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Topic: Yossi Beilin's comments

topic by barb 4/10/2002 (14:43)

reply top A Plan for Peace An Oslo Accords architect explains how to get two stubborn children back to the negotiating table. By Yossi Beilin Issue Date: 3.11.02 Print Friendly | Email Article The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is surely the most protracted international dispute since the end of the Second World War. Today, however, it is easy to forget that over the past 25 years, various important and encouraging advances have occurred in the political process between Israel and its neighbors: peace with Egypt; peace with Jordan; the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanon; the stability of the interim agreement with Syria; and the Oslo Accords. Indeed, only yesterday many people felt that the Middle East -- one of the world's most troubled areas, long plagued by a lack of stability and saddled with continuing violence -- was moving toward a solution that would make the region attractive for development and investment and profoundly change its character. The intensive dialogue between Israel and both Syria and the Palestinians that took place during Ehud Barak's short term as Israel's prime minister and the last two years of Bill Clinton's presidency created extremely high expectations. But these hopes were shattered by the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in late September 2000, by Barak's overwhelming defeat in the early elections a few months later, and by Ariel Sharon's victory. As violence mounted, world opinion underwent a surprisingly rapid metamorphosis from a state of optimism about the prospects for an immediate agreement to a state of pessimism about the feasibility of any solution at all. Various experts now explain that there will be no solution for many years -- because Yasir Arafat has not made the necessary strategic decisions, because Sharon has never believed in the possibility of peace with the Arabs, and because George W. Bush heads an extreme-right administration that believes that 'managing' the conflict is preferable to attempting to solve it with no guarantee of success. This new consensus seems to have taken hold in Washington and Jerusalem; similar voices can be heard in Europe, too, and in the Palestinian camp as well. The worst thing about this outlook is that it is a self-fulfilling prophecy: If many learned people believe that there is no point in making great efforts to reach a resolution of the conflict -- that it is enough simply to manage it -- then concerted efforts will not be made to resolve it. Indeed, even if such efforts are made, so long as this mind-set prevails, the problem will not be resolved. This new consensus is particularly frustrating in light of the fact that there is no international conflict whose solution is clearer, whose final outlines are already more apparent -- not the conflicts in Kashmir or Cyprus or anywhere else. A technical approach for achieving a full cease-̃re was agreed upon during CIA Director George Tenet's last visit to the region. The way from there back to the negotiating table was also agreed upon, when both sides accepted the recommendations of the fact-finding commission headed by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell. This international commission, which was formed in the late stages of President Clinton's second term and submitted its conclusions to President Bush, laid out confidence-building measures that both sides should take in order to return to the path they had embarked on -- but which became soaked in the blood of the Palestinian intifada and the Israeli retaliatory measures. The permanent-status agreement cannot be described as a puzzle, either. All who acknowledge the need for a historic compromise between Israel and the Palestinians and even those who do not believe that such a compromise should exist will admit that the only logical way forward is the one proposed in the Clinton plan of December 2000, which covers all the concerns due to have been resolved in the permanent-status agreement. The Clinton plan, in turn, is based on the understandings reached in 1994 and 1995 between Arafat's number two in the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mahmud Abbas (known as Abu Mazen), and me. It was a tragedy for both sides that they did not make a supreme effort in 1996 to implement those understandings in a permanent-status agreement. It will be an additional tragedy, if, after having agreed over a year ago to accept the Clinton plan (with various reservations), they both renounce their agreement, claiming that it was made at a different time, in a different context, under a different U.S. president. The territorial question was, and remains, the most important one in the dispute between the two sides. What the Clinton plan determined, in effect, was that the basis for the boundary between the new Palestinian state and Israel would be based on the border preceding the Six-Day War in 1967. Israel may annex between 4 and 6 percent of the area of the West Bank, so as to include within the State of Israel those areas where the majority of the settlers live. In return, however, Israel will pay in the form of relinquished territory -- even if not identical in size -- from areas that have been under Israeli sovereignty since 1948. All the settlements in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank in those areas not annexed to Israel will be evacuated. The Clinton plan also addresses security arrangements: The Palestinian state will not have offensive weapons; an international force will be situated on the border between Jordan and the Palestinian state; and Israel will have early-warning stations in the area. The Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will become part of the Palestinian state and home to the Palestinian capital. The Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem will all be part of Israel. As for the tough question of the so-called Holy Basin (an area smaller than three-quarters of a square mile): The Western Wall, the adjacent sacred area, and the Jewish Quarter will be part of Israel; the rest of the Temple Mount and the non-Jewish areas will be part of the Palestinian state. I believe that full internationalization of the Old City could serve as an additional option both sides could accept. As a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the Clinton plan makes five different proposals: rehabilitation of the places where they live; absorption into the Palestinian state; absorption into other countries around the world; absorption into areas that Israel will transfer to the Palestinian state; and absorption of a limited and agreed-upon number of refugees into Israel. There will also be various types of compensation. Although it was extremely difficult for either side to agree to the Clinton plan, Israel accepted it by a government decision on December 28, 2000, and Arafat gave it a positive response in his meeting with President Clinton on January 2, 2001. Ostensibly, the decision of the Israeli government remains in full force: It has not been revoked, not even by the Sharon government. Arafat's response has not been revoked either, though President Clinton did announce that with the end of his term of office the United States was no longer bound by the proposal. Yet in the current political reality, it is convenient for Israel and the Palestinians to disregard their consent to the Clinton plan, despite the fact that this was the only time since 1967 that both sides agreed to the same plan for peace. It is particularly convenient for Israel, given the difficulty inherent in giving up sovereignty on the Temple Mount, and it is particularly convenient for the Palestinians, considering their difficulty in publicly relinquishing the 'right of return.' But both these concessions are symbolic rather than real. Israel's unilateral sovereignty over the Temple Mount has no practical meaning. The Muslim Waqf has controlled the Mount, even after its occupation in 1967, and Jews have been prohibited from praying there. Since Sharon's provocative visit on September 28, 2000, no Jew has set foot on the site. And concerning the 'right of return,' once the Palestinians made a decision to support the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel, it was clear to the pragmatic Palestinian leadership that the 'right of return' would refer to the Palestinian state to be set up as part of the overall settlement. To demand that millions of Palestinians exercise their 'right' to return to sovereign Israel would mean that they quickly would become the majority there. Thus, this demand is tantamount to demanding the establishment of a second Palestinian state. Recent pronouncements of Sari Nusseibeh, the Palestinian Authority's newly appointed political commissioner for Jerusalem, introduce a degree of sanity in this regard. Nusseibeh makes it clear that expecting the Palestinian 'right of return' to apply in the State of Israel is unrealistic and will prevent us from reaching any solution at all. Professor Nusseibah should be commended for making such courageous comments in the face of the widespread opposition within the Palestinian camp. The solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict already has been spelled out in all its stages and details. The Middle East does not need new solutions. It needs a kindergarten teacher to separate the two children, splash some cold water on their faces, calm them down, and send them back to the fine place where they left their sanity. This kindergarten teacher could be the United States; if not, it could be Europe. But the biggest mistake the world could make would be to say of the Israelis and Palestinians, 'Let them bleed.' The orphaned negotiating table still is waiting for the two sides to come back -- and it is still not too late. Yossi Beilin

reply by John Calvin 4/10/2002 (15:16)

reply top http://www.npq.org/issues/v144/p42.html Volume 14 #4 Middle East: The Quagmire of Peace Yossi Beilin, the Israeli diplomat who started the Oslo peace process, and Khaled Meshaal, the Hamas leader whom the Mossad tried to assassinate in Amman, offer two divergent views on the future of the Middle East. From the Architect of Oslo: A Way Out of Deadlock Yossi Beilin, a labor member of the Knesset, was the initiator of the Oslo Peace Accord and a former minister in the governments of Yitzkah Rabin and Shimon Peres. THE ROAD TO DEADLOCK The Oslo track was never much of a love story, neither when I initiated the process in the winter of 1992, nor when the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook Yasser Arafat's hand on the White House lawn in September 1993. Israel extended its hand to the Palestine Liberation Organization only after it became clear that the Hamas religious fundamentalists had weakened the PLO and stood waiting to replace it. The PLO only extended its hand to Israel in light of the cold shoulder it had received from the world following the Gulf War and the gradually diminishing internal support it had among the Palestinian people. Oslo was a pragmatic, yet last-ditch effort and was never actually accompanied by mutual trust. It was a track that materialized because of the lack of any other option. Since June 1996, the Likud government has acted as though it has a better alternative. Netanyahu has spoken about meeting with other Palestinians and has denigrated the Oslo track. In the end, however, despite his better wishes and those of most of his coalition partners, he realigned himself with the official governmental line of negotiation. The Palestinians have presented a mirror image of the 'better alternative' attitude and have begun talking about a return to violence and the intifada. Both sides commit drastic violations of Oslo yet blame one another for stopping the negotiations. Propaganda has returned to its central role. The Netanyahu government is losing public support over its inability to materialize its 1996 campaign promises of peace and security. The Palestinian Authority leadership is weakening as it fails in its efforts to combat terrorism and struggles to explain to its constituency the lack of benefits reaped from Oslo. The Oslo agreement - with its five-year period of autonomy, its renewed withdrawal of army troops from the West Bank and Gaza, its strong Palestinian police force and its postponement of final status talks until the last stage of autonomy - is the legitimate son of Camp David. When I raised the possibility early on of skipping directly to the final status talks, Rabin - and, surprisingly, the Palestinians - all voiced their preference of staying with the pre-established Camp David framework. As a result, we now find ourselves two years away from the end of the autonomous period, with no negotiations going on toward a final status agreement and with the agreed - on army redeployment suspended. GETTING THERE FROM HERE The pathway to peace in the Middle East has become blocked by deep distrust, terrorism against Israelis and massive deterioration of the Palestinian economy. It does appear difficult to bridge the wide differences the two sides have on so many issues. The Palestinians speak of an independent Palestinian state with pre-1967 borders and full authority and control over the whole West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposes any militarized Palestinian state and is willing to discuss territorial compromise of up to only 50 percent of the territory. The Palestinians maintain their stance that East Jerusalem is their capital, while the Israeli consensus recognizes an undivided Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Palestinians demand the option of return to Israeli villages for the refugees who fled Israel in 1948 and took up temporary residence in neighboring Arab countries, while the Israeli consensus fears such a return as a threat to a Jewish majority in Israel. Yet as a result of a series of noncommittal talks I have had with Palestinian leaders, 1 can envisage the following solution - a solution that neither fits perfectly with the Israeli nor the Palestinian agendas, but emerges - as political solutions should - as that elusive bridge between the two: A Palestinian state will be established, with Israeli early-warning stations built to prevent a surprise attack from the east. The state will contain Gaza and nearly all of the West Bank, save for the small areas inhabited by the majority of the Israeli settlers. The settlers who fall under Palestinian control will be offered the choice of either returning to Israel with appropriate reimbursement or staying in their homes with special security arrangements. The refugees will be allowed to return to the Palestinian state, but not to Israel. An international refugee organization will be established, with Israel playing a major role in reimbursing and resettling the refugees. Jerusalem remains the only issue that will be difficult to resolve in a two-state arrangement. In my scenario, the city will remain unified. The nearby area of Abu Dis, outside the municipal authority of the city of Jerusalem and yet still considered by the Palestinians as part of Al-Quds [the Arab Jerusalem -Editor], will be recognized by Israel as the capital of the Palestinian state. The Palestinians will recognize West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Immediately following the signing of the peace agreement, the world's ambassadors will move their offices there from Tel Aviv. East Jerusalem will be classified as disputed territory, and both sides will discuss the final status of the area without setting a deadline. So long as no agreement is reached, the status quo will prevail in that part of the city. Neither side will leave the table having accomplished all its goals, but both sides will acknowledge having received what was most important to them: For the Israelis, security and an undivided Jerusalem; for the Palestinians, a state and an answer to the refugee question. Whatever we can accomplish will be the new reality. And the faster we reach a solution, the harder it will be for the extremists on both sides to torpedo the successes with their violence. What Hamas Thinks Khaled Meshaal, chief of the Hamas Political Bureau, was the target of the botched assassination attempt by Israeli agents in Amman, Jordan. The attack unleashed a political storm in the region. Meshaal was interviewed exclusively for NPQ on Thursday, October 9, by Rhami Khouri in Amman. NPQ: Why do you think you were targeted personally in the assassination attempt? KHALED MESHAAL: (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu, after his many failures - especially his failure to provide Israelis with the security he promised them and his failure in south Lebanon - wanted to achieve a theatrical or symbolic victory. That was intended to cover up for his failures on the one hand and to lift the morale of the Zionist people on the other. Netanyahu also wanted to export his domestic crisis abroad, and thus he chose Hamas' chief of the political bureau. NPQ: After the latest developments, how do you see your relations with the Palestine National Authority, especially after the meetings between Sheikh Yassin and Yasser Arafat in Amman and in Gaza? MESHAAL: We deal with the PNA as part of our people despite our political differences. Although we are against the Oslo agreements, we strive to bolster national unity in the face of occupation and in the face of any confrontation. After the recent developments our resolve has been strengthened. We hope that the PNA would reconsider its stands and give priority to Palestinian national interests and resist all the pressures applied on it by the Israelis and Americans. Our main fight is against the enemy. This has always been our policy. But the PNA changed in response to Israeli positions and criteria. We want to meet with the PNA, but based on Palestinian positions and criteria. NPQ: King Hussein of Jordan this week talked about a letter he sent to Netanyahu suggesting a dialogue with Hamas. \What is the letter about and what is its importance? MESHAAL: Let me be very clear about this: Hamas did not send any message, whether written or verbal, whether direct or through an intermediary, to the Zionist enemy. NPQ: How do explain what the king said, then? MESHAAL: Ask the other parties. Clearly all the parties want to draw Hamas into the circle of the settlement, because Hamas is an influential force and because it has a strong presence in the Palestinian arena and cannot therefore be ignored. There is a desire and an intention to draw Hamas into the current process to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, but that does not mean that Hamas has agreed to this. NPQ: How do you interpret (Hamas founder and spiritual leader) Sheikh Ahmad Yassin's statements that the Palestinians are ready to coexist with the Jews if Israeli settlements and occupation are ended? MESHAAL: Sheikh Yassin was talking about a situation after the rights of our people are restored. But there can be no coexistence with the enemy as long as it occupies our land and uproots our people. The victim must not be asked to live with his or her victimizer. But once our people have realized their rights, like the Americans realized theirs long ago, once we own our land and the five million Palestinians in the diaspora return home, then we can coexist with Jews. There is no reason why a Jew cannot live with a Muslim and be secure in his home and his place of worship. That is what the Sheikh meant. And this is not new to our umma (Muslim community or nation). We lived for 14 centuries with many religions, and those people enjoyed safety among us. NPQ: What rights do you mean? Do you mean that Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders and coexist with a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza? Or do you mean that Israel should not exist as a Jewish state and instead all the peoples in Israel and Palestine should live together in a single state? MESHAAL: The Palestinian right is a whole and cannot be divided. It means their right to live on their land as they did before the occupation. We want to go back to that (situation). We will not forfeit that right with the passage of time. We have no problem accepting the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as a transitional solution, but without giving up our right to the rest of the land (of Palestine) and without giving legitimacy to the state of occupation and aggression. This transitional liberation is only one stage in our quest for the total liberation of Palestine. NPQ: Doesn't transitional liberation imply a recognition of Israel? MESHAAL: When we talk about a liberation in stages we talk about a truce only. But we will not recognize the usurpation and occupation of Palestine, nor will we give up the rest of the Palestinians' national rights. NPQ: You are against the existence of a Jewish state then? MESHAAL: Yes. That would be like rewarding aggression, something that all divine religions and international legal conventions and charters reject. NPQ: But it seems the majority of Palestinians accepts Oslo, even if grudgingly, and seeks to gain its rights incrementally. How do you compare your stand with what seems to be majority Palestinian support for the Oslo approach? MESHAAL: After four years Oslo did not achieve anything for the Palestinian people. The agreement has failed. It continues not because of its achievements or the Palestinian people's faith in it, but rather due to American and international support. The agreement failed because Israel does not believe in it nor is it willing to compromise. On the other hand the Palestinian people are not behind the Oslo agreement. Those who gave the agreement a chance four years ago now believe it will not work. The life of the Palestinian people has become black and grim. The 5,000 Palestinian prisoners were not released, Israeli settlement building goes on, bypass roads are being built, killing of our people goes on, threats to Jerusalem and Hebron persist, no Palestinian refugees were allowed back home. NPQ: Hamas uses a form of armed resistance which the West and many others in the world call terrorism, especially when targeted against civilians. Is Hamas considering relatively less armed struggle and relatively more political struggle? Or are things going to stay as they are? MESHAAL: The accusation of terrorism does not scare us. Because we are not terrorists. We are practicing a right that is guaranteed to all peoples: the right to resist occupation. Real terror is that embodied in the Zionist entity: The experience of my attempted assassination is a testimony. Israel practices state terrorism, international terrorism, technological terrorism. It considers all the capabilities of the world its own even if it violates the sanctity of a friendly state like Canada and a country with which it has a peace treaty like Jordan. When the enemy violates the sovereignty of Jordan that is a proof that it does not respect peace or abide by peace treaties. The Palestinian people have no choice but to resist, especially after the failure of all other options. NPQ: Does Hamas think of reviving the intifada and halting military operations against Israel? MESHAAL: As long as occupation persists and Palestinian rights are usurped and the enemy's violations of these rights inside and outside Palestine continue, and as long as five million Palestinians remain refugees, the Palestinian people will use all available options to resist - whether through military operations or intifada - and until liberation and our return to our land are achieved. NPQ: We hear talk in the press of Sheikh Yassin speaking of a possible truce between Hamas and Israel - what is the reality of this talk from your perspective? MESHAAL: What Sheikh Yassin said about a truce is not new; he offered it before. Hamas is not against transitional liberation of the West Bank and Gaza. We accept that part of Palestine be liberated as a step toward the whole liberation of Palestine and toward achieving all our rights. The withdrawal must be real, and settlements must be dismantled and settlers removed. Sovereignty for us must be complete. We are not against that. A future moment might come when the conditions for that are right. But these developments can only be achieved through continued resistance and at least some change in the balance of power. NPQ: You are then ready for an interim solution, but in the long run you refuse to coexist with a Jewish state? MESHAAL: Of course. NPQ: Since Hamas refuses to engage Israel in talks how can a truce be reached? MESHAAL: That can be achieved through the compounded and cumulative consequences of resistance. When the enemy feels that the cost of occupation is very high it will give in. Then some arrangements can be worked out. Meanwhile, there is no use in contacting Israeli parties, since that will only be begging the Israelis, as happened in Oslo. NPQ: What if Yasser Arafat is out of the picture in the near future, for some reason? How do you envision developments in Palestinian political society? MESHAAL: Our stand has not changed. We are keen on safeguarding the higher interests of our people and maintaining our unity, whether in the time of Arafat or after him. We are not in competition with, nor do we want to replace, anybody. We are also not in the stage of dividing the spoils or the political cake that is on offer. Our concern is the interest of our people. Main E-Mail NPQ Copyright Index & Abstracting Microfilm Copyright ©1999-2002, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions