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The Utility of 'Muslim Terror' in Israeli-American Relations:
In the 1970s, Arab American academics like Edmund Ghareeb, Jack Shaheen, and Michael Suleiman made strong connections between stereotypes of Arabs in corporate culture and the issue of Palestine. [42] They concluded that in order for the dispossession of Palestinians to bc supported by ordinary Americans, Arabs had to bc written off as either backward barbarians (who don't understand that colonization is in their best interests) or violent terrorists (who deserve to be eliminated). This was a time when no one used the term 'Muslim fundamentalist.' Even the Islamic revolution in Iran was seen as some kind of wild and crazy Persian phenomenon.
At the same time, with the gradual acquiescence of Arab regimes to either American or Israeli demands throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there was a shift from 'Arab terror' to 'Muslim terror.' The infrastructure of imagery, already in place from decades of anti-Arab propaganda, simply had to be transferred to Muslims, the new 'enemies of peace.' In fact, many of the same political problems still persist, but the 'terrorists' are now conceptualized as Muslims, since Arab regimes were now obedient allies. Although the Persian Gulf Oil War was a successful test case for enframing the Muslim world into 'good' and 'bad' parties, Zionist colonization of Palestine still remains one of the core issues contributing to conflict in West Asia.
American scholar Edward S. Herman believes that anti-Muslim racism in US corporate culture is closely related to the issue of Palestine. He sees an 'enormous pro-Israel (and anti-Arab) bias of the mainstream media and intelligentsia,' and gives four sources of this bias:
Israel's strategic value to the US.
the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC.
Western feelings of guilt toward Jews.
anti-Arab racism.
Herman clarifies what he means by anti-Arab racism:
This racism is mainly an effect and reflection of interest and policy rather than a casual factor. . . Arabs who cooperate with the West. . . are not subject to racist epithets and stereotypes. This suggests that if other Arabs were more tractable and responsive to Western demands they would cease to be negatively stereotyped. Scapegoating is a function of power and interest. [43]
While his remarks on anti-Arab racism illustrate my point about the utility of imagery, I want to take another one of Herman's observations-the pervasiveness of the Israeli lobby in framing American policy-and look at the utility of Muslim terror in that context.
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) held a conference on the 'Middle East Peace Process' in Washington DC on 7 May 1995, which was aired live on CSPAN. The guests of honour included US president Bill Clinton and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. In his speech, Rabin warned that 'extremist radical Islamic fundamentalists' are the 'enemies of peace' and that 'Khomeinism without Khomeini is the greatest danger to stability, tranquillity and peace in the Middle East and the world.' The 'scourge of Khomeinism' has replaced the 'scourge of communism,' and even as the Israelis 'consolidate peace with Jordan,' the forces of 'terror' are seeking to 'destroy peace between peoples of our area.' He called for the 'free world,' which successfully mobilized itself against communism, to mobilized itself against 'Khomeinism.' Rabin concluded by stressing that 'only a strong Israel can guarantee stability in the Mideast' and that, therefore, US foreign aid 'must remain a key pillar of the peace process.' But the aid Rabin demands is about more than 'peace' and 'stability.'
Israel cannot survive without continuous transfusions of American dollars, both from US government aid ($4-5 billion in American tax dollars annually), and private contributions, making Israel one of the few states in the world whose economic viability relies almost entirely on foreign donations and charity. (Despite this, it has never been economically viable, with even the World Bank considering Israel to be a weak financial risk.) This is meaningful because recently the US Congress has been threatening to cut foreign aid. While the Cold War provided the impetus for supporting aid for Israel as the ''first line of defense' against the 'communist threat,' it seems that the 'Islamic threat' is now being utilized for the same purpose by Israeli politicians and their proxies in the US Congress.
After Rabin concluded his speech, AIPAC president Steve Grossman introduced US president Bill Clinton by emphasizing that Clinton has raised the 'strategic partnership between the US and Israel to new levels.' Clinton began his speech by emphasizing that the US role in the 'peace process' was to 'minimize the risks taken for peace.' He then noted that Russia's cooperation with Iran was a 'prime concern' of the US because Iran is 'bent on building nuclear weapons.' Clinton ignored another 'prime concern' of people living in the region, the long standing Israeli nuclear weapons programme and its cooperation with South Africa in detonating a several nuclear weapons, or its kidnapping and imprisonment of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli technician who revealed the existence of the long-denied Israeli nuclear weapons programme to the outside world.
Clintons rationale for preventing Iranian-Russian cooperation was that since Iran has 'ample oil reserves' it cannot possibly need nuclear technology for peaceful energy purposes. He warned that while Iran haunts the Mideast,' the US will seek to 'contain Iran as the principle sponsor of terrorism in the world,' reminding his audience that Iran undermines the West and its values.' He also thanked the Israelis for 'drawing our attention to Iran's history of supporting terrorism.' But the utility of this imagery became clearer when Clinton next asked for AIPAC to help out with the floundering American embargo against Iran. American attempts at convincing the Europeans and Japanese to sever their economic ties with Iran have been met with little international support, and he seemed to think the Israelis would have some sway over European politicians.
Clinton stated that US support for Israel was 'absolute' and that all forms of current assistance will be continued.-He chastised the US Congress as a bunch of 'budget cutting back door isolationists' for daring to suggest that the US discontinue its bloated but politically selective foreign aid programs, emphasizing that the US 'did not win the Cold War to blow the peace' on budgetary issues. But the kind of peace that Clinton and his cohorts support is clear from the ensuing promises he made to the AIPAC congregation.
Clinton revealed that the once closed American space launcher vehicle market would now be open to the Israeli arms industry, along with other previously unavailable high-tech US weaponry. He also noted that the US would escalate its pre-positioning of weaponry in Israel, and that it would buy $3 billion worth of Israeli made military products. Since the US already has the largest military-industrial complex in the world, buying weapons from Israel is another thinly disguised form of economic aid.
As with other aid, US taxpayers are slated to foot the bill in the name of 'national security.' Clinton explained the need for all of this wheeling and dealing about war and weapons of mass destruction as necessary because 'Israel is on the front line of the battle for freedom and peace.' Again seeming to assume that they held some sway over public opinion, this time domestically, Clinton suggested that AIPAC help to 'lobby' the American people about budgetary matters.
Israel needs more than military aid. Clinton also assured his audience that the US will continue to support-loan guarantees for the 'settlement of 600,000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union.' This is perhaps the most intractable problem in the Middle East conflict, and one of the main causes of tension, since many Russian emigres are given inducements (and military training) to settle in West Bank areas, in and around Palestinian towns. But in the official conceptualization of this issue, when people who live there resist in any way, they do so because they are inherently 'terrorists,' not because of any machinations of state power. This contradiction is worth a closer look.
Rabin used the word 'terrorist,' and its by product 'terror,' more than 'peace' in his speeches like the one at the AIPAC conference. Bernard Nietschmann attempts to provide clarification of the utility of language used to describe conflict and war. [44] He concludes that most wars and conflicts in the world today are of the state-versus-nation variety, and in most cases the state is able to frame the nation they are trying to subdue as 'terrorists' or 'extremists.' Those states, in many cases clients of larger states like the US, are generally supported by the major Western corporate news media. Nietschmann believes that a term like 'terrorist' is in most cases a non-word in the struggle for normative issues: the aggressors have always provided the definitions of words used to explain their actions. [45] As we have seen above, words provide the climate for actions.
Especially useful is the assertion that 'terrorist' is basically a non- word, because it is always used from a position of power to describe those who struggle against the status quo, or the emerging neo-colonial world order. (One could add to this the term 'fundamentalist,' which came into vogue after the Islamic Revolution in Iran; similarly, the French use 'integriste.') State terminology defines struggles and these terminologies are used to undermine nations that want to have their own vision. More often than not, the nations under state domination are indigenous peoples- Native Americans, Palestinians, South Africans, Australian Aboriginals- who were displaced by European invaders.
Nietschmann reminds his fellow Western political scientists that state systems set up boundaries and that all peoples within those boundaries become subjects. The present historical moment does tell us that states result in hierarchy and violence, that lines on a map make the world, that history has become the history of lines. States define land masses, and most defy logic. The state system serves transnational corporations, which need to bc able to deal with a head man. In addition to facilitating transfer of goods, states also allow use of force within their borders. Usually, the violence is explained as a police action against terrorists, who are portrayed as acting out of some kind of irrational, religious fanaticism. Occasionally, states will even cross borders into another state to attack 'terrorists' without actually declaring war on that state, as in repeated Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon, or the recent Turkish incursions into northern Iraq.
There are parallels to this discussion in US history. When Mexicans resisted US expansion in the 19th century, they were called 'bandits.' Texans had a policy to shoot on sight any bandits, and sometimes marched as far as Mexico City to root out banditry. However, the 'war against banditry' was accompanied by a systematic process of enclosure and depopulation, followed by mass ranch ownership. Within 2 years, over a million acres were conquered, while the 'bandits' were relegated to the realm of American popular culture. Similar stories could be told about racism toward Native Americans. Returning to Berkhofer's discussion of whites stereotyping Native Americans, he notes that warlike images of Indians prevailed when Indians were a threat to US interests, and that the nostalgic images prevailed when they were seen as a vanishing race. When the US was involved with military action against Haiti around the turn of the century, American newspapers featured stories about stereotypical Haitians, drawing upon a previously constructed repertoire of images and tales of cannibalism and barbarous voodoo rituals.
Nietschmann's distinction between 'state' and 'nation' is useful, but it suffers from some glaring omissions, particularly in his list of nation/state conflicts. Israeli incursions into Lebanon since the early 1970s are not mentioned, nor is Indian domination over Kashmir. While the Timorese struggle against the Indonesian state is stressed, the struggle of the Achenese is ignored. These Muslim peoples have been struggling against oppression and domination since the 19th century, first against Dutch imperialism and later against its Indonesian surrogate state. Can the Shi'ites of Iraq and Bahrain (where they are oppressed majorities) and in Saudi Arabia (where they are an oppressed minority) be classified as 'nations'? Or are religious distinctions not acceptable? There are other shortcomings in this short work on a long topic, but the overall point is instructive.
Conventional American public discourse utilizes images of Islamic resistant movements as intolerant and predisposed toward violence. While many contemporary movements do have a strong anti-Western sentiment, it is often qualified and in any case is a fairly recent phenomenon. If Arabs and Muslims are extremists in anything, I believe that it is in the patience and tolerance they have shown toward persistent Western interventions until very recently. Islamic movements have much more important characteristics than intolerance and violence. A central concept is social justice. In the West, where it is fashionable to be anti-social under the pretense that socialism is obsolete, it is easy to overlook calls for social justice and fixate instead on violent struggle. But seeing social movements only in terms of violence, real or imagined, is seeing them only in terms that are important to a narrow set of strategic interests.
I became deeply interested in this line of research around the time of the Persian Gulf Oil War in 1990-91. I was amazed at how readily the government and the corporate news media were able to rally public support for that senseless and destructive war. I was sickened by the grotesqueness of the war and the way academic experts and journalists self-righteously mimicked each other's stereotypes and biases in their inhuman depictions of 'bad' Arabs and Muslims, while slavishly parroting the official public relations-fueled imagery of the 'good' ones. I found it absolutely incredible that the persona of Saddam Hussein could be reworked from loyal proxy, during his murderous war against Iran, to Hitlerian demon after he became too big for his American britches. I thought to myself, Americans must be brain dead if they buy this. Many did. Not content with that as the sole explanation, I set out to see how imagery could be reworked to expedite a shifting political economy. This article is largely about what I found. One of the points I have tried to make is that Western civilization maintains a shifting array of images about Islam and Muslims. These images can be called upon as needed to explain, justify or simplify complex political, social and economic problems, whether they be international or domestic.
http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/default.asp?url=islamicimageryinwest.htm
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