topic by
Seth Sims
4/24/2002 (18:56) |
|
A cut and paste well worth reading.
THE REGION: The way forward
By Barry Rubin
(April 24) The world should be amazed that Israel tried to abide by the rules of the peace process for so long after its destruction by unilateral Palestinian action. It should rise to its feet in admiration that Israelis act with far more restraint than any other country would in similar conditions. It should applaud the fact that, despite their experiences, Israelis still want peace, are eager to end the occupation, and would be ready to accept a Palestinian state if they thought concessions would bring real peace.
Don't hold your breath waiting for this scenario to materialize; but understand that this is the way Israelis view it.
Now conditions have forced the development of a concept and strategy which, though likely not explicit in the minds of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and other decision-makers, does guide their actions. In outline:
* There is no belief that the current Palestinian leadership is going to make peace with Israel. There is considerable doubt that it is even willing to agree on a real cease-fire.
* The peace process initiated by the Oslo agreement is clearly finished. This end came against Israel's wishes and as a result of Palestinian behavior. Thus the interim agreements and territorial designations laid down during a very different era no longer apply.
(They could be reinstated if the Palestinian leadership demonstrated to Israel - not to the EU, the Arab League, or the Western media - that it is seriously ready to live up to its commitments. Such an outcome does not, however, seem likely in the near future.)
* Given Israel's experience with the Palestinian leadership and external actors, it seems unlikely that more concessions, or even returning to some of the concessions already offered, is a solution. Before offering anything unilaterally Israel wants to know for sure what the other side is going to do in return.
* Yasser Arafat will not be expelled. Since he seems overwhelmingly concerned with his own welfare and not his people's, his removal to some other place would only increase his indifference to the material consequences of his policies. He would feel even less pressed to seek a cease-fire and be more able to mobilize - or at least believe he was mobilizing - international support.
* If Israel needs to hold certain territorial areas - mostly non-urban ones - for the protection of its roads, borders and settlements, it will do so for as long as necessary.
* When required, Israeli forces will go anywhere and stay there for as long as possible to wipe out safe havens being used by terrorists and their backers to launch attacks on Israel. This includes any town in the West Bank or Gaza.
* There is no interest in recapturing all the territories or even a considerable proportion of them, nor in annexing any territory.
* There is no expectation that the military will win a victory which will make existing problems will go away or cause the other side to sue for peace. The root of the crisis lies precisely in its reluctance to make peace.
* A small victory is any added pressure on the Palestinians that increases the likelihood of their ending the war - even though that process will take months, or even years; also reducing their capacity to wage war by destroying military and bomb-making facilities, gathering intelligence, and killing or capturing terrorists bent on attacking Israel's population.
* A limited, but welcome, victory would be a reduction in the number of successful terrorist attacks against Israelis, even though attacks would continue at some level.
* A major victory would be forcing the Palestinians to end their war or agree on a real cease-fire.
* This war must be conducted on the highest possible moral plane, with the greatest effort made to avoid civilian casualties, despite the fact that the other side - and most of the world - will never give Israel credit for acting in this way.
* In addition to an offensive policy, the time has come for Israel to create a reasonable defensive system. This would include a fence system with sensors, strong points, mobile forces and other features. It would not be 100% effective, but it would reduce casualties and provide leverage for 'winning' (i.e. ending) the war as soon as possible.
The precise placement of the wall would be determined by military criteria, though political factors may have an influence. The line drawn would not be intended as a final border in any way.
* Israel will not withdraw unilaterally from the West Bank and Gaza, or evacuate settlements. If the Palestinians want Israel and the settlements to leave these areas they will have to agree to a real and lasting peace.
* Since much of the world has chosen to slander Israel and disregard the real situation, Israel will not be overly influenced by international pressure. In addition, the world can neither deliver Arafat, nor does it seem interested in offering Israel any incentives to take even more risks.
US advice and interests will be carefully considered and heeded whenever possible, but Israel must put preserving its existence and its citizens' safety at the top of its list of priorities.
* This war is going to go on for some time. It will only end when the Palestinian side gets tired and persuades, or forces, its leaders to change course. Many Palestinians already know that their strategy is folly, but fear to say so in public.
The real question here is when Arafat will wake up and decide to change his policy. If such a alteration in course ever comes about, it will not be because Arafat feels Israel is weak, or making concessions; or because he believes the world will come to his rescue if only he keeps on fighting.
* While remaining open to diplomatic initiatives and ready to explore any options, Israel views a diplomatic solution as being extremely unlikely.
* The best thing the world can do to help both sides is persuade Arafat that he is on his own, that no one will save him, that continued fighting will lead to even bigger disaster, and that more terrorism will lead to support of Israel, against him.
* The worst thing the world can do is persuade Arafat that it is on his side, that terrorism will be overlooked, that Israeli retaliation will lead to a boycott of Israel, and that it will demand more Israeli concessions to get him to stop the violence.
For if they tell Arafat he is winning, why should he stop?
|
|