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Suez 1956
by Chris Leininger
The second half of 1956 marked a turning point in the Cold War and the balance of power in the Middle East. On July 26, 1956, Gamel Abd al-Nasser defied the West and nationalized the Suez Canal. This act eventually led to an Israeli-British-French attack on October 29,1956. The Crisis ended quickly with all sides agreeing to a cease-fire November 6,1956. The US found itself in the middle of the Crisis from the moment it began. The US faced the seemingly impossible choice of abandoning its allies or standing on principle. The two men guiding US foreign policy were John Foster Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower. Their handling of the situation, albeit not perfect, showed a depth of understanding not only of the specific crisis but the US position in the Middle East. It has frequently been argued that not only did Dulles initiate the controversy with his renege on the Aswan Dam offer, but that he abandoned our allies and placed NATO in grave danger. I hope to prove that Dulles and Eisenhower were, throughout the Crisis, the only Western voices of reason, Dulles' decision to pull the plug on the Dam was the right thing to do, and that neither man abandoned Britain or France. They responded logically to a legitimate claim by a legitimate power, and Britain and France must shoulder responsibility for the debacle known as the Suez Crisis of 1956.
The Players
In 1952, Nasser helped lead a group of army officers, known as the Free Officers, in a revolutionary coup in Egypt. Their revolution was part of the general post war restructuring of the Middle East that had begun during World War I and continued through World War II. Nasser hoped to carry this revolution beyond the borders of Egypt, and into the entire Arab world. For the Suez Crisis to be understood, one must first grasp the message Nasser was sending to the world with his actions.
Nasser hoped that he would be the one to reunite the Arab people; therefore, he developed a foreign policy that would place him in the position to do that. The essence of Nasser's policy was a return to dignity.i The primary objective of his policy was independence from external control -- military, political, and economic.ii Thus, he hoped to restore the dignity of the Arab people by removing the corruptive influence of all types of foreign entanglements. He hoped to create an Arab bloc, which could protect, police, and finance itself. Central to his policy was the principle of positive neutralism or non-alignment.iii In Nasser's mind, any Arab country that aligned itself with a major power gave up their sovereignty, and subjected itself to the will of the stronger.
Following WW II both Britain and France attempted to maintain their influence in the Middle East. These two colonial powers would be severely tested by the rise of nationalism in the region. Many have defined the Crisis in terms of the end of an era (colonialism), and the beginning of another (Pan-Arabism); however, the Crisis did not occur in such a neat little vacuum. Britain had developed a number of ways to maintain its influence without abject political control. The very concept of the Commonwealth was one example. Another example was the Baghdad Pact, which Britain hoped to use to keep its foot in the Middle Eastern door. Nasser's reaction to the Pact should have alerted the two colonial powers to the type of opposition their actions would receive.
Anthony Eden was a central figure throughout the Crisis. He was the last prime minister to consider Britain an equal power to the US and USSR.iv He openly criticized Dulles and accused him of abandoning his closest allies, but it was Eden who lost control of Suez.v Blinded by ghosts from the past -- appeasement, colonial glory, and his own success -- he lost touch of the great game and played an extremely sloppy hand.
US foreign policy, as it often was in the Cold War, was in a state of transition. The Eisenhower Doctrine would follow on the heels of this Crisis and the Rollback policy had conveniently been rolled under the White House carpeting. Much has been made about Dulles the moral crusader, he has been portrayed as one who based his foreign policies on his personal beliefs about good and evil.vi This paints a rather anorexic portrait of Dulles' actual policies. I believe that portrayal was due to the combined effect of relying too heavily on European versions of the story, and an inability to separate Dulles' rhetoric from the meat of his policies.
If Dulles was truly the moral crusader he was made out to be, clearly Nasser's non-alignment policy would be unacceptable. The facts tend to show this was not the case. Although Dulles was not a fan of non-alignment, he recognized Egypt's freedom of choice. A closer look at the Czech arms deal and the Dam offer reveal that Nasser's 'aggressive non-alignment' in the latter would not be tolerated.vii
Further, US estimates of Nasser and the overall situation in the Middle East were closer to reality than any of the allies. From the outset of the Crisis, the US sought to isolate Nasser and was concerned about: 'making Nasser a much more important figure than he is.'viii Although Dulles and Eisenhower sought to solve the present Crisis, they kept their eye toward the future and their expanding role in the region.
The Antecedents
No one predicted Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26,1956. It was the most flagrant in a series of bold acts of defiance against the West. What led Nasser to this ultimate test of wills? Four interconnected events prepared the way for Nasser's greatest moment: the Evacuation Treaty of 1954, the Baghdad Pact, the Czech arms deal, and the Aswan Dam negotiations.
The Suez Canal represented a remnant of the colonial era -- built on the backs and with the blood of the Egyptian people it was a constant reminder of their loss of dignity. That Britain's military base at Suez housed 80,000 troops made things worse; thus, Nasser began a diplomatic campaign to restore Egyptian dignity and get the British out of Egypt.ix The US helped pressure the British to reach an accord for two reasons. The US was historically anti-colonial, and the US hoped to gain a quid-pro-quo from Nasser.x
The British planned to create a Middle Eastern collective security organization similar to that of NATO and SEATO to protect their interests in the region. The US supported the idea in principle but would not consider joining any such agreement. Dulles traveled to Egypt in 1953, because be believed Britain should consider Egypt for the base of the organization. He quickly realized that neither Nasser nor his people would ever consent to such a thing.xi On January 12,1955, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain inked their fateful pact. Dulles called in his chip and asked Nasser to join, he refused.xii
Nasser stated he would have no part in this 'imperial device' that further eroded Arab unity, was another insult to Arab dignity, and was an attempt by the West to build up Iraq as a competitor to Egypt in the Arab world.xiii Ironically, his reaction to the British ensured Egypt would not be the center of the Pact, and he was dead on in his concern that the US and Britain were attempting to isolate him. His version of collective security: 'give us weapons and we will defend ourselves' had about as much chance of succeeding as a third world leader taking on the combined forces of Israel-Britain-France and winning.xiv
The British evacuation of the Suez Base had begun, the Baghdad Pact was signed, and Nasser now turned to the US for arms. The US government considered the proposal, but the pro-Zionist movement in the US quickly pushed the proposal off the table.xv Nasser and his generals clearly wanted US arms -- they were trained to read the English manuals; further, Nasser feared that with Soviet arms would come Soviet ideologues -- a situation he did not want.xvi However, the US made no offer. Nasser knew he needed weapons, he had to turn somewhere, and Russia was the logical place.
Moscow was careful. The Kremlin desired an 'in' in the Middle East, but wanted to move quietly into the region. Moscow decided to work the arms deal through Czechoslovakia. When Dulles heard of the deal he was 'simmering with anger.' He immediately sent Kim Roosevelt, who two years earlier led a CIA coup that toppled the government of Iranian nationalist leader Mossediq, to visit with Nasser.xvii Nasser was warned by his advisors: 'Remember Guatemala, remember Guatemala,' to which he replied simply: 'To hell with Guatemala.'xviii He then proceeded directly outside and announced the Czech arms deal. Thus, he again defied the West as he had over the Baghdad Pact. The arms deal was more than mere defiance, however, it was a proclamation: 'we are independent of the West.'xix
To his credit Dulles recognized Nasser's right to acquire the arms: 'Arab countries were independent governments and free to do whatever they wished in the matter...it is difficult to be critical of countries which feeling themselves endangered seek the arms which they sincerely need.'xx Dulles seemed to sense that Nasser's non-alignment was serious business, and that a harsh response would push him farther into the Soviet orbit. The British were incensed: 'we may have to get rid of Nasser, especially if he becomes publicly committed to the arms contract.'xxi This was said by Eden's top aide only two days before Nasser's announcement.
Britain had one final hope of bringing Nasser to heel -- the long talked about Aswan Dam project. British intelligence had received reports in November of 1955 that the Soviets were ready to make an offer to finance the Dam.xxii Eden became intent on convincing Dulles that the project was worthy of their mutual support. Dulles needed the convincing, he did not like the idea from the beginning. There were three reasons Dulles initially backed off: he tended not to associate himself outwardly with Britain in the Middle East -- he feared guilt by association, he did not want to place himself in the middle of the ongoing dispute between Iraq and Egypt, and finally the sheer magnitude and time frame of the project worried him.xxiii Although he agreed in December to make the offer, he was adamant about attaching strings to protect the huge investment. Nasser delayed, saying he needed time to consider all his options.xxiv
The Aswan Dam issue has been a center of controversy. On July 19, 1956, Nasser 'accepted' the offer, but Dulles pulled it off the table. Nasser used the Aswan incident as an example of the West's lack of respect for his people, and a week later he nationalized the Suez Canal saying he would use the extra money to finance the Dam himself. Dulles has been blamed by virtually every nation involved for initiating the Crisis. Was it an example of lack of respect and was he responsible? It was not meant to be an affront to the Egyptians, and Dulles was not responsible for initiating nationalization.
Dulles was never convinced about the soundness of the project, thus he conditioned his offer with strings. Although Nasser wanted the money, he refused to accept the strings attached to it. Nasser was the first to delay. He wanted to play all his cards, he likely hoped to take the US offer to the Soviets and see if they would one-up it.
In the meantime, a number of factors came together that cast a darker shadow on the prospects for the US backed loan. Congress became increasingly concerned with the project. Dulles was confident but not certain he could persuade Congress to go along at this time, however, Nasser's reputation and unreliability made the ten year time frame of the project imposing -- especially if Congress planned to fight the outlay every year.xxv Nasser aggravated the situation even more by going out and recognizing Red China, and again publicly stating that Egypt was: 'still considering a Soviet offer to build the Dam.'xxvi
Finally, on July 13, 1956, Dulles sent word to Nasser that the US was not able to deal with the matter, because Congress was in the middle of a pitched battle over the Dam that was threatening the entire Mutual Security Act.xxvii Nasser chose to ignore the warning and decided to press the issue. He sent Ambassador Hussein to Washington to get a definite answer. Hussein told Dulles that Egypt would accept the offer, and he hoped the US had not decided to renege because Egypt (patted his pocket) had an offer from the Soviets.xxviii Dulles had been pushed to the limits of his patience. He had allowed the arms deal with a virtual no comment -- non-alignment was one thing, this was blackmail. He told Hussein to take the Russian offer, but added that the US would still consider smaller projects in the future.xxix
It was Nasser who pushed the issue; he demanded a 'yes' or 'no' at a time that Dulles simply could not give a definite answer. Some have said that Dulles should have somehow delayed a decision, but that assumes anyone could have predicted Nasser's next move -- and no one did. Dulles wondered if he had done the right thing.xxx He had. The Dam was a loser. It would have been a ten year ordeal. The Soviets eventually did finance the Dam, and I found no tangible long term benefits accrued to them from the project. Nasser, on the other hand, gained immediate and immense dividends from this not very suprising rejection.
Nationalization
Dulles reneged on the Dam offer July 19,1956. The British followed suit the next day. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Nasser viewed the Western rejection as a purposeful slap in the face and a deliberate blow to his policy of neutralism and his leadership position in the Arab world.xxxi Furthermore, Nasser sensed a conspiracy. He believed: 'the necessary consequences are that you fellows are out to kill me. And all I can do is protect myself...I am not going to be killed.'xxxii It seemed logical that Nasser feared a plot (maybe CIA) was bearing down on him, he feared the people would be so deflated from the news that they might just join in, and so he nationalized the Canal. Of course, it was also possible he had planned on doing so for a long time, but was awaiting the right moment.
Nationalization produced a general uproar in the West, but the volume of the roar varied depending on the locale. Nasser's action created a crack in the Western power structure. Three areas of difference became immediately apparent between the US and Britain. First, they differed in their interpretations of the Soviet threat. Eden viewed Nasser as a Soviet puppet: 'he is in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler's.'xxxiii Dulles viewed the Soviet threat as more long-term, he believed that nationalization had nothing to do with Russia, and everything to do with colonialism.xxxiv Second, Eden was convinced that Nasser was the second coming of Hitler, and in no way could he be appeased.xxxv Eisenhower disagreed: 'This is a picture too dark and severely distorted.'xxxvi Finally, the two previous differences conditioned the degree to which the two countries were willing to respond. If Nasser followed through with his pledge to keep the waterway open and compensate the shareholders, Dulles was willing to accept Egyptian control -- although he preferred international control.xxxvii Eden believed that force was the only response (as did France and Israel), and he immediately ordered plans be drawn for an adequate response.xxxviii
Thus, the use of force quickly became the central issue as the Crisis moved into August and beyond. Nasser had placed himself in a dangerous position, but he did so only after considered calculation. His action was clearly legal -- US and British international lawyers agreed on at least that much (to the chagrin of Eden).xxxix Nasser had made certain that neither France nor Britain could launch an immediate attack,xl he fully intended to do whatever it took to keep the Canal open, and he began working on the means to compensate the shareholders.xli Nasser relied on the belief that by the time France or Britain could attack, the Canal would be running so well that no justification would exist for such an overt act of aggression. He miscalculated the time factor, and he could not ever have guessed the excuse that would eventually be created to justify the allied attack.
Eden proved willing to risk Britain's entire future in the Middle East over the Suez Canal. He viewed the Canal as the 'jugular vein' of Britain's global empire.xlii Nasser guessed right about one thing: Britain was not prepared to respond in August. Nationalization caught Eden off guard and this forced him to react irrationally. Eden's irrationality directly led to the real crisis in October-November of 1956.
Two days after the nationalization, Eden called Captain Liddell-Hart into his office and ordered him to develop a plan to regain the Canal and force Nasser out of power.xliii Hart developed four plans for Eden, who rejected each in order. The fifth plan Hart presented Eden was exactly what he wanted. It was a duplicate of the first plan and Liddell-Hart told Eden that -- Eden responded by throwing an ink well at Hart to which Hart: 'picked up a government issued waste paper basket, and jammed it over the prime minister's head.'xliv
Eden was losing it, as Dulles discovered when he arrived in London for meetings on August 1-2. Dulles was intent on keeping the resort to force as only a last ditch option, Eden was equally intent on using force.xlv Eden began their meeting by telling Dulles that Nasser's act was illegal and a violation of Britain's most recent treaty with Egypt. Dulles asked to see the treaty, it took Eden a half-hour to produce it, and it was clear to Dulles that: 'Eden nor his staff had really read the darned thing.'xlvi
Finally, Eden's desperation can be surmised from the fact that he opted to be a part of the French-Israeli invasion plan. Frankly, this was unforgivable. Acting alone would have been bad, but acting in collusion with France and Israel so endangered Britain's position in the Middle East that even Nasser refused to believe that any type of collusion with Israel would be a possible alternative.xlvii
Dulles' response to nationalization showed he grasped both the US position and Nasser's positioning in the region. After the October-November enterprise failed, both Britain and France condemned Dulles for abandoning them. Those accusations were categorically false.
Throughout the Crisis both Eisenhower and Dulles continually stated that their goal was to solve the Crisis through diplomatic means. It was clearly not the time nor the manner in which to remove a leader of Nasser's stature. Before Eisenhower sent Dulles to London for the August meeting, he told Dulles the British resort to force was 'unwise policy' and 'out of date.'xlviii Eisenhower sent Dulles to London with explicit instructions: 'to let the British know how gravely we view the matter, what an error we think the decision is, and how this course of action would antagonize the American people...and that every peaceful means of resolving this difficulty must be completely exhausted.'xlix Dulles stated: 'I had come to the conclusion that, regrettable as it might be to see Nasser's prestige enhanced even temporarily, I did not believe the situation was on which should be resolved by force...the Soviet Union would reap the benefits.'l The US position was made crystal clear early on in the Crisis, and equally important, Dulles and Eisenhower agreed both on the real issues involved and the best means to solve the problem.
Dulles set out to solve the problem through normal diplomatic channels. Meanwhile, the French, British, and Israeli's were working out their plan of attack, and neither Eden nor Nasser budged from their positions. Dulles never wavered and neither did the US position, in mid-September he stated: 'the US did not intend itself to try to shoot its way up the Canal.'li Thus, time passed but the 'three' sides were not getting any closer, however, both the US and Egypt believed that time was the perfect remedy for the problem. They were wrong.
The Attack
On October 29,1956, Israel attacked Egypt. The following day Britain and France issued ultimatums to both sides to immediately stop the fighting. The actual words of the ultimatums warned that French and British troops would be landing whether or not the fighting stopped.lii Everyone from Cairo to Washington saw through this poorly concealed ploy and the collusion that had occurred. Dulles and Eisenhower met immediately and decided to take the initiative. They first brought action to the Security Council and when that failed, they took their case to the General Assembly of the UN.liii The move forestalled a Soviet action, and was meant to clearly distance the US, in a manner the whole world would see, from its allies. The US was not about to go down with the HMS Former Colonial Powers. The timing of the invasion could not have been worse from the US perspective for two reasons: the presidential election was only a week away, and the Soviets were beginning their crackdown in Hungary.
The upcoming presidential election meant that Eisenhower was in no position to stand pat. He had to comment on the situation. It was not feasible for him to condemn the Russians for their wanton acts of aggression in Hungary, and condone his allies for their actions in Egypt.liv With a 'heavy heart' Dulles told the General Assembly: 'the Israeli-French-British invasion is a grave error inconsistent with the principles and purposes of this charter.'lv Eden's expectation that his old friend Eisenhower would 'lie doggo' were dashed.lvi
Nasser and the Arab world responded as one might expect they would -- with shock, repulsion, and anger. Nasser closed down the Canal, cutting the invasion force off from the oil needed to continue the operation for any extended period. The Egyptian people decisively rallied around their leader -- millions joined on to resist the invasion.lvii The Baghdad Pact crumbled, as Iraq refused to sit with the British and severed ties with the French.lviii The Arab world surrounded Nasser with encouragement and cut the pipeline running from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.lix
Russia remained relatively quiet during the Crisis. On November 5, 1956, she sent letters to London and Paris threatening 'rocket attacks' if the invasion did not end.lx By this point however, US and UN pressure made the cease-fire agreement of November 6 inevitable, and the US position had been made painfully clear. By doing nothing really yet appearing to seriously threaten the West, Russia stepped into the now gaping power vacuum that was the Middle East. Both during and after the Crisis, Nasser built up the Soviet role. This opened the door for a counter-balance to the US in the region -- which was exactly what both Nasser and the Soviets wanted.lxi
Conclusion
The Suez Crisis was a turning point in the Middle East because it heralded the beginning of a series of new eras. Nasser would use his successful handling of the Crisis to catapult himself into the position of leader of Pan-Arabism. It remained to be seen if he could do what none had been able to do in modern history -- unify the Arab people under one flag. He could not. Ironically, if the Middle East had been democratic it might have been possible, but as it stood the US was not the only country that feared Nasser. Most Middle Eastern leaders, although they respected Nasser, also feared and did not trust him. Thus Pan-Arabism never took off in the manner Nasser hoped it would, yet its form and substance still exist in the Middle East today.
Britain and France were finished in the Middle East for all practical purposes. Their attack on the Suez and their collusion with Israel sealed their fates. Eden's political career was over, and De Gaulle was just coming to power in France. Their collusive action further de-legitimized Israel in the eyes of the Arab world by proving its dependence on the West.
The power vacuum created by the British and French evaporation in the Middle East was used by Dulles, Eisenhower, and the US to further entrench itself into the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 grew directly out of the effects of this Crisis. The stature and statesmanship of Dulles have suffered due to the 'errors' he made here. Eden went to his grave condemning Dulles for abandoning him at Suez, but unless new documents somehow reveal a promise Dulles made behind closed doors to Eden the abandonment argument can safely be set aside.
Dulles' decision not to finance Aswan was equally sound. The only conceivable way to do the project was with the very types of strings Dulles attached to the US offer. Besides the fact that it was not yet definite that Nasser could be trusted, these 'strings' would have tied the US government to the Egyptian government and vice versa. The inherent danger of this was all too obvious. Those 'strings' could easily be turned against the US by Nasser some time down the road as 'just another example of Western colonialism.'
Finally, US silence or involvement in the British-French-Israeli use of force was out of the question. The future of US foreign policy in the Middle East would have been destroyed. By standing up for principle, Dulles left the door open for continuing and increasing involvement in the Middle East, even as it reacted against the West in general. Thus, Dulles and Eisenhower handled the Crisis suprisingly well considering the event in its totality and with an eye toward the future. Certainly misjudgments were made -- both in regards to Nasser's response to pulling the Aswan offer, and the British response to nationalization -- but in the shifting sands of the Middle East it was the overall consistency of US policy from beginning to end that insured the Suez Crisis did not turn into the Suez War it easily could have become.
Endnotes:
i Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 32. ii Dessouki, 33. iii Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, (New York: Columbia UP, 1972) 256. iv Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, 'The Historical Context,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 11. v Robert R. Bowie, 'Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 213. viJohn G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979) 126-127. viiGuhin, 274. viii Keith Kyle, 'Britain and the Crisis: 1955-1956,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 123. ixDessouki, 34. xLeonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network, (New York: Dial Press, 1978) 384. xiWm. Roger Louis, 'The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 60. xiiDessouki, 35. xiii Dessouki, 35. xivDessouki, 34. xv Mosley, 384. xviMosley, 397. xvii Mosley, 388. xviii Mosley, 388. xix Dessouki, 37. xx Guhin, 255. xxi Kyle, 106. xxii Kyle, 108. xxiii Guhin, 266-267. xxiv Guhin, 268. xxv Guhin, 272. xxvi Guhin, 268. xxvii Guhin, 273. xxviii Mosley, 402. xxix Bowie, 195. xxx Mosley, 403. xxxi Dessouki, 38. xxxii Mosley, 404. xxxiii Guhin, 287. xxxiv Guhin, 288. xxxv Louis and Owen, 4. xxxvi Guhin, 288. xxxvii Guhin, 289. xxxviii Mosley, 408. xxxix Amin Hewedy, 'Nasser and the Crisis of 1956,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 166. xl Mosley, 405. xli Hewedy, 165. xlii Louis and Owen, 22. xliii Mosley, 409. xliv Mosley, 409. xlv Bowie, 197. xlvi Mosley, 410. xlvii Hewedy, 169. xlviii Bowie, 198. xlix Bowie, 199. l Bowie, 201-202. li Bowie, 205. lii Winthrop W. Aldrich, 'The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History,' Foreign Affairs XXXVI (1967):548. liii Bowie, 208-209. liv John C. Campbell, 'The Soviet Union, the United States, and the Twin Crises of Hungary and Suez,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 245. lv Guhin, 291. lvi Mosley, 407. lvii Hewedy, 170. lviii Dessouki, 39. lix Hewedy, 171. lx Albert Hourani, 'Conclusion,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 403. lxi Rashid Khalidi, 'Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World,' Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 380.
Bibliography
Aldrich, Winthrop W. 'The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History,' Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (April 1958), 371-82. Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. 10th Ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980. Bill, James A., and Spingborg, Robert. Politics in the Middle East. 4th ed. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Eden, Anthony. The Suez Crisis of 1956. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960. Guhin, Michael A. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times. New York: Columbia UP, 1972. Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1973. Louis, Wm. Roger., and Owen, Roger., eds. Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Lesch, David W. 'Gamel Abd al-Nasser and an Example of Diplomatic Acumen,' Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 31 April 1995: 362-375. Mosley, Leonard. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network. New York: Dial Press, 1978. Stoessinger, John G. Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979. 'President Gamel Abdel Nasser.' http://www.mordor.com/hany/egypt/nasser.html (25 April 1996).
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This paper was sritten May 1, 1996, by Chris Leininger (cl1@acusd.edu)
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