topic by
Someone
10/25/2001 (16:31)

Guardian UK
By Brian Whitaker
Tuesday October 23, 2001

There was a conference in London a few months ago about investment in Saudi Arabia. People paid Ł1,000 a head just for the privilege of attending. Amnesty International was very concerned that companies thinking of investing in the kingdom should be made aware of the human rights situation.

Amnesty was therefore delighted when Peter Hain, the British Foreign Office minister responsible for the Middle East at the time, agreed to 'refer' to human rights in his speech to the conference.

What Mr Hain actually said was this: 'Greater openness will improve mutual understanding, develop common values and increase respect for international standards, in the social, as well as the economic spheres.'

Someone well-versed in the language of diplomacy might, possibly, decode 'international standards in the social sphere' as meaning 'human rights', but conference delegates would have been hard-pushed after their lunch to spot it. Such language comes under the heading of 'not rocking the boat'. We don't want to offend the Saudis because they're very helpful when the oil markets turn sticky and of course they're valued
purchasers of British weap... sorry, aerospace technology.

But since September 11, the boat has been well and truly rocked. American newspapers, at least, are full of critical articles about Saudi Arabia.

Thomas L Friedman, the caustic columnist of the New York Times who often reflects attitudes at the highest political level, last week told the Saudi billionaire, Prince Talal, where to stuff the $10m cheque he offered to victims of the suicide attacks.

'To listen to Saudi officials, or read the Arab press,' Friedman wrote, 'you would never know that most of the hijackers were young Saudis, or that the main financing for Osama bin Laden - born in Saudi Arabia - has been coming from other wealthy Saudis, or that Saudi Arabia's government was the main funder
of the Taliban ... If you want to do something useful with your $10m, then endow an anti-corruption campaign in Saudi Arabia.'

An article in the New Yorker, by Seymour M Hersh, was even more blunt. 'Since 1994 or earlier, the national security agency has been collecting electronic intercepts of conversations between members of the Saudi Arabian royal family,' it began.

'The intercepts depict a regime increasingly corrupt, alienated from the country's religious rank and file, and so weakened and frightened that it has brokered its future by channelling hundreds of millions of dollars in what amounts to protection money to fundamentalist groups that wish to overthrow it.'

The article spoke of 'riveting intelligence' from eavesdropping on the phone calls of senior princes. In one call, according to Hersh, the interior minister, Prince Nayef, had urged a subordinate to withhold from the police evidence about the hiring of prostitutes.

'In the intercepts,' the article continues, 'princes talk openly about bilking the state, and even argue about what is an acceptable percentage to take. Other calls indicate that Prince Bandar, while serving as ambassador, was involved in arms deals in London, Yemen, and the Soviet Union that generated
millions of dollars in 'commissions'.'

This certainly made interesting reading for Americans, but there is little doubt that its intended audience was the rulers in Riyadh. As far as the US is concerned, the gloves are off.

The Saudi regime is now in a trap. It can't please the Americans on whom its security ultimately depends. Nor, faced with conflicting internal demands from modernisers, traditionalists and religious militants, can it please its own people.

The nightmare scenario is that Bin Laden might somehow escape from Afghanistan and arrive at the Grand Mosque in Mecca to proclaim a new caliphate.

But according to one former American diplomat quoted by Hersh, it might not even need Bin Laden to overthrow the monarchy. 'Something ruthless, small, highly motivated, and of great velocity' carried out by 20-30 Saudi soldiers could be sufficient.

On the other hand, there may be safety in numbers. The royal family is extremely large - it runs into the thousands - and many more, who depend on its patronage, would be unhappy to see the status quo overturned. The unknown factor is how many people would seriously fight to defend the regime if it came to the crunch.

Saudi royalty have visibly failed to uphold the religious principles on which their rule is based, and there is dissatisfaction with the privileges that even the most distant relatives of the king enjoy over ordinary citizens. An obscure prince who happens to be 3,000th-or-so in line to the throne can draw a monthly stipend without having to do any work, simply by virtue of his 'royal' blood.

Most of the regime's problems are self-inflicted, and none more so than in the field of education, where the authorities have sought to buy off religious extremists.

A draft report issued last June by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington warns: 'The government has ... tolerated a decline in educational standards in the name of Islam.

'The ulema [religious scholars] have been allowed to increase their influence over the curriculum, and more and more students are encouraged to pursue Islamic studies, which do not offer any career opportunities and increase the disaffection of Saudi youth.'

It adds: 'The futility of such education is exemplified by a glut of [graduates] in Islamic studies whose degrees are not taken seriously by Islamic scholars in other Arab countries and who have often become opponents of the government that has educated them.'

The problem is not the study of Islam itself, but the way other studies that could provide the skills the kingdom needs have been neglected. About two-thirds of all the PhDs awarded in Saudi Arabia are in Islamic studies.

So far, the kingdom has escaped serious trouble, but that may be about to change. One crucially important safety valve up to now has been freedom of travel: those who don't like the system can leave.

The significance of this in controlling internal opposition has generally been under-estimated. It plays a bigger part in Saudi Arabia than in poorer Arab countries because Saudis are more likely to have the means and the freedom to go abroad.

Until recently, the safety valve worked for religious extremists and liberal modernists alike. The extremists went on jihad to Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan - which, happily for the princes, meant they were not around to cause trouble in the kingdom. Meanwhile the liberal Saudis, whenever they found the system too oppressive, could take a few weeks' break in Europe or the US.

Britain issues 53,000 visas to Saudis every year and the US issues 60,000 - far more than for any other Arab country.

The British embassy's website in Riyadh says: 'We warmly welcome Saudi and other nationalities who want to visit the UK for business or pleasure, or who want to study there. We are committed to providing the fastest possible service to our customers.'

In Riyadh, British visas are normally ready the same day, and Saudi nationals are encouraged to apply for five-year multiple-entry visas which allow them to visit the UK as often as they please. To see what a remarkable privilege this is, compare and contrast the discouragingly bureaucratic visa advice given -
for example -by the British embassy's website in Morocco.

Up to now, the US has also readily granted visas to Saudis, while making intensive background checks on others such as Iranians and Syrians.

But in the light of the September 11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan, there is little chance that Saudi Arabia's safety valve will remain open.

The opportunities for jihad outside the kingdom will be severely curtailed and, given that so many of the New York and Washington hijackers turned out to be Saudis, visas to the west may become harder to obtain.

In future, we can expect the forces of opposition to generate steam inside the kingdom rather than outside it.

Email Brian Whitaker
brian.whitaker@guardian.co.uk

reply by
Barb
10/27/2001 (1:14)

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I noticed two things in this article in error:
Osama Bin Laden was not born in Saudi Arabia; he was born in some little country south of it (can't think of the name). Mayor Guiliani was the one who said, 'no thanks' to the check from the Saudi Prince. After the prince made a comment that the US has to re-examine its foreign policy on the mideast, Guiliani said,
'Comments like those are part of the problem.'

reply by
someone
10/28/2001 (13:18)

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I am not sure if I understand Barb correctly but Usma was born in Saudi Arabia. In fact, Saudi Arabia took away his citizenship many many years ago under US pressure. Again no proof but on strong arm tactics.

As far as Guiliani is concerned, he was not representing the whole US but was more concerned about his jewish constituency. After all we all have freedom of expression and anyone can express his point of view.

This is one big problem in our country. We do not want to have an open discussion about the our policies in the whole MidEast.

Thanks to people like Mark B., who started this wonderful site and his newsletter, many of us are better educated then the rest.

There needs to be an open forum in Congress to discuss why we support dictators of MidEast, why we ignore UN policy violations by Israel, and what is this peace process is all about.