reply by
John Calvin
4/26/2002 (23:06) |
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Nonsense of the highest order, typical in the way it casts political developments in Indonesia and other countries in terms familiar to the cohorts of 'liberal' anti-religious bigots in the U.S., but completely distort and confuse the picture of what is going on in the countries they pretend to be reporting on. And, of course, mistaking the fearful cow-towing to Bush's belligerent 'Infinite Justice Crusade' as a significant political trend.
Indonesia Presenting Numerous Obstacles to U.S. Action
22 April 2002
Summary
Attention is turning toward Indonesia as the center of Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia, which would seem to make the country a likely and necessary target of U.S. anti-terrorism action. But unlike the Philippines, where U.S. troops are deployed on an anti-terrorism training mission, the political, social and geographic realities of Indonesia make any U.S. action there extremely difficult.
Analysis
Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian with alleged ties to al Qaeda, was sentenced in the Philippines to at least 10 years in prison April 18 for illegal possession of explosives. Al-Ghozi was given a second concurrent sentence April 19 for falsifying passports, an act which was allegedly in preparation for planned bombings against U.S. targets in Singapore this year.
Al-Ghozi is believed to be a key leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesia-based Islamic militant group seeking the establishment of a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia. He still faces charges of plotting a series of bombings in Manila in December 2000 that left 22 dead and more than 120 injured.
The Philippines is not alone in tracing militants and terrorism to Indonesia. Malaysian security detained two Indonesian nationals April 17 and 18 during a sweep that netted 14 suspected members of Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, an al Qaeda-linked group accused of plotting to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. Even Singapore's government has accused Indonesia of being a major regional hub of Islamic militancy.
The regional finger pointing at Indonesia makes the nation appear a likely, and perhaps even necessary, target of the U.S. war against terrorism. Yet Washington is severely constrained in its options by the political, social and geographic structure of Indonesia.
The U.S. government's doctrine since Sept. 11 has been that any nation unwilling or unable to deal with suspected terrorists or al Qaeda supporters would be subject to unilateral U.S. action. Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have repeatedly accused the Indonesian government of failing to tackle Islamic militancy or even detain suspected terrorists within its borders. Yet the United States has not taken steps to act in Indonesia, despite the growing evidence that Jakarta cannot and to some extent will not crack down on groups and individuals with suspected al Qaeda links.
The most recent example is the debate in Jakarta over whether to detain Abu Bakar Bashir, a suspected key member of the Jemaah Islamiyah. Indonesian officials questioned Bashir following requests from Malaysia and Singapore, but have not detained him due to lack of evidence.
The Indonesian government's excuse for not detaining Bashir and other suspected Islamic militants is that the country's move to a democratic system has stripped authorities of the right to detain people without evidence, unlike in Singapore and Malaysia, where internal security acts remain the chief tool for putting the squeeze on militants.
The fact that Indonesia is predominately Muslim, its heavily dispersed population and the limited central control over outlying regions have made the country a prime location for regional and international militants to regroup and plan. Elements in the government and military also draw their support and power from some of Indonesia's more militant Islamic groups, and there are even suggestions that the military may be using Islamic rebels -- such as from the Laskar Jihad -- to quash the ethnic separatist movement in the Irian Jaya province.
The same factors that are making Indonesia an attractive location for militants also make it extremely difficult for the United States to carry out any anti-terrorism operations. This is in contrast to the Philippines, where the predominately Christian government can call on the U.S. military for support in suppressing the Muslim Abu Sayyaf rebel group, which is viewed locally as more of a kidnap-for-ransom gang than an Islamic independence movement. Indonesia does not present such ready opportunities for U.S. intervention.
Washington was critical of Indonesia's military since before the fall of former President Suharto, but was finally prompted to break off most remaining military ties with Jakarta after the violence that accompanied East Timor's independence referendum in 1999. This has limited the openings for Washington to get involved in Indonesia in the war against terrorism.
In any case, it would be politically difficult for the Indonesian government or military to open up to U.S. involvement even if they wanted to. The current government structure remains a fragile and tense collection of nationalists and Islamists vying for power and control over the Indonesian masses.
Indonesia's physical structure -- an archipelago comprising 17,000 islands, of which 6,000 are inhabited -- also presents a massive challenge to any U.S. action. It is very difficult for U.S. troops, alone or with their Indonesian counterparts, to sweep the entire nation and thus deny al Qaeda a place to operate from. Furthermore, a U.S. military deployment could trigger a serious outcry from the more than 200 million Muslims in Indonesia, who may not share the same extreme views as al Qaeda but are none too keen on having American forces invade their country.
Washington is currently trying to overcome some of these problems, restarting talks on cooperation with the Indonesian military and praising the current government for its efforts in the war against terrorism. But the reality in Indonesia and in other nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, where al Qaeda can still operate with relative freedom, is that the United States -- despite the seriousness of its mission -- is severely constrained from operating fully in some of the very countries where that mission is perhaps most pressing.
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