. Currently, says Rabinovitz, "Rabin wants Arafat  to
become Israel's  'rais'  [headman  or  contractor  in  Arabic  or
Hebrew] for security of Jewish lives,  threatening  that  in  the
event  of  his  failure  in  this  task,  Israel  will  stop  the
negotiations, impose a perpetual closure of the  Territories  and
stop the flow of money  from  the  Western  states.  However,  if
Arafat performs his job as required, Rabin  will  reward  him  by
granting him the security of tenure as a Mukhtar...  It  is  true
that Rabin has decisively  opted  against  militaristic  form  of
colonialism, but what the  [Israeli]  left  proposes  instead  is
nothing  less  than   a   neo-colonialist   form   of   perpetual
domination...

"It is still unclear whether Arafat  wants  to  fight  Hamas  and
whether he believes that he can defeat it. But Arafat can  defeat
Hamas only in a way which guarantees his  stay  in  power  as  an
Israeli puppet heading the crowds of his secret police agents,  a
sort of a  Palestinian  Antoine  Lahad  responsible  for  another
'security zone'. In such a case it may be  possible  to  maintain
Arafat in power with the help of money from  Western  states  and
other means Israel would take to maintain him in  power.  But  in
such a case  Arafat  cannot  be  expected  to  deliver  political
benefits which  only  a  legitimate  leadership  with  a  popular
mandate could deliver. This is why  the  difference  between  the
respective solutions of [Israeli] left and right do not  seem  to
be so great. The right-wing solution is cruder, more violent  and
more short-sighted of the two, whereas the  leftist  solution  is
better adapted to current  international  fashions.  But  neither
succeeds in protecting us from the cold wind entering through the
tear and wear in the cloak, so hastily  patched  up  in  Oslo  in
order to keep us cozily warm".

Those developments could have been predicted (and  have  in  fact
been predicted in my reports) by those who took  the  trouble  to
analyze the actual Zionist policies pursued since the 1920s,  and
after 1967 in the Territories. Let me begin with  Israel  itself.
The laws of the State of Israel pertaining to the use of land are
based on the principle of discrimination  against  all  non-Jews.
The State of Israel has turned most of the land in Israel  (about
92%) into "state land". After those lands are defined as owned by
the State of Israel they can be leased for long periods  only  to
Jews. The right to a long-term lease of such land  is  denied  to
all non- Jews without a single exception. This denial is enforced
by placing all state lands under the administration by the Jewish
National Fund, a branch of the World Zionist Organization,  whose
racist statutes forbid their long-term lease, or any  other  use,
to  non-  Jews.  Their  lease  to  Jews,  conditioned  upon   the
prohibition of sub-lease to non-Jews, is granted for  the  period
of 49 years with an automatic renewal for another 49 year period.
Consequently, they are treated as property and are  bought,  sold
and mortgaged, provided the party to  the  deal  is  Jewish.  The
small and decreasing number of cases of  leasing  state  land  to
non-Jews for grazing is never for more than 11 months.  A  Jewish
leasee of state land is allowed, often  subsidized  or  otherwise
encouraged, to develop the land and especially to build  a  house
for himself there, but non-Jewish leasee is  strictly  prohibited
to do so. Leasing state land to a non-Jew is  always  accompanied
by  restrictive  conditions,   such   as   the   prohibition   of
construction or  any  other  development  or  sub-leasing  it  to
somebody else. By  the  way,  membership  of  all  kibbutzim  and
moshavim (whose supposed "socialist" or "utopian" character is so
stridently advertized outside Israel) is strictly limited to Jews
by virtue of their being all located on state land. Non- Jews who
desire to become members of  a  kibbutz,  even  a  kibbutz  whose
Jewish members are atheists, must convert to Judaism. The kibbutz
movements, in cooperation with the Israeli Chief  Rabbinate,  are
keeping special training facilities for preparing "easy", (i.e in
most cases fake) conversions to Judaism for such people.

As a consequence the Galilee can be  described  as  the  land  of
apartheid. Palestinian localities are  bursting  with  population
growth but are surrounded by state land which they cannot use  it
in order to expand. The town of Sakhnin in the Galilee, inhabited
by about 25,000 Palestinians, is surrounded from three  sides  by
state land allotted to three kibbutzim founded in 1970s  for  the
express purpose to "guard state land" from  "Arab  encroachment".
Those kibbutzim are  in  every  respect  failures.  The  original
members had long ago left them and so did their  successors,  but
new Jewish volunteers (mostly from the "peace  camp")  are  being
sent there all the time. Those kibbutzim receive huge  subsidies,
both from the Israeli government and from the Jewish Agency  i.e.
ultimately from tax-free contributions  of  Jews  all  around  of
world. No one proposes,  even  for  the  sake  of  efficiency  or
winning support of the Palestinians for the peace  process,  that
even the tiniest part of state land around Sakhnin be allotted to
non-Jews of that town. Obviously,  an  ideological  consideration
overrides all political  considerations,  like  in  religion  the
sacred always overrides the profane.

There are many states  which  in  the  past  were  systematically
engaged in land robbery. The USA, for example, robbed the Indians
of  their  land,  transforming  most  of  it  into  state   land.
Nevertheless, this land is now  available  for  use  by  any  USA
citizen. If a Jew were  in  the  USA  prohibited  to  lease  land
belonging to the state only because he were Jewish, this would be
rightly interpreted  as  anti-Semitism.  But  anti-  Semitism  is
already considered in the USA  disreputable,  whereas  in  Israel
"Zionism" is the official state-ideology and is indoctrinated  as
a goal of public education. Of course, the land issue is no  more
that a single  (but  crucial)  example  of  official  racism  and
discrimination against the  non-Jews.  But  racism  pervades  all
walks of life in Israel,  victimizing  mainly  the  Palestinians.
Some Zionists recently want to  alleviate  its  effects,  but  no
Zionist party nor Zionist politician has ever proposed to abolish
it or had second thoughts  about  its  underlying  ideology.  The
whole discriminatory system is obviously intended to be practiced
in the foreseeable future.

It is easy to see that by the rigorous enforcement of such  laws,
also against most  loyal  supporters  of  the  state,  Israel  is
undermining its own imperial and military power. Let me give  two
instances  of  this.  The  first  concerns  the  Druzes  who,  as
discussed in report 153, are serving in the Israeli army,  police
and intelligence, often reaching high ranks  in  those  services.
They are nevertheless legally barred from use of the  state  land
and as non-Jews they suffer from  other  discriminatory  laws  as
well. The same can be said about other  Palestinians  who  either
serve in the above mentioned  security  services  or  reach  high
ranks in various  branches  of  civil  service,  for  example  as
judges. Israel had appointed Palestinians to be its  consuls  and
other diplomatic representatives.  It  is  now  contemplating  an
appointment  of  the  first   Palestinian   ambassador.   But   a
Palestinian general, ambassador or judge is still subject to  the
discussed discriminatory laws. He still does not have  the  right
to lease even a small plot of state land,  whereas  any  released
Jewish murderer has this right as matter of course.

Right now, Palestinians may or may  not  perceive  themselves  as
victims of Israeli discrimination. Many of them are too mystified
by their feudal mindset to perceive it clearly. If anything, that
mindset dictates to them an almost  exclusive  concern  with  the
loss of ancestral property. But their eventual  modernization  is
inevitable. It  is  anticipated  even  by  the  Israeli  "Arabist
experts" who are no fools. As soon as it comes, the  Palestinians
are bound to perceive themselves first and foremost as victims of
Israeli legal discrimination, applied against them by  virtue  of
their being non-Jews. When this  occurs,  Israel's  domestic  and
international position can be expected to become highly unstable.
Some Israeli decision-makers can be presumed to be aware  of  it.
It can even be presumed that a major reason of the  Oslo  process
was the hope (common for Israel and Arafat) to arrest the process
of Palestinian society's change by using force to refeudalize it.
But the  Israeli  experts  must  know  that  the  probability  of
arresting social change is very low, at least within  Israel.  In
other  words,  Israel  as  an  imperial   power   is   not   even
contemplating to adapt itself to changing circumstances in a  way
other imperial powers did with success. To return  to  the  Druze
case: even if brigadier-general (reserves) Muhammad  Kana'an  who
performed to perfection the duties of military commander  of  the
Gaza Strip during the Intifada and who yet, as a non- Jew  is  as
discriminated against by Israel as  any  other  non-Jew,  is  not
aware of this fact, his sons and sons of other Druze are sure  to
be aware of it in a not so distant a future.

The second example concerns the two  Arab  villages  in  Galilee,
Bir'am and Ikrit. The inhabitants  of  both  are  Christians  who
didn't resist Israeli forces in 1948, and who surrendered as soon
as the Israeli  army  was  approaching.  Their  inhabitants  were
evacuated "for two weeks only", as was solemnly promised  in  the
capitulation accord signed by the Israeli army. After two  weeks,
however, the army reneged on its promise.  In  1951  the  Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the villagers' return,  but  its  verdict
was soon overruled on  the  basis  of  the  "Defense  Regulations
1945". These  regulations  had  originally  been  passed  by  the
British to be used against the Jews. Before the creation  of  the
State of Israel they were described by some most respected Jewish
legal authorities in Palestine as "Nazilike laws",  or  as  "even
worse than the Nazi laws", because they provided  the  government
with an almost unlimited powers on the  condition  of  exercising
them through the  army.  Begin's  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  Simha
Erlich, quipped that "these Regulations let a general  commanding
the Jerusalem district or a Defense minister surround the Knesset
by tanks and arrest its members with perfect legality". The State
of  Israel  nevertheless  kept  them  in  force,  applying  them,
however, almost exclusively against  non-Jews.  In  the  case  of
Bir'am and Ikrit Ben Gurion's was able to respond to the  Supreme
Court's verdict  by  using  the  "Defense  Regulations  1945"  to
confiscate land belonging to the two villages and by ordering the
Airforce to bomb both villages on Christmas Eve of 1951, with the
adult male villagers rounded up and  forced  to  watch  from  the
nearby hill how their houses  were  being  demolished.  Only  the
churches were spared from destruction: they serve to this day  as
destinations for pilgrimage for the former villagers  who  retain
their  Israeli  citizenship.  The  remainder  of  the  land   was
allocated to kibbutzim and moshavim, with a  "left-wing"  kibbutz
(which even adopted Bir'am's name) receiving a lion's share.  The
Supreme Court  ruled  that  those  confiscations  and  demolition
orders had been perfectly legal.

Nevertheless, the inhabitants of  the  two  villages,  have  been
campaigning till this very day: particularly those of Bir'am  who
are  all  of  Maronite  religion  and   many   quite   right-wing
politically. Rationally speaking, their campaign could have  good
chances to succeed, especially after they solemnly and repeatedly
declared that they didn't demand their farmlands,  but  only  the
church, the neighboring cemetery and a tiny  plot  nearby  to  be
used as a museum. All pragmatic considerations would be in  favor
of accepting their modest request. After all, many of them  serve
in the Israeli police. They have close connections with Maronites
in Lebanon which Israel  had  exploited  before  and  during  its
invasion of Lebanon. Their case  is  supported  by  the  Catholic
Church and other important international bodies. Yet there is  no
chance that their request  may  be  accepted,  least  so  by  the
current "peace government".

For the analysis of Israeli policies in the  era  of  the  "peace
process" it is even more important to recall  that  by  the  time
Oslo Accord was signed Israel had already turned about 70% of the
West Bank land into "state land" which, like in Israel, could  be
leased only to Jews. (By further  confiscations  this  percentage
has after Oslo risen to 72% or 73% but for the  purpose  of  this
report I will use the  round  figure  70%.)  All  the  West  Bank
settlements, being built on this land, are intended only for  the
Jews, who don't even need to be Israeli. The Jews from the entire
world are entitled to settle on  this  land.  Hence  the  Western
media are wrong (possibly even deliberately) in their  persistent
use of the term "Israeli settlements". The fact is  that  a  non-
Jewish  Israeli  citizen,   like   brigadier-general   (reserves)
Muhammad Kana'an, is denied the legal right to  settle  in  these
settlements; and so are  Christians  who  fervently  support  the
cause of "Greater Israel". If we suppose that one day the  Spirit
will command reverend Falwell  or  reverend  Robertson  to  leave
their holy work in the U.S. in order to settle  in  Kiryat  Arba,
they won't be allowed to as non-Jews. But if we suppose that  the
Spirit will command them to convert to Judaism, they will  become
legally eligible to settle in any Jewish  settlement  right  from
the moment their conversion is finalized.  This  is  not  just  a
theoretical possibility, as groups of converts  to  Judaism  from
some obscure tribes in Peru and India have actually been  brought
and settled in the Territories.

On the other hand, there have  been  several  attempts  of  Druze
veterans (some of whom profess very hawkish views) to  apply  for
an allotment of West Bank state land  in  order  to  establish  a
Druze settlement there. All such  requests  were  firmly  denied,
against best Israeli interest.  Moreover,  especially  since  the
inception of the Intifada, Palestinian  collaborators  living  in
fear of death have persistently requested the Israeli authoritues
to let them settle in Jewish settlements of the West  Bank,  even
temporarily. As  some  of  them  argued,  this  would  be  highly
advantageous to Israeli intelligence since they could live  close
to their former homes and be able  to  maintain  to  some  extent
their former contacts. Yet again, all such requests  were  firmly
denied. After Oslo Israel had to remove some  collaborators  from
the West Bank and settle them in Israel. But even  then,  instead
of allotting them any state  land,  it  rented  private  land  or
private housing for the purpose.

Let me return to the West Bank land issue. Of  70%  of  its  land
which became state land, only 16% has actually been allocated  to
Jewish settlements. The remaining 54% stand empty. It needs to be
acknowledged that removing Jewish settlements, or perhaps even  a
single one of  them,  may  well  give  rise  to  grave  political
problems, including the risk of  armed  clashes  which  may  even
escalate into a civil war. (Such  dangers  have  been  repeatedly
discussed in my reports.) But the prospect of returning  some  or
even the whole of the 54% of the not yet settled state land  back
to the Palestinian peasants carries only minimal risks. It  could
have been done easily during the first  6-8  months  after  Oslo.
Since the attachment of the Palestinians, (not only the  peasants
but of the entire nation) to the land is profound, and the  well-
justified fear of being driven away from  it  palpable,  one  can
easily imagine the effect of an even partial restitution  of  the
empty 54% of the West Bank land  on  the  Palestinian  masses.  A
better way of  binding  Palestinian  public  opinion  to  Israeli
interests served by the Oslo and Cairo Accords  could  hardly  be
imagined.

The same is true for the Gaza Strip. If  anything,  its  case  is
more glaring because the number of Jewish settlers  there,  5,000
when the Oslo Accord was signed, increased since to about  8,000,
is incommensurably smaller than the number of Jewish settlers  in
the West Bank, 130,000 when the Oslo Accord was signed, increased
since to  about  160,000,  East  Jerusalem  excluded.  Also,  the
proportion of Jewish settlers to Palestinians in the  Gaza  Strip
(officially 800,000, in  reality  about  million)  is  completely
different in scale than the proportion of the  West  Bank  Jewish
settlers to West Bank Palestinians (officially  about  1.200,000,
in reality about 1.300,000 excluding East Jerusalem.)  Yet  about
28% of the  Strip's  area  duly  converted  to  state  land,  was
allotted to Jewish settlers  long  before  Oslo  and  after  Oslo
withheld from the autonomy's jurisdiction. Also in the  Strip  no
empty state land was restored to Palestinian  ownership.  In  the
case of the Gaza Strip I don't know the proportion of  the  empty
to the settled state lands, but I do know that the former  exist.
In the single case of settlement of  Netzarim  (whose  residents,
far from doing any farming, are for  the  most  part  engaged  in
studying Talmud), detailed maps have been published in the Hebrew
press (for example, Haaretz, April 10). The  maps  show  a  large
land area attached to that settlement, necessarily empty  but  of
course denied to the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, Rabin  hasn't  even  contemplated  giving  back  to
Palestinian peasants, or even to the Palestinian Authority, a few
symbolic dunums of the state land  around  Netzarim.  True,  some
Zionist "peaceniks" are  advocating  the  removal  of  the  whole
settlement of Netzarim as causing loss of too many Jewish  lives.
As mentioned above, this  is  regarded  as  a  factor  which  may
temporarily override ideological considerations. But  no  Zionist
"peace lover" has as yet advocated the return of an  empty  state
land for the sake of a mere  political  advantage.  This  can  be
generalized. The peace process was "sold" to Israeli Jews  public
not only as an effectual means of  guaranteeing  their  security,
but also as a potential for profits from trade with  Arab  states
expected in its wake to expand. Nevertheless, just as in the case
discussed above, no Zionist has ever dared to  propose  that  the
ideology  of  discriminating  against  non-Jews   be   for   once
sacrificed for the sake of advancing the Oslo  process  and  thus
enhancing  Israel's  power  and  wealth.  To  the  best   of   my
recollection,  Israel  (or  Zionist  Movement   before   Israel's
inception) has never sacrificed its  ideology  on  the  altar  of
merely political considerations or economic interests.

In other words, empirical evidence (valid as anything in politics
can  be  valid)  shows  that  Israeli  policies   are   primarily
ideologically motivated and that the ideology by which  they  are
motivated is totalitarian in nature. This ideology can be  easily
known since it is enshrined in the writings of  the  founders  of
Labor Zionism, and it can be easily inferred from  Israeli  laws,
regulations and pursued policies. Those  who,  like  Arafat,  his
henchmen and most Palestinian  intellectuals,  have  through  all
these years failed to make an intellectual  effort  to  seriously
study this ideology, have only  themselves  to  blame  for  being
stunned by all the developments of  the  20  months  after  Oslo.
Whoever after Oslo stopped denouncing Israeli  "imperialism"  for
the sake of a meaningless  "peace  of  the  brave"  slogan,  only
showed that he learned nothing and forgot nothing. Their  blunder
is all the greater since Israel has by no means  been  unique  in
pursuing ideologically determined  policies.  Strict  ideological
considerations determine policies in plenty  of  other  past  and
present states. In other cases an  ideology  underlying  a  given
policy,  however,  is  not  only  openly  admitted  by  a   state
concerned, but also well-known and discussed beyond its  borders.
Israel  is  indeed  unique  in  that  the  discriminatory  Jewish
ideology dictating its policies is hardly ever  discussed  beyond
its borders, due to  the  fear  of  offending  the  Jews  of  the
diaspora and of being labelled by their powerful organizations as
an "anti-Semite" or "Jewish self-hater".  At  the  same  time  in
Israel the ideology of discriminating against all non-Jews is not
only openly admitted  but  also  advocated  as  guaranteeing  the
character of Israel as a "Jewish state" mandated to preserve  its
"Jewish   character".   The   Jewish   supporters   of    Israeli
discriminatory practices freely admit  that  they  thus  want  to
preserve the "Jewish character" of Israel, conceived of  by  them
and by the majority of Israeli  Jews,  as  legacy  of  historical
Judaism. Indeed, if  we  overlook  the  modern  times,  there  is
sufficient truth in this claim. Until the advent of modern  times
all Jews firmly believed that non-Jews  should  be  discriminated
against whenever possible. It  now  turns  out  that  the  Jewish
Enlightenment failed to change the attitudes of all,  or  perhaps
even of most, Jews in this respect. Many  completely  irreligious
Jews still believe that for the sake of the Jewish religious  law
and tradition which commanded to discriminate  the  non-Jews  the
latter should be discriminated in  the  "Jewish  state"  forever.
This is professed in  spite,  or  perhaps  even  because  of  the
undeniable fact that this discrimination has the  same  character
as that which the anti-Semites want to apply against the Jews.

In the light of the  impact  of  the  ideology  upon  the  actual
Israeli  policies  the  critiques  of  the  latter  by  Reinhart,
Benvenisti and Rabinovitz discussed  at  the  beginning  of  this
report are valid, yet in one crucial respect inadequate. For  all
their superiority to the "experts in Israeli  affairs"  from  the
Western press, the named  authors  seem  always  puzzled  by  the
policies Israel  is  pursuing.  They  never  cease  offering  the
Israeli government "good advice"  of  how  it  can  gain  in  its
relations with  the  Arabs  by  "being  moderate".  Analysis  and
experience show that  offering  such  an  advice  amounts  to  an
exercise in futility. Numerous  historical  analogies,  including
the  recent  collapse  of  Communist  regimes  in  Europe,   show
conclusively that a real change is impossible as long as a  party
representing no matter how flexibly a  state  ideology  stays  in
power. In Israel power is firmly in  the  hand  of  the  Security
System and of the Zionist parties whose deep  commitment  to  the
Zionist ideology has not been challenged. On the other hand,  the
mentioned analogies show that once the power of a state  ideology
is challenged in public, it means that a real change  is  on  its
way. Eventually, such  a  change  may  materialize  by  a  sudden
disintegration of the state  ideology  and  the  state  apparatus
supporting it. This is what happened  since  the  late  1970s  in
Poland. KOR and Solidarity which challenged the ideological basis
of the state were the true harbingers of the fall of  the  entire
European communism; whereas the plethora of  reforms  imposed  by
the Polish Communist party from above amounted to  no  more  than
palliatives which changed nothing. The Israeli ideology which has
been only slightly undermined in the  period  of  1974-1993,  has
been again revitalized in the  aftermath  of  Oslo.  Due  to  its
social cohesiveness, military and particularly nuclear power  and
the increasing support of the U.S. Israel feels  at  present  too
strong to offer  even  palliative  concessions  to  Palestinians.
Under those conditions ideological considerations can  remain  to
be predominant, except when Jewish lives are lost.

From high abstraction let me again pass  to  concretes.  Omitting
facts already presented in report 151, let me now  show  how  the
actual Israeli policies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank  draw
from the ideology of  continuous  discrimination  by  means  more
effectual than beforehand. Let me first deal with the Gaza Strip.
Detailed maps of the Strip often published by  the  Hebrew  press
(but never by the Palestinian  press!)  show  how  it  is  criss-
crossed by "military roads"  which  according  to  Cairo  Accords
remain under Israeli jurisdiction.  Those  roads  are  constantly
patrolled by the Israeli army, either separately or jointly  with
the Palestinian police. The Israeli army has the right  to  close
any section of any such road to all Palestinian traffic, even  if
it runs deep within the autonomy, and it actually uses this right
after any Palestinian assault. For example,  Haaretz  (April  11)
reported that the Israeli army closed "until further notice"  two
road sections  deep  inside  the  autonomy  "to  all  Palestinian
vehicles" after two assaults which  occurred  two  days  earlier.
Appended to the report was a map showing the Strip's  roads.  One
of them, called "Gaza city bypassing road", traverses the  entire
length of the Strip, carefully bypassing the cities  and  refugee
camps. A military road and a narrow strip of land not included in
the autonomy cuts it off from Egypt. A number of  parallel  roads
traverse the Strip's autonomous area from the Israeli  border  on
its east side to the sea or a  Jewish  settlement  block  on  the
west. All authorized entry points to the autonomy are located  at
the beginning of military roads.

One such road is the Netzarim road. It begins  at  an  authorized
entry point to the autonomy at  Nahal  Oz.  From  there  it  runs
westward, skirting all Palestinian localities. After crossing the
"Gaza city bypassing road" it reaches Netzarim. It does  not  end
there, however, but continues to a military fortress on  the  sea
shore. It thus cuts the Gaza Strip into two parts.  A  sector  of
that road which approaches Netzarim is closed to all  Palestinian
traffic. The obvious effect  of  that  closure  is  to  encourage
Hamas' assaults, as there is no risk that a  Palestinian  vehicle
may be hit there by mistake. This case is the  best  illustration
of the extent to which an ideological consideration can  override
even elementary security precautions!

The overall effect is that the autonomous part of the Gaza  Strip
is sliced into enclaves controlled by the  bypassing  roads.  The
role of the Jewish settlements is not only to guard  state  land,
but also to serve as pivots of the road grid devised to ensure  a
perpetual Israeli control of the  Strip  under  a  new  and  more
effectual form. This new form of control, referred  to  by  Rabin
and other Labor politicians as "control from outside" allows  the
army to dominate the Strip (and to reconquer it  with  a  minimum
effort if need be) without having to commit  large  manpower  for
constant patrolling and pacifying the Strip's towns  and  refugee
camps "from inside". The latter task is now being  undertaken  on
Israel's behalf by various uniformed  and  secret  polices  under
Arafat's command.

Let me proceed to discussing the  West  Bank.  The  task  of  the
"Rainbow of Colors" is to eventually produce results  similar  to
those already existing in the  Gaza  Strip.  The  conditions  may
there even turn out  worse,  due  to  a  much  larger  number  of
settlers and  to  the  extensive  construction  of  the  separate
networks  of  roads,  electricity  and  water  supplies  for  the
settlers which cannot but pass near or  through  the  Palestinian
enclaves. (In the Gaza Strip, with few exceptions electricity and
water for the settlers are supplied either from  Israel  or  from
the sites close to settlements.) Moreover, the West Bank includes
the "Greater Jerusalem" area in which the apartheid is  practiced
more strictly  than  elsewhere.  "Greater  Jerusalem"  officially
extends from Ramallah to the  south  of  Bethlehem,  but  in  the
future it can be assumed to grow. To make the matters  worse,  as
mentioned in report 151, the Palestinians  from  the  Territories
are to be forever barred from crossing  to  Israel.  Their  labor
force is instead to be employed in "industrial  parks"  exporting
mostly to the U.S. Even at its worst South African apartheid  was
not as all-inclusive as what is planned for  the  West  Bank  and
what already exists in the Gaza Strip.

How  come  the  experts  of   the   Israeli   government   expect
acquiescence to this situation on the part  of  the  Palestinians
(including the Israeli citizens among them,  whose  influence  in
Knesset can be considerable) and on  the  part  of  international
public opinion? The two questions seem to have a  single  answer.
Israeli experts and the government apparently anticipate to  make
those realities palatable for both as  long  as  Israel  confines
itself only to "control from  outside",  while  leaving  "control
from inside", (i.e. the job of actually enforcing order)  in  the
hands of Israel's Palestinian  proxies  who  will  be  granted  a
semblance of an independent authority. (I am not going to discuss
international public opinion separately, because  Latin  American
and African precedents make me convinced that the response of the
world at large to the "control from inside" will be as  tame  and
as acquiescent as in Palestine.) Much  as  I  abhor  the  Israeli
government's plans on moral grounds, this anticipation strikes me
as well-grounded. After all, a  large  majority  of  Palestinians
have tamely acquiesced to the numerous violations of human rights
committed directly by Arafat's regime in the Gaza  Strip  and  by
his secret polices in the West  Bank.  (The  potentially  violent
dispute between Arafat and Hamas is about power rather than about
human or any other rights.)

The utmost the Palestinian opposition to  Arafat  is  capable  of
doing, is  to  send  loyal  petitions  to  "His  Excellency,  the
President", in which he is humbly requested  to  reconsider  such
and such a decision of his. While a death of a Palestinian  under
interrogation carried out  by  Israeli  Shabak  continues  to  be
fiercely resented, a death of a Palestinian  under  interrogation
carried out by Palestinian Shabak elicits  only  polite  requests
for "an investigation". If "His Excellency"  agrees  to  open  an
investigation, he is complimented by everybody concerned: even if
the promised "investigation" does  not  materialize  for  months.
Quite numerous instances of killing the Palestinians by  Arafat's
forces, let alone the routine beatings and humiliations pass with
hardly a notice. Even a sentence of  death  recently  imposed  by
Arafat's military court failed to provoke an outrage, and nothing
indicated a prospect of an outrageous response if it is  actually
carried out.

Let me give a concrete example. When John Major visited Arafat in
Gaza, a Palestinian policeman killed a child aged 11. The killing
was,  of  course,  officially  described  as  an  "accident";  an
"investigation" (which hasn't  yet  materialized)  was  promised,
exactly as had been customary when Israel had controlled the Gaza
Strip "from inside". But in terms of the impact  of  the  child's
death on the Palestinian public in general and on the  Gazan  one
in particular the contrast couldn't be  greater.  Under  Arafat's
rule, John Major's  visit  continued  undisturbed.  The  official
explanation of  "accidental  death"  was  accepted  by  everyone,
except for the child's family. In the end even the  family,  when
firmly ordered "to shut its mouth" by Palestinian secret  police,
did so, whereas since  the  inception  of  the  Intifada  similar
Israeli orders had been ignored. There were  none  of  the  usual
protests which had used to occur in the Strip when  a  child  had
been killed by an Israeli soldier.

This is the place to recall that the  standard  of  life  in  the
Strip has decreased by about 60% since Arafat arrived  there.  Of
course, the main responsibility for  this  state  of  affairs  is
Israel's,  although  Arafat's  contribution  to  it  through  his
corruption and inefficiency  shouldn't  be  overlooked.  But  the
point I am trying to make is not at all  economic.  To  keep  the
Palestinians as poor as  possible  has  always  been  an  aim  of
Israeli policy, in my view also in order to arrest social  change
in their society. With Arafat's complicity Israel now can achieve
this aim without  eliciting  any  strong  protests,  and  without
spending much of its manpower on suppressing  such  protests.  In
other words, it  can  impoverish  the  Palestinians  cheaply  and
effectually. Bureaucracies tend to believe that  their  successes
can be stretched indefinitely, and the Israeli Security System is
no exception. No wonder it believes that if a solution tested  in
the Gaza Strip has worked well there, it  would  also  work  well
when "Rainbow  of  Colors"  is  implemented  in  the  West  Bank.
Likewise, the Security  System  probably  believes  that  if  the
Palestinian uniformed and secret polices obey Arafat's orders  so
faithfully, they  will  continue  to  do  so  when  commanded  by
somebody else.

Those hypotheses about the Israeli  Security  System's  modes  of
thinking can be confirmed by facts. For example, while much  land
is now being confiscated in the West  Bank  for  the  purpose  of
constructing the bypassing roads, there  have  been  few  if  any
popular protests against those confiscations. The protests of the
Palestinian Authority against the recent confiscations of land in
East Jerusalem stand in glaring contrast to its silence in  cases
of the much more massive land confiscations  currently  going  on
elsewhere in the West Bank. Danny Rubinstein  (Haaretz,  May  12)
explains that in case  of  Jerusalem  Arafat  is  constrained  to
protest by the leaders of  Arab  and  Muslim  states,  for  whose
publics Jerusalem is a particularly  sensitive  religious  issue.
The same leaders, however, couldn't  care  less  about  the  West
Bank. Rubinstein reports that "many delegations  from  West  Bank
localities came recently to Arafat. Their grievances  were  many,
but they particularly emphasized  that  their  lands  were  being
confiscated. Arafat did his best to  mollify  those  delegations.
For example, a delegation of inhabitants of  [the  town  of]  Al-
Birah, located near  Ramallah,  who  received  land  confiscation
orders  from  Israeli  authorities  intending  to  build  a  road
bypassing their town to serve the  needs  of  the  settlement  of
Psagot, recently requested Arafat  to  intervene  to  make  these
orders annulled. One delegate told  me  how  stunned  he  was  by
Arafat's response. Arafat told them: 'Forget this matter. This is
only a minor confiscation. It is preferable  to  have  this  land
confiscated than Psagot settlers driving through  your  town  and
causing trouble. Owing to this confiscation, the settlers will at
least be able to bypass your town'". Rubinstein says that  Arafat
is giving such "advice whenever he fears that his  opposition  to
an Israeli measure may result in cancellation of his negotiations
with Israel". I can confirm Rubinstein's view by information from
my own sources, both Israeli and Palestinian. Moreover,  Arafat's
"advice" works, because it is backed by the  people's  fright  of
his thugs. This is why most attempts to organize popular protests
against the confiscation of land have been stifled. Israel cannot
expect a support for its apartheid policies more  effectual  than
Arafat's.

Yet in two factual points I  differ  from  the  Israeli  Security
System's assessments of Arafat's role.  First,  they  ignore  the
impact of Arafat's behavior on Jewish public in Israel. In  order
to let Arafat serve Israeli  interests  effectually  Israel  must
salvage his dwindling prestige among the  Palestinians,  and  for
that purpose leaves him a  considerable  freedom  of  expression,
never granted  Palestinian  collaborators  before.  Arafat  takes
advantage of this privilege to indulge  in  the  most  outrageous
lies and to make the most provocative attacks on  Israel.  As  an
example of the former one can  give  his  oft-repeated  assertion
that Israel  (or  Israeli  army  officers,  or  Shabak's  agents)
conspired with Hamas to carry out the Beit-Lid terror assault. As
an example of the latter one can give his frequent assertion that
the entire Jerusalem (not only its Eastern part) belongs  to  the
Arabs or to the Muslims. While neither Rabin nor  Peres  dare  to
expose Arafat as a liar or to denounce his position on  Jerusalem
as incompatible with that of all  Zionist  parties  (even  Meretz
supports the so-called "unification of  Jerusalem"),  the  Hebrew
press often does so, and  so  do  the  opposition's  politicians.
Rabin's dwindling credibility and popularity can be attributed to
Jewish public's outrage at his condonement of Arafat's  lies  and
antics. To a much greater degree the same is the  case  of  Peres
and the entire Israeli "peace  camp"  which  seem  to  be  losing
whatever political clout they  once  had.  In  other  words,  the
advantages of the "control from outside" are being neutralized by
domestic drawbacks of using Arafat. As  the  1996  elections  are
approaching, the latter factor can  be  assumed  to  increasingly
outweigh the former in importance.

The second  point  where  I  differ  from  the  Israeli  Security
System's  assessments  concerns  the  "Rainbow  of  Colors".  The
Israeli experts assume it can last forever, whereas I think it is
bound  to  be  rather  short-lived.   Even  if   Arafat   commits
indescribable atrocities in smashing all opposition to his  rule,
I doubt if he can keep the Palestinian  population  inside  their
enclaves under his effective control. After all, the facts on the
ground will be all too tangible for  the  Palestinians,  and  the
arguments  of  the  opposition  particularly  of  Hamas,  (unless
destroyed by Arafat's victory in a civil war) will  be  bound  to
undermine Arafat's standing in a relatively short period of time.
So far his attempts to suppress the opposition,  half-hearted  at
best, have alternated with attempts to make a compromise with it.
His oppression can be said to have  intimidated  individuals  and
small groups like the PDFL, but it has made Hamas stronger,  more
influential and more outraged than before. It  is  impossible  to
say whether Arafat will decide to accede to Israel's  demands  to
smash the opposition, or  continue  to  play  the  same  game  of
serving Israel covertly and to  opposing  it  in  words.  In  any
event,  however,  the  Palestinian  masses  see  with  increasing
clarity that their situation is rapidly deteriorating. At present
it is only Arafat's vestigial prestige which prevents  them  from
beginning to organize a popular resistance movement. Once all his
credibility is gone, which may occur quite soon, the only Israeli
alternative for still exercising "control from outside" would  be
through a naked Palestinian  dictatorship,  whether  Arafat's  or
somebody else's. Oppression then unleashed is  bound  to  surpass
anything experienced in the period of "control from inside".

I am fully conscious of the immense human suffering which such an
oppression is bound  to  cause.  Yet  I  do  not  attribute  much
political importance to the question whether it can  succeed  and
for how long. In any event, it  will  mark  the  failure  of  the
"control from outside" scheme as an  easy  and  cheap  method  of
domination,  which   can   be   "sold",   Peres-style,   to   the
international public. In the last analysis  the  failure  of  the
"control from  outside"  cannot  but  mark  the  end  of  Israeli
policies based on the absolute priority of Zionist ideology.

May 1995