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Topic: Psych 101

topic by Seth Sims 4/12/2002 (14:34)

reply top It's really simple psychology. Reward a behavior, and you'll see more of it. Don't reward it and it'll eventually disappear. Reinforce the wrong behavior, and you create a mess. Nowhere are these simple rules more apparent or applicable than in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the last few decades. And in the application of psychology, the Palestinians, till now, have had the upper hand. Look at the Middle East in terms of a psychological conflict and the lines are fairly well drawn. On one side are the Israelis, who have something that the other side, the Palestinians, want. The Palestinians recognize this and do what they need to do in order to get what they want from the Israelis. Simple enough. When the conflict began over 50 years ago, Arab behavior was low on psychology, but high on brutishness. Like the class bully, the Arabs reasoned that force and bravado would get them what they want. By pushing, threatening, hitting and fighting, the goal was to force whom they perceived as the weaker party out of the neighborhood. After losing one, two, three wars, some in the Arab world began to realize that tactics needed to change. The change didn't come quickly. In fact, after their overwhelming defeat by Israel in 1967, the Arab response was 'no' to peace, 'no' to negotiation and 'no' to recognition. After another couple of wars, the Arabs were even further from the goals they set in 1948. Along came Anwar Sadat. Instead of war, he offered peace. His words were backed by deeds, and Israel relinquished all the land that Egypt claimed as its own. Some years later, Jordan, under the leadership of King Hussein, did the same and received disputed land back from Israel. The principle seemed rather simple. I'll give you what you want, and you'll give me what I want. In the case of Egypt, Jordan and Israel, it worked for all involved. A clear cause and effect relationship was now established. Israel will in fact give up land in return for peace with its neighbor. The Palestinians, who used terror and more terror for years, decided to adopt the strategy and began to engage the Israelis in discussions along the same principle. Give me what I want, namely a Palestinian state, and I'll give you what you want, namely peace and security. Again, the rules of psychology worked. Israel, having experienced what it perceived as a successful 'land for peace' deal with Egypt, was ready to try another successful application of the same principle. And so were born the Oslo accords. But even as the Palestinian leadership talked peace, they continued to incite their population and repeatedly violated the accords they signed. Despite the consistent ignoring of commitments, the 'peace process' went on and the Palestinians were reinforced for the wrong behavior. Today, after close to two years of unrelenting terror and repeated violations of the Oslo accords, most Israelis, not to speak of Europe and the United States, are resigned to the realization of the Palestinian goal of an independent state. The logical conclusion? Terror works. While Israel busies itself with eradicating terrorists and those that sponsor them, the world is divided on how to react. The Arab world cries ' foul' and is backed by the European Community, who, in their shortsightedness, is eager to appease both Arab governments and the resident Muslim populations in their countries. The United States, acting both as a military and moral superpower, was alone in supporting the validity and legality of the Israeli actions. With both Israel and the United States, the goal is clear. Zero tolerance for terror. For both, now is the chance to set the tone for the battle the civilized world is engaged in. Political discussions of any type while terror continues will only reinforce the use of violence and terror as a means to attain political goals. Allow perceived injustices to be resolved in this manner, and a Pandora's box of anarchy and mayhem will be opened. In order to defeat terror politically, it must first be utterly defeated militarily. It's 'first win, then talk'. Not the other way around. And that's just simple psychology

reply by simplistic 4/12/2002 (14:41)

reply top Eevr heard of the American, French, Russian, or any other revolution? The British thought exactly the same thing when the American revolutionaries drove them out. The Palestinians think exactly the same way. In their view, if they keep acquiescing, it will teach Israel the wrong lesson. In their view, they have to let Israel feel their pain, through suicide bombings unfortunately. Psych 101 isn't leading either of them anywhere.

reply by truth_hurtz 4/12/2002 (14:58)

reply top Care to explain the status of those supposed arab countries ???? Who was ruling them ??? and who put them there ..??? and who gave them the weapons to fight the zionist gangs ????? Care to tell the turth once in your fealthy life? 'When the conflict began over 50 years ago, Arab behavior was low on psychology, but high on brutishness. Like the class bully, the Arabs reasoned that force and bravado would get them what they want. By pushing, threatening, hitting and fighting, the goal was to force whom they perceived as the weaker party out of the neighborhood. After losing one, two, three wars, some in the Arab world began to realize that tactics needed to change. The change didn't come quickly. In fact, after their overwhelming defeat by Israel in 1967, the Arab response was 'no' to peace, 'no' to negotiation and 'no' to recognition. After another couple of wars, the Arabs were even further from the goals they set in 1948.'

reply by Raquel 4/12/2002 (15:06)

reply top Seth, in 1947, 90% of the population living in Palestine was arab. Can you explain to me how they were those promoting terror? I think you failed history 101!

reply by J'ai compre 4/12/2002 (15:17)

reply top The point is, if Israel wants to the year 2100, it will have to make peace with the arabs. Contrary to popular Sharon belief, 5 millions jews in Israel will not be able to exterminate 500 million arabs, their nukes not withstanding. Since Israel can not move it country to the south pacific,nit is in the interest of Israel to make peace with its neighbors. Or the conflict and the intefada and suicide bombings will continue till Israel runs out of citizens.

reply by Seth Sims to Raquel 4/12/2002 (15:35)

reply top 'Seth, in 1947, 90% of the population living in Palestine was arab. Can you explain to me how they were those promoting terror? I think you failed history 101!' Raquel, I think you need to check your facts. IN 1940 Jews made up 30.01% of the population in Palestine according to British records. There were numerous terrorist attacks against Jews prior to 1948. Again, do your historical research. Here are a list of some prior to 1967. I will retrieve a list for you from prior to 1948. Palestinian and Arab spokesmen commonly claim that the recent Palestinian terrorism is the result of the Israeli 'occupation' of the West Bank and Gaza, adding that the violence will cease only when the 'occupation' is ended. Despite this claim, it should be recalled that the many Palestinian and Arab rejectionist factions (such as the Hamas and the Hizbullah) repeatedly declare that even if Israel would fully withdraw from the territories they will continue their attacks, since they refute Israel's basic right to exist. More importantly, however, the basic premise of the Palestinian claim - that the 'occupation' causes terrorism - is historically flawed. Arab and Palestinian terrorism against Israel existed prior to the beginning of Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza as a result of the Six Day War of June 1967, and even prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. For example, Arab terrorism was rampant during wave of anti-Jewish riots in 1920-21 (which was characterized by the brutal murder in Jaffa of the prominent Jewish author Y. Brenner), during the 'Disturbances' of 1929 (which included the massacre of the Jewish community in Hebron), during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, and in many other recorded incidents of wholesale anti-Jewish Arab violence throughout the pre-state period. The Palestinian terrorism campaign was stepped-up on the eve of the UN Partition Resolution of November 1947, and led to the joint Arab invasion of 1948-49 which delineated the boundaries of the newly established State of Israel. Indeed, this deplorable violence can be traced back to the beginning of the renewed Jewish settlement of the Land of Israel over a century ago. After the War of Independence, Arab terrorism expanded in scope. In 1952, when 'fedayeen' terrorist border incursions reached their height, there were about 3,000 incidents of cross-border violence, extending from the malicious destruction of property to the brutal murder of civilians. In the years 1951-1955, 503 Israelis were killed by Arab terrorists infiltrating from Jordan, 358 were killed in attacks from Egypt, and 61 were killed in attacks originating from Syria and Lebanon. This anti-Israeli violence encompassed both frontier settlements and population centers, and was perpetrated, for the most part, against innocent civilians, most of them new immigrants. In conclusion, the oft-repeated Arab claim that the Israeli 'occupation' is somehow to blame for the Palestinian terrorism is nothing more than an empty retort, repudiated by the facts, and disproved by a century of historical reality. The following is a partial list of documented acts of Arab terrorism, all occurring prior to the beginning of the Israeli administration of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967: Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War Jan 1, 1952 - Seven armed terrorists attacked and killed a nineteen year-old girl in her home, in the neighborhood of Beit Yisrael, in Jerusalem. Apr 14, 1953 - Terrorists tried for the first time to infiltrate Israel by sea, but were unsuccessful. One of the boats was intercepted and the other boat escaped. June 7, 1953 - A youngster was killed and three others were wounded, in shooting attacks on residential areas in southern Jerusalem. June 9, 1953 - Terrorists attacked a farming community near Lod, and killed one of the residents. The terrorists threw hand grenades and sprayed gunfire in all directions. On the same night, another group of terrorists attacked a house in the town of Hadera. This occurred a day after Israel and Jordan signed an agreement, with UN mediation, in which Jordan undertook to prevent terrorists from crossing into Israel from Jordanian territory. June 10, 1953 - Terrorists infiltrating from Jordan destroyed a house in the farming village of Mishmar Ayalon. June 11, 1953 - Terrorists attacked a young couple in their home in Kfar Hess, and shot them to death. Sept 2, 1953 - Terrorists infiltrated from Jordan, and reached the neighborhood of Katamon, in the heart of Jerusalem. They threw hand grenades in all directions. Miraculously, no one was hurt. Mar 17, 1954- Terrorists ambushed a bus traveling from Eilat to Tel Aviv, and opened fire at short range when the bus reached the area of Maale Akrabim in the northern Negev. In the initial ambush, the terrorists killed the driver and wounded most of the passengers. The terrorists then boarded the bus, and shot each passenger, one by one. Eleven passengers were murdered. Survivors recounted how the murderers spat on the bodies and abused them. The terrorists could clearly be traced back to the Jordanian border, some 20 km from the site of the terrorist attack. Jan 2, 1955 - Terrorists killed two hikers in the Judean Desert. Mar 24, 1955 - Terrorists threw hand grenades and opened fire on a crowd at a wedding in the farming community of Patish, in the Negev. A young woman was killed, and eighteen people were wounded in the attack. Apr 7, 1956 - A resident of Ashkelon was killed in her home, when terrorists threw three hand grenades into her house. Two members of Kibbutz Givat Chaim were killed, when terrorists opened fire on their car, on the road from Plugot Junction to Mishmar Hanegev. There were further hand grenade and shooting attacks on homes and cars, in areas such as Nitzanim and Ketziot. One person was killed and three others wounded. Apr 11, 1956 - Terrorists opened fire on a synagogue full of children and teenagers, in the farming community of Shafrir. Three children and a youth worker were killed on the spot, and five were wounded, including three seriously. Apr 29, 1956 - Egyptians killed Roi Rotenberg, 21 years of age, from Nahal Oz. Sept 12, 1956 - Terrorists killed three Druze guards at Ein Ofarim, in the Arava region. Sept 23, 1956 - Terrorists opened fire from a Jordanian position, and killed four archaeologists, and wounded sixteen others, near Kibbutz Ramat Rachel. Sept 24, 1956 - Terrorists killed a girl in the fields of the farming community of Aminadav, near Jerusalem. Oct 4, 1956 - Five Israeli workers were killed in Sdom. Oct 9, 1956 - Two workers were killed in an orchard of the youth village, Neve Hadassah, in the Sharon region. Nov 8, 1956 - Terrorists opened fire on a train, attacked cars and blew up wells, in the North and Center of Israel. Six Israelis were wounded. Feb 18, 1957 - Two civilians were killed by terrorist landmines, next to Nir Yitzhak, on the southern border of the Gaza Strip. Mar 8, 1957 - A shepherd from Kibbutz Beit Govrin was killed by terrorists in a field near the Kibbutz. Apr 16, 1957 - Terrorists infiltrated from Jordan, and killed two guards at Kibbutz Mesilot. May 20, 1957 - A terrorist opened fire on a truck in the Arava region, killing a worker. May 29, 1957 - A tractor driver was killed and two others wounded, when the vehicle struck a landmine, next to Kibbutz Kisufim. June 23, 1957 - Israelis were wounded by landmines, close to the Gaza Strip. Aug 23, 1957 - Two guards of the Israeli Mekorot water company were killed near Kibbutz Beit Govrin. Dec 21, 1957 - A member of Kibbutz Gadot was killed in the Kibbutz fields. Feb 11, 1958 - Terrorists killed a resident of Moshav Yanov who was on his way to Kfar Yona, in the Sharon area. Apr 5, 1958 - Terrorists lying in ambush shot and killed two people near Tel Lachish. Apr 22, 1958 - Jordanian soldiers shot and killed two fishermen near Aqaba. May 26, 1958 - Four Israeli police officers were killed in a Jordanian attack on Mt. Scopus, in Jerusalem. Nov 17, 1958 - Syrian terrorists killed the wife of the British air attache in Israel, who was staying at the guesthouse of the Italian Convent on the Mt. of the Beatitudes. Dec 3, 1958- A shepherd was killed at Kibbutz Gonen. In the artillery attack that followed, 31 civilians were wounded. Jan 23, 1959 - A shepherd from Kibbutz Lehavot Habashan was killed. Feb 1, 1959 - Three civilians were killed by a terrorist landmine near Moshav Zavdiel. Apr 15, 1959 - A guard was killed at Kibbutz Ramat Rahel. Apr 27, 1959 - Two hikers were shot at close range and killed near Massada. Sept 6, 1959 - Bedouin terrorists killed a paratroop reconnaissance officer near Nitzana. Sept 8, 1959 - Bedouins opened fire on an army bivouac in the Negev, killing an IDF officer, Captain Yair Peled. Oct 3, 1959 - A shepherd from Kibbutz Heftziba was killed near Kibbutz Yad Hana. Apr 26, 1960 - Terrorists killed a resident of Ashkelon south of the city. Apr 12, 1962 - Terrorists fired on an Egged bus on the way to Eilat; one passenger was wounded. Sept 30, 1962 - Two terrorists attacked an Egged bus on the way to Eilat. No one was wounded. Jan 1, 1965 - Palestinian terrorists attempted to bomb the National Water Carrier. This was the first attack carried out by the PLO's Fatah faction. May 31, 1965 - Jordanian Legionnaires fired on the neighborhood of Musrara in Jerusalem, killing two civilians and wounding four. June 1, 1965 - Terrorists attack a house in Kibbutz Yiftach. July 5, 1965 - A Fatah cell planted explosives at Mitzpe Massua, near Beit Guvrin; and on the railroad tracks to Jerusalem near Kafr Battir. Aug 26, 1965 - A waterline was sabotaged at Kibbutz Manara, in the Upper Galilee. Sept 29, 1965 - A terrorist was killed as he attempted to attack Moshav Amatzia. Nov 7, 1965 - A Fatah cell that infiltrated from Jordan blew up a house in Moshav Givat Yeshayahu, south of Beit Shemesh. The house was destroyed, but the inhabitants were miraculously unhurt. Apr 25, 1966 - Explosions placed by terrorists wounded two civilians and damaged three houses in Moshav Beit Yosef, in the Beit Shean Valley. May 16, 1966 - Two Israelis were killed when their jeep hit a terrorist landmine, north of the Sea of Galilee and south of Almagor. Tracks led into Syria. July 13, 1966 - Two soldiers and a civilian were killed near Almagor, when their truck struck a terrorist landmine. July 14, 1966 - Terrorists attacked a house in Kfar Yuval, in the North. July 19, 1966 - Terrorists infiltrated into Moshav Margaliot on the northern border and planted nine explosive charges. Oct 27, 1966 - A civilian was wounded by an explosive charge on the railroad tracks to Jerusalem.

reply by Seth Sims 4/12/2002 (15:41)

reply top Jews who had dwelt on historical Palestinian terrain both east of the Jordan River and in the area called 'the West Bank' were driven out of that land's Arab-dominated towns over the past half century by sporadic pogroms and pillage, so that by the 1940s the Palestinian towns in Transjordan and the West Bank were considered 'purely Arab' -- already purged of their former Jewish population. The Jews once living in the area of Palestine known as Jordan and the West Bank had become 'Palestinian Jewish refugees' as the result of Arab violence. And the fact that there are Jewish 'Palestinian refugees' of twentieth-century vintage is overlooked even in Israel. These refugees found safety only in the predominantly Jewish-settled areas of Palestine's coastal plain, which today is Israel. By 1948, the more than seventy-five percent of Palestine that the British had allocated to the Arabs as 'Transjordan' already had been efficiently purged of all Jews, through periodic Arab onslaughts upon the various long-established Jewish communities. Despite that fact, the Jordanian government's nationality law of 1954 sought to safeguard its would-be racial purity: According to that law 'Palestinian' living in Jordan was entitled to Jordanian citizenship unless he as a Jew.9 9.Jordanian Nationality Law, Article 3(3) of Law No. 6 of 1954, Official Gazette No. 1171, February 16, 1954.

reply by Seth Sims to Raquel 4/12/2002 (15:46)

reply top The Arabs of Palestine, not even referred to by name in Balfour's document, were increasingly angry at what they feared would be their eventual replacement and domination by an alien, inspired and technologically superior people of different religion. Bloody inter-communal rioting broke out during the 1920s, the most notorious example perhaps being the massacres of some 60 religious Jews in the town of Hebron, about 20 miles south west of Jerusalem. The situation intensified in the 1930s as Nazism spread across Europe, bringing more persecution and more and even more sophisticated and determined Jews to Palestine. Arab resistance The Arabs were incensed. In 1936, they rose in armed revolt, mainly against the British rulers they saw as authors of their plight. But they were disorganised, factional and poorly equipped. British soldiers searching Arabs during the revolt in the late 1930s By 1939, the British had crushed the uprising, ending for good effective Arab resistance to the Mandatory Power and the Zionist planners, and leaving behind a fractured Palestinian-Arab society. The Arab resentment, however, did force the British, first, to abandon a plan to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish sectors; and seriously to restrict Jewish immigration at that very crucial moment, in 1939-40, when Hitler was at his most dangerous, conquering Europe and launching his mission to exterminate the Jewish people.

reply by anti_seth 4/12/2002 (15:53)

reply top UNITED NATIONS S -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Security Council S/3180/Add.1 24 March 1954 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DOCUMENT S/3180/Add.1 Exchange of correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Governments of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan and Israel regarding the convocation of a conference under article XII of the General Armistice Agreement [Original text: English] [24 March 1954] NOTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate for the information of members of the Security Council the texts of the following additional communications on this matter: 1. Letter dated 24 February 1954 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General. 2. Letter dated 24 March 1954 from the Secretary-General to the representative of Israel. 3. Telegram dated 24 March 1954 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite King-dom of the Jordan to the Secretary-General. 4. Telegram dated 24 March 1954 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan. Letter dated 24 February 1994 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General I have the honour to convey the following observations of my Government on your letter of 18 February 1954: The Government of Israel welcomes your offer to preside at the initial meeting of the conference and expresses the hope that under your chairmanship the two parties will overcome the problems of procedure and agenda without difficulty. The Government of Israel hopes that in their discussion of the procedure and agenda, the two parties will agree to assume direct responsibility for the conduct of the conference. If, in your view, Jerusalem is the most suitable venue for the conference, the Government of Israel would suggest that meetings be held in the Israel and. Jordan parts of the city alternately. The Government of Israel would wish the confer-ence to be held at the earliest date compatible with your convenience. (Signed) Abba EBAN Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Letter dated 24 March 1954 from the Secretary-General to the representative of Israel I have the honour to refer to the replies of the Governments of Israel of 24 February and of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan of 24 March to my communications of 18 February regarding the convocation of a conference with representatives of the two governments to deal with 'concrete issues of limited scope arising out of the implementation of the armistice agreement'. The reply of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan states that its attitude remains unchanged with respect to the appropriate methods of discussing the problems under reference. I consider that, for the present, my pursuance of this matter any further is not warranted. I enclose copy of the reply of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan. (Signed) Dag HAMMARSKJOLD Secretary-General Telegram dated 24 March 1954 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan to the Secretary-General I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with my telegram dated the 6th February 1954 and your telegram dated the 18th February 1954 regarding the invitation to my Government to meet with representatives of the other Government concerned in Jerusalem under your chairmanship for discussions under para 3 of article XII of the General Armistice Agreement. The' Jordan Government has given the views raised in your last telegram their very careful consideration, and find nevertheless that there is nothing in them to justify changing their attitude detailed in my previous telegrams, in that the only appropriate method of discussing the problems under reference, is through the Mixed Armistice Commission which is competent to deal with them under article XI of the said Agreement. I have further to reiterate that the Jordan civilian and military representatives on the Mixed Armistice Commission which is held under the auspices of the Chief Truce Supervision Organization are prepared to meet at any time and at the headquarters of the M.A.C. with the Israeli representatives to discuss all matters referred to in your last telegram, under article XI. (Signed) Dr. Hussein F. KHALIDI Minister for Foreign Affairs Telegram dated 24 March 1954 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan Have honour refer to replies of Governments of Israel of 24 February and of Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan of 24 March to my communications of 18 February regarding convocation of conference with representatives of two Governments to deal with 'concrete issues of limited scope arising out of implementation of Armistice Agreement'. Reply of Government of Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan states that its attitude remains unchanged with respect to the appropriate methods of discussing the problems under reference. Consider that, for the present, my pursuance of this matter any further is not warranted. Text reply of Israel Government is quoted below. (Signed) Dag HAMMARSKJOLD Secretary-General ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement (April 3, 1949) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the beginning of March 1949, talks began on the island of Rhodes between Israeli and Jordanian representatives under the chairmanship of Dr. Bunche. The major issues raised by Israel were free access to Jewish Holy Places in Jerusalem, border rectification, and the presence of Iraqi forces in the West Bank. Jordan sought to raise the Arab refugee question and the question of passage from the Old City of Jerusalem to Bethlehem. On 3 April, the agreement was signed, fixing the armistice line of the West Bank, transferring to Israel a number of Arab villages in the central part of the country and providing for a mixed committee to work out arrangements in Jerusalem (Article VIII). Text of the agreement: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Preamble The Parties to the present Agreement, Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice; Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement; The undersigned representatives of their respective Governments, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions: Article I With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed: 1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties; 2. No aggressive action by the armed forces - land, sea, or air - of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organisations; 3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected; 4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine. Article II With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed: 1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognised; 2. It is also recognised that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations. Article III 1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties - land, sea and air - is hereby established. 2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines set forth in articles V and VI of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party. 3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party. Article IV 1. The lines described in articles V and VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Lines and are delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948. 2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Lines is to delineate the lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move. 3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI. Article V 1. The Armistice Demarcation Lines for all sectors other than the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on the maps in annex I to this Agreement, and shall be defined as follows: (a) In the sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall follow the truce lines as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation; (b) In the Jerusalem sector, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area; (c) In the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on map 1 and marked B in annex I to this Agreement; (d) In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958) to the southernmost tip of Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be determined by existing military positions as surveyed in March 1949 by United Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement. Article VI 1. It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the intention of the Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the Acting Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister of Iraq authorising the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn. 2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement and marked A. 3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be established in stages as follows, pending which the existing military lines may be maintained: (a) In the area west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of Kafr Qasim: within five weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed; (b) In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed; (c) In all other areas of the Iraqi sector: within fifteen weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed. 4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in paragraph (c) of article V of this Agreement and marked B on map 1 in annex I, which involves substantial deviation from the existing military lines in favour of the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, is designated to offset the modifications of the existing military lilies in the Iraqi sector set forth in paragraph 3 of this article. 5. In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the Government of Israel agrees to pay to the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty kilometres of first-class new road. 6. Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the inhabitants of such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in, their full rights -of residence, property and freedom. In the event any of the inhabitants should decide to leave their villages, they shall be entitled to take with them their livestock and other movable property, and to receive without delay full compensation for the land which they have left. It shall be prohibited for Israeli forces to enter or to be stationed in such villages, in which locally recruited Arab police shall be organised and stationed for internal security purposes. 7. The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for all Iraqi forces in Palestine. 8. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement. 9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto. 10. Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be established, including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this purpose, within ten days from the date on which this Agreement is signed. 11. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in article V shall be subject to such rectification as may be agreed upon by the Parties to this Agreement, and all such rectifications shall have the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated in full in this General Armistice Agreement. Article VII 1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this impractical, as at the southernmost tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in annex II to this Agreement. In the sector now held by Iraqi forces, calculations oil the reduction of forces shall include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector. 2. Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, shall be completed within the same period. 3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with a view toward further reduction of such forces by mutual agreement of the Parties. Article VIII 1. A Special Committee, composed of two representatives of each Party designated by the respective Governments, shall be established for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application. 2. The Special Committee shall be organised immediately following the coming into effect of this Agreement and shall direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following, on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem. 3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it. Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may provide for the exercise of supervisory functions by the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article XI. Article IX Agreements reached between the Parties subsequent to the signing of this Armistice Agreement relating to such matters as further reduction of forces as contemplated in paragraph 3 of article VII, future adjustments of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, and plans and arrangements formulated by the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall have the same force and effect as the provisions of this Agreement and shall be equally binding upon the Parties. Article X An exchange of prisoners of war having been effected by special arrangement between the Parties prior to the signing of this Agreement, no further arrangements on this matter are required except that the Mixed Armistice Commission shall undertake to re-examine whether there may be any prisoners of war belonging to either Party which were not included in the previous exchange. In the event that prisoners of war shall be found to exist, the Mixed Armistice Commission shall arrange for all early exchange of such prisoners. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to afford full co-operation to the Mixed Armistice Commission in its discharge of this responsibility. Article XI 1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of such matters as fall within the exclusive competence of the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organisation designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement. 2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Jerusalem and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work. 3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement. 4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting. 5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members. 6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organisations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman. 7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement. 8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement. 9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations. 10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed. 11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement. Article XII 1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed. 2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article. 3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties. 4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine. 5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine. Done at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the third of April one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation. For and on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom Signed: Colonel Ahmed Sudki El-Jundi Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Maayte For and on behalf of the Government of Israel Signed: Reuven Shiloah Lieutenant-Colonel Moshe Dayan Annex I Maps Delineating Armistice Demarcation Lines [These maps follow annex II, and are explained in the note by the Secretariat to article V of the Agreement] Annex II Definition of Defensive Forces 1. For the purposes of this Agreement defensive forces shall be defined as follows: 1. Land forces (a) A standard battalion to consist of not more than 800 officers and other ranks, and to be composed of not more than: (i) Four rifle companies with ordinary infantry equipment; rifles, LMG's, SMG's, light mortars, anti-tank rifles and PIAT. The light mortars shall not be heavier than 2 inch. The following number of weapons per battalion shall not be exceeded: 48 LMG's, 16 mortars 2 inch, 8 PIAT's; (ii) One support company with not more than six MMG's, six mortars not heavier than 3 inch, four anti-tank guns not heavier than six-pounders; (iii) One headquarters company; (b) The artillery and anti-aircraft artillery to be allotted to the defensive forces shall consist of the following type of weapons: field guns not heavier than twenty-five pounders, the anti-aircraft guns not heavier than forty millimetres. 2. The following are excluded from the term 'defensive forces': (a) Armour, such as tanks of all types, armoured cars, Bren gun carriers, halftracks, armoured vehicles or load carriers, or any other armoured vehicles; (b) All support arms and units other than those specified in paragraphs I (a) i and ii, and I (b) above; (c) Service units to be agreed upon. 3. Air forces In the areas where defensive forces only are permitted airfields, airstrips, landing fields and other installations, and military aircraft shall be employed for defensive and normal supply purposes only. 11. The defensive forces which may be maintained by each Party in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as provided in paragraph I of article VI, shall be as follows for the sectors described in article V, paragraph 1: 1. Sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area: one battalion each. 2. Jerusalem sector: two battalions each. 3. Hebron-Dead Sea sector: one battalion each. 4. Sector Engeddi to Eylat: three battalions each. In addition, each side will be allowed one squadron of light armoured cars consisting of not more than 13 light armoured cars or half tracks. The weapons permissible on these vehicles will be determined by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 5. Sector now held by Iraqi forces: five battalions each, and one squadron of armoured cars each. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS INTRODUCTION EGYPT was the first Arab State to enter into armistice negotiations with Israel. United Nations auspices. Negotiations began on 12 January 1949, on the island of Rhodes, under the chairmanship of the Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche. After lengthy and difficult parleys, most differences were resolved and an agreement was signed on 24 February. The Egyptian example paved the way for negotiations with the other Arab belligerents, with the exception of Iraq (see below), and those with Lebanon and Jordan started on 1 March. An agreement with Lebanon was signed on 23 March on the Lebanese-Israel border, and one with Jordan on 3 April. Negotiations with Syria started on 5 April and the agreement was signed on the Syrian-Israel border on 20 July. That with Egypt set the pattern of principles, procedure and machinery for all the agreements. The basic assumption was that the agreements were intended to eliminate the threat to peace in Palestine and facilitate the transition to permanent peace (Document 1). Consequently, each agreement stipulates in Article I the basic aim of returning to permanent peace and emphasises that no aggressive acts shall be undertaken, planned or threatened by one party against the other. It is further emphasised that the armistice lines are purely military lines and not to be construed in any sense as political or territorial boundaries. They are to remain in force until a peaceful settlement is achieved between the parties, and either party, after the agreement has been in force at least one year, may ask for its amendment or revision. In the absence of mutual accord, either party may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to call a conference for the purpose of reviewing, revising or suspending any of the provisions; participation in the conferences would be obligatory. The execution of each agreement would be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) composed of an equal number of representatives of the parties to it and of the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), or his representative, as Chairman. Decisions of the MAC would be adopted by majority vote. The armistice lines followed, in general, the previous cease-fire lines, with some changes due to military or economic considerations. Egypt consented to withdraw its forces from the Faluja area; it retained control of the Gaza Strip but elsewhere withdrew behind the former boundary between Palestine and Egypt; the area of El-Auja and its vicinity was to be demilitarised. In the agreement with Lebanon, Israel consented to withdraw from the area which it occupied in southern Lebanon, and the armistice line was to follow the former international boundary between Lebanon and Palestine. More difficult was the demarcation of the armistice line with Jordan. Ultimately, after secret meetings between Israeli negotiators and King Abdullah, a line was accepted which coincided roughly with the former cease-fire line, slightly modified in favour of Israel to prevent disruption of lines of communication. Problems arising out of the division of Jerusalem were to be settled by a Special Committee (Article VIII): they included free movement on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads, resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus, free access to the Jewish Holy Places, including the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives and, above all, the Western Wall. The ancillary agreements arrived at earlier on the demilitarisation of Mount Scopus and of the area between the lines, including the Government House area, were incorporated. Iraq did not enter into an armistice agreement with Israel but evacuated its forces from Palestine, and Jordanian forces took their place (Article V). The most arduous talks were with Syria, the only Arab State that held a strategically important area in the territory allotted to Israel. After three and a half months of argument, Syria agreed to withdraw from Mishmar Ha-yarden in return for Israel's consent to the establishment of several demilitarised zones (Article V). The four agreements were hailed as the decisive step toward restoration of peace, and Dr. Bunche was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Hopes were soon dashed when it became apparent that the Arab States were not ready to enter into peace negotiations and insisted on belligerent rights - a claim explicitly repudiated by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution S/2322 of 1 September 1951 (see Section VIII, Document 5). The demilitarised zones, agreed upon to ease the solution of difficulties that had arisen during the negotiations, proved to be a major source of friction. In the course of the Sinai Campaign of 1956 (see Section IX), Israel declared the armistice agreement with Egypt null and void and withdrew from participation in the MAC. The agreements with Jordan and Syria had become ineffective and largely inoperative. The only agreement fully operative by the time the Six-Day War broke out in 1967 was with Lebanon. The consequence of the Six-Day War was to bring about the collapse of the entire armistice system (see Section XI). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/articles/book_jones_secrets/book_jones_secrets.html Brief Comments on James Bamford's Body of Secrets review by Curtis F. Jones Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the ULTRA-Secret National Security Agency from the Cold War through the Dawn of a New Century By James Bamford (Doubleday & Company, Incorporated, 2001. pp. 721. $30.) With the publication of two magisterial books—The Puzzle Palace in 1982 and Body of Secrets in 2001—James Bamford has established himself as the reigning expert on the National Security Agency. His research is so vast and his contacts are so authoritative that no one has challenged his primacy in that esoteric field. One caveat is incumbent on any reviewer or commentator, however. The very magnitude of Bamford's topic has drawn him into consideration of regional events that exceed the grasp of any generalist, however polymathic. His discussions of NSA involvement in the Middle East are so telescoped that they are imprecise and, in at least one case, inaccurate: He dismisses the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal as the consequence of Nasir's awkward attempt to play the Americans off against the Soviets in his bid for financing for the Aswan High Dam. This explanation ignores the crucial regional environment at the time. As Donald Neff recounts in Warriors at Suez (1981), Egyptian events of 1955-56 were inflamed by the mounting threat of war with Israel. Denied arms from the West, Nasir concluded an arms agreement with the Soviet Bloc in September 1955. Insensitive to the gravity of Nasir's situation, the United States and the UK made a feeble attempt to salvage their relations with Egypt by offering in December to help finance the first stage of the High Dam, but the offer was relegated to background noise by Israel's intent to dispose of Nasir by precipitating an all-out war. (See Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 2000.) In the spring of 1956, Nasir's alarm was intensified by continued shipments of arms from France to Israel (this arrangement under a 'secret' agreement leaked by British intelligence), probably also by secret U. S. approval of Canadian sales of jet fighters to Israel, and finally by the great power floating of a possible arms embargo on the whole Middle East. Looking for a fall-back source of arms, Nasir abruptly recognized Communist China on May 16, 1956. For Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the devout anti-Communist, this was the last straw. His reaction was deliberate, but immoderate. Without revealing his intentions, he asked his Bureau of Intelligence (INR) in the Department of State if Nasir could survive the political repercussions of the collapse of the High Dam project. INR responded that the project had not been hyped in regime propaganda and the repercussions would probably be manageable by Nasir. Dulles reportedly asked the Department of State Egyptian desk how Nasir might retaliate for withdrawal of the financing; the desk reportedly included nationalization of the Canal in the list of Nasir's options. It seems, however, that Washington was persuaded of the validity of the Canal company’s claim that Egypt was incapable of running the Canal on its own, a claim that Egypt was soon handily to disproved. Dulles ignored or discounted his own Department of State analyses. On July 20, 1956, Washington canceled its agreement to help finance the High Dam, questioning in terms that seemed designed to be offensive the capacity of the Egyptian economy to support the project. On July 26, Nasir nationalized the Canal. Bamford's paragraph on the ensuing war is on the mark—with the reservation that, although the Anglo-French plan to retake the Canal was ''fully agreed to' by Israel's leaders, the latter were willing to invade Egypt only if Israel could configure the action so as to evade the risk and the onus for having done so. Israel's initial actions was the introduction of airborne forces that could be pulled out at once if either the UK or France failed to fulfill its part in the conspiracy. (See Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (1982). These comments are offered in the spirit of amendment, rather than criticism of Bamford’s scholarship. No one who takes on such an ambitious project can hope to to get it all right. The alternative, which clearly would have had its own drawbacks, would have been to assemble an authorial committee for a product on the order of The Columbia History of the World.

reply by Raquel 4/12/2002 (16:24)

reply top Did you also fail Math 101? 1917 Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary sent a letter to the Zionist leader Lord Rothschild which later became known as 'The Balfour declaration'. He stated that Britain would use its best endeavors to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. At that time the population of Palestine was 700,000 of which 574,000 were Muslims, 74,000 were Christian, and 56,000 were Jews.

reply by Someone 4/12/2002 (16:24)

reply top Anti_seth, Do you from where on the internet I can find those old maps? Thankx.

reply by Seth Sims to Raquel 4/12/2002 (16:42)

reply top This is what you wrote: Seth, in 1947, 90% of the population living in Palestine was arab. Can you explain to me how they were those promoting terror? I think you failed history 101! You are now changing the years on me. Where do you want to go next? 1837? I think you may have failed drug test 101.

reply by anti_seth 4/12/2002 (16:42)

reply top www.google.com key words 'ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS ' I got that from results of www.google.com keywords 'Hashemite Kingdom Jordan' Look the entire history of the middle East is on line .. zionist version and the truth. just apply some common sense in judging which is which.

reply by Raquel 4/12/2002 (17:10)

reply top Nice argument Seth! So, now, anyone who does not agree with your Zionist strategies is on drugs? Take some and open your mind a little bit!

reply by Seth Sims 4/12/2002 (17:55)

reply top I was referring to you getting huffy with me about which years we were talking about. The drug test reference was in regards to you being confused about which years you were talking about. Lets review: You first said that there were no terrorist attacks against Jews by Arabs prior to 1947. I gave you some examples of terrorist attacks by Arabs on Jews prior to 1947. You then complained that I was confused and that you had written the year 1917, not 1947. I re-posted your original post showing that you were the one who was confused. Get it? Open you mind a little bit and it will come to you. If not, re-read through all our posts.

reply by Raquel 4/12/2002 (17:58)

reply top I did not get confused with the years, I was adding info, here it is some more. What did the Zionist terrorists actually do at Deir Yassin and at other villages that caused the Palestinian people to flee in fear? A Red Cross doctor, Jacques de Reynier, chief representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Jerusalem gave a shocking account of the massacre in his official report.(11) De Reynier arrived at the village on the second day and saw “the mopping up,” as one of the Israeli terrorists put it to him. It had been done with machine guns, then grenades, and was finished off with knives. The Jews decapitated some of the victims and fatally maimed 52 children in sight of their mothers. They cut open 25 pregnant women's wombs and butchered the babies in front of them. Israelis present at Deir Yassin have confirmed these atrocities. After his retirement in 1972, Israeli Haganah officer, Colonel Meir Pa’el, stated the following about Deir Yassin in Yediot Ahronot, a major Jewish publication: The Irgun and LEHI men came out of hiding and began to `clean' the houses. They shot whoever they saw, women and children included, the commanders did not try to stop the massacre…they were taken to the quarry between Deir Yassin and Giv'at Shaul, and murdered in cold blood... (12) The commander of the Haganah unit that controlled Deir Yassin after the massacre, Zvi Ankori, made this statement in the Israeli newspaper Davar: I went into six to seven houses. I saw cut off genitalia and women's crushed stomachs. According to the shooting signs on the bodies, it was direct murder.(13)

reply by truth 4/12/2002 (18:23)

reply top Back then .. mass graves were not invented yet.!

reply by Seth Sims 4/12/2002 (18:31)

reply top They sure were. They were real popular in Poland, Germany, Lithuania, etc.

reply by truth 4/12/2002 (18:33)

reply top I guess the zionists were just lazy then!!

reply by ozzie Hooper 4/12/2002 (19:35)

reply top Seth You Zionazis are the ones trying to go back to 72 A.D.. So yes, lets go back to 1837, or better yet lets go back to 1700. Studying your Zionist Elder's fictional stories isn't going to help you pass History 101 any time soon.