WASHINGTON SCENE:

MIDDLEEAST.ORG - MER - Washington - 25 November: They already have firm control of the Pentagon, which also actually means some 80% of the "Intelligence" Budget. And they've made great progress in recent years taking over the State Department as well as the National Security Council. Now crusading "Neocons" -- many Jewish and nearly all connected over the years with the Israeli-Jewish lobby in Washington -- are determined to finally bring the last resistant power center, the CIA, into line. Washington these days is like the land of the body-snatchers, everyone looking over their shoulders, the fear factor rising higher and higher.

Now the Israeli-connected Neocons are in reality the very Washington operatives that are really responsible for all that has gone so wrong in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Most of the lies about Iraqi "Weapons of Mass Destruction", most of the most militant and blood-thirsty tactics of the military, can be traced back to them, to their ideology, and to their purposeful deceptions and trickery.

But by successfully blaming so much that has happened instead on the CIA the Neocons not only are getting themselves off the hook, they are using the opportunity they now have to purge the CIA of any and all who have opposed them; especially those who have tried to come forward with honest and truthful information about what has been happening. The situation is so bad that the CIA's Acting Director, himself being forced out in the purge along with many other senior long-timers at the Agency, has to write on the Washington Post's Op Ed Page that "The CIA Is No 'Rogue' Agency".

And there's serious purpose to this madness; it's not just the fully empowered Neocons getting back at their political and ideological antithesis. The Neocons know very well that their work is hardly done; they are preparing the way for their plans for still greater warmongering and crusading soon to come.

Whatever one thinks of them and their ideology, the Neocons are seriously getting ready for what is to come. Those who oppose them, those who are frightened by them, should be more wary then ever!
As for the CIA itself, once purged, once converted to neoconism with few restraints, the once proud Agency will not only bulk up on new neocon-approved spies but will be unleashed for more and more covert ops, assassinations, and 'regime changes'.

By Dana Priest
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, November 25, 2004; Page A04

In his first television interviews in June, an anonymous CIA analyst made a splash not only because he was a novelty but also because he was accusing the CIA of failing to adapt to al Qaeda's changing structure.

By August, as the presidential campaign heated up, the author of "Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror" was chastising the administration for the war in Iraq. "I'm not an expert at all on Saddam or WMD or Iraq," he told Channel NewsAsia, "but as it factors into the war against al Qaeda and al Qaeda-ism, it was a tremendous gift to bin Laden."

Some administration officials and others in the national security world viewed the unusual interviews from a CIA employee as a sly move by departing CIA Director George J. Tenet to retaliate against the White House for letting his agency take so much heat for the failed prewar judgments on Iraq and other missteps.

But two former CIA officials and the author himself said four top managers at the agency, not including Tenet, made the decision to let "Anonymous" publish and give interviews. The officials said they did so only because they feared that the author would resign, earning even more attention for a work they viewed as partly ludicrous. They said the agency underestimated how the book would play in the presidential campaign.

Nevertheless, the fallout over Michael Scheuer's comments -- he began using his name just before leaving the CIA this month -- provided the latest example of how some in the White House and their allies, on one side, and the CIA, on the other, have come to believe that each is out to take down the other.

By the time a new CIA director, Porter J. Goss, took over on Sept. 24, "both sides were primed to be offended," said a former senior CIA official who admires Goss.

Now, Goss's every gesture is being magnified through the lens of suspicion and apprehension as he undertakes the kind of bureaucratic change that would be difficult under any conditions.

"There is probably no doubt that Porter Goss was given a mandate to bring this organization around," said Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), chairman of the House intelligence committee. He said that "to do it smoothly would have taken more time. Porter knows the people. He knows the agency, and he obviously believes there hasn't been enough change since September 11. I support him."

"There is some internal tension. The key is how Porter manages it," Hoekstra said. "The question becomes, do you pull so hard you break the rubber band."

The debut of the Goss era was bound to be painful even without suspicions by some that Tenet's successor was arriving to carry out a White House-directed purge. Reeling from criticism over the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and faulty intelligence on Iraq, the CIA had lost its biggest public defender, Tenet, in July. By contrast, Goss, when chairman of the House intelligence committee, had publicly lashed out at CIA deficiencies more than once.

Tension rose with a rumor that Goss had a hit list of 80 employees and the retirement of an unusually large number of people when he took over. Following Tenet out the door were officials in charge of security clearances, personnel and recruiting, global logistical support, internal management, legislative affairs, and public affairs.

Then, two weeks ago, the director of operations quit, as did his deputy, after a blowup with Goss's chief of staff, Patrick Murray, who is perceived by some longtime CIA officials as disrespectful of many people who have spent their lives there. This week the chiefs of the European and South Asia divisions "submitted their papers," according to former and current CIA officials.

"The place is boiling," one longtime CIA officer said. "People think it's slash and burn."

While Goss has largely remained silent about his plans and strategy, his latest attempt to calm the waters has backfired. In an e-mail to employees on Monday, Goss said "as agency employees we do not identify with, support or champion opposition to the administration or its policies."

Some employees interpreted the message as a clampdown on dissent. Other CIA employees and the CIA public affairs office said it was a restatement of the agency's obvious mission as an executive branch agency and adviser to the president.

"It was more like a clumsy effort to say, 'It's our job to supply the facts to the president,' " said Frederick P. Hitz, a former CIA inspector general. "There have to be changes, but 'housecleaning' is a strong word."

Against this backdrop, CIA employees worry that the White House believes the agency has turned into a den of Democrats, a notion that is laughable to many career employees who witnessed the closeness between Tenet and Bush.

"They're paranoid," one former official said of the White House.

John McLaughlin, deputy director of the CIA, took the unusual step of responding to the tumult with an op-ed article in yesterday's Washington Post that was headlined "The CIA Is No 'Rogue' Agency."

He acknowledged allegations that CIA employees leaked information to hurt the president. But McLaughlin said he knew "beyond a doubt . . . that the CIA was not institutionally plotting against the president, as some allege. The accusation is absurd."

Even Scheuer, whose book is deeply critical of the CIA leadership, has been taken aback by the attacks on the agency. Waiting in the Green Room on Sunday to appear on NBC's "Meet the Press," Scheuer said he found himself face to face with Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who had earlier described the CIA as a dysfunctional, rogue agency.

"I told him, 'Sir, I'm a Republican, I vote Republican, and I thought your comments were scurrilous,' " Scheuer said in an interview.

Scheuer said the group of people who decided to allow him to publish his book included A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard, the CIA's executive director; Stephen R. Kappes, deputy director for operations; Scott White, deputy for analysis, Scheuer's immediate supervisor at the counterterrorism center; and Phil Mudd, deputy director of the center.

One former agency official involved in the decision-making said the book represented Scheuer's personal opinion and contained nothing classified. Neither Tenet nor McLaughlin took part in the decision, Scheuer and the former CIA official said.

The CIA "decided it was better to let him vent than resign and go off and say things," the former official said.

Once he did, Scheuer said, colleagues let him know there was a move afoot "to seize my royalties" in retaliation.

When Scheuer, who was required to inform the CIA about his interviews after the fact, began having numerous sessions with the same reporters that were never published, the CIA figured he was no longer talking about the book. It then imposed onerous prior permission rules, which he could not meet.

Scheuer said he tried to refocus his media interviews but reporters mostly wanted to talk about Iraq.

At the end of July, Bill Harlow, the head of CIA public affairs, called him in. "This is affecting the president, you're getting involved in the election. The agency is being interpreted as not being evenhanded," Scheuer said Harlow told him.

Harlow said in an interview that the agency's leadership explained to Scheuer that his comments to the media were "inappropriate for a currently serving intelligence officer."

"No one was happy about what he was saying," said the former CIA official. ". . . This is a problem of unintended consequences."

By John McLaughlin

Wednesday, November 24, 2004; Page A21

Seldom in my memory has there been such intense controversy about the CIA. Seldom has so much of what is said been so distorted and misinformed. Seldom has there been so little concern about the potential impact on the agency's ability to perform its mission and the consequences that holds for national security.

The time has come to turn down the temperature of the debate, to take a deep breath, and to get some balance and thoughtfulness into the discussion.

Let's start by dispelling the myth that the CIA has become a "dysfunctional" and "rogue" agency.

Like any organization of human beings, the CIA is far from perfect and has made mistakes -- mistakes we have recognized and are working to remedy. But dismissing the agency as "dysfunctional" is way out of line. This is an organization that, during the six months of seemingly deadlocked debate over "intelligence reform," has worked with its intelligence-community and foreign partners to take down about a dozen important terrorists who were plotting against our country and its allies. Despite waves of harsh criticism, the agency has never once lost its focus or its drive to protect the U.S. homeland and American interests abroad.

This is the same agency that, through its operators and analysts, was in large part responsible for many of the victories against terrorists and weapons proliferators cited during the recent election campaign -- the penetration and destruction of the illicit A.Q. Khan nuclear supply network, the closely related surrender of Libya's weapons of mass destruction, the capture of many of the key perpetrators of Sept. 11 attacks, to mention just a few.

It is the same agency that worked with its partners in the intelligence community to piece together analysis that drew attention to Iran's nuclear ambitions and North Korea's illicit uranium enrichment program.

"Risk-averse" is another charge now casually hurled at the agency by pundits and commentators. Risk-averse? Tell it to the CIA officers who flew into hostile Afghanistan ahead of U.S. troops just 16 days after Sept. 11 and linked up with Afghan contacts developed years before. Tell it to the scores of CIA operations officers and analysts located with American troops throughout Iraq. Tell it to the CIA officers living side by side with foreign partners in remote and dangerous areas elsewhere, determined to deny sanctuary to terrorists. Or tell it to the analysts who daily put their reputations on the line by making difficult judgment calls with incomplete information on some of the most highly charged issues of our time.

Americans need to start thinking of these officers as our troops without uniforms, for that is what they are.

So let there be no doubt: The CIA is a risk taking enterprise -- the risks are both physical and intellectual. But those who claim the CIA is risk-averse should make clear whether they are prepared to give the benefit of the doubt when something goes wrong -- always possible in any truly risky endeavor -- rather than immediately charging "intelligence failure" or "rogue agency."

Put another way, is there real tolerance for things that go awry in carefully planned operations that must be carried out in circumstances not completely under anyone's control? There should be, because there is often as much "fog" in clandestine intelligence work as there is in wars.

Beyond all this, it is alleged that the CIA was leaking material before the election to damage the president. There were leaks to be sure, but the truth is that no one, other than those who leaked and those who reported, knows where they were actually coming from.

What I do know beyond a doubt is that the CIA was not institutionally plotting against the president, as some allege. The accusation is absurd. CIA officers are career professionals who work for the president. They see this as a solemn duty, regardless of which party holds the White House. Has everyone ruled out the possibility that the intelligence community during this period was simply doing its job -- calling things as it saw them -- and that people with a wide array of motives found it advantageous to put out this material when the CIA's views seemed at odds with the administration's?

Unlike the CIA's critics, I point no fingers. I only regret that we are in a period when intelligence is being used as a weapon -- but more against ourselves than our enemies. We should all agree that this must stop.

Many people have called for a return to civility in Washington. To me, civility means thoughtful and well-informed debate. Nowhere is this more needed than in the debate over intelligence. Like the U.S. military, our nation's intelligence officers face daunting challenges now and for years to come. Constructive criticism can help. Tirades and hyperbole will not.

The writer is deputy director of central intelligence.

By Walter Pincus and Dana Priest
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, November 24, 2004; Page A04

President Bush has ordered CIA Director Porter J. Goss to increase by 50 percent the number of qualified CIA clandestine operators and intelligence analysts, an ambitious step that would mean the hiring and training of several thousand new personnel in coming years.

Bush also ordered the doubling of CIA officers involved in research and development "to find new ways to bring science to bear in the war on terrorism, the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and against new and emerging threats." In the presidential order, dated Nov. 18 and released by the White House yesterday, Bush also called for a 50 percent increase in the number of CIA officers proficient in "mission-critical languages" such as Arabic.

The directive comes as the CIA is under intense scrutiny and in a period of transition under Goss's new leadership, and as the administration is under pressure to show progress in addressing the shortcomings documented by the Sept. 11 commission this summer. Last week Congress was unable to agree on details of legislation to dramatically reorganize the U.S. intelligence community.

In addition to calling for such a reorganization, the 9/11 commission had also urged strong increases in the number of clandestine officers, intelligence analysts and language specialists, as had the Senate and House intelligence committees.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the CIA has undertaken an unprecedented recruiting and training campaign. The president's order left unclear how that would be accelerated.

The 50 percent increases he called for "are huge," requiring a new training facility "and even more aggressive recruiting, or lowering the quality of people," a former CIA official involved in the recruiting effort said.

The exact number of CIA officers in one area targeted for increase -- the clandestine service, officially known as the Directorate of Operations -- is classified, but former officials say it is around 4,500. Only about one-third are in the field as case officers who recruit agents, a former official said. The rest provide support from headquarters and overseas. Overall, the agency is believed to employ about 20,000 people.

U.S. officials said much of what Bush proposed was already being undertaken by the CIA and had been outlined in a strategic plan finished in December 2003. Officials said the White House was not aware of that planning when the president signed the directive, the existence of which was first reported by the New York Times.

Goss has said he wants to make significant changes in the way the agency does business, but he has been unclear on many specifics.

His tenure so far has been tumultuous. Several senior and mid-level clandestine officers, including the director and assistant director of the Directorate of Operations, have resigned or retired.

In his order, Bush gave Goss 90 days to put together a budget and implementation plan for hiring and training the new personnel. One former senior agency official said yesterday that the task "could take years."

Bush's order said the increases should be done "as soon as feasible."

Since many new trainees will be used against tough targets such as terrorists and closed governments such as North Korea and Iran, the training and eventual placement overseas will be even more difficult. Many will not be able to work out of embassies with diplomatic cover -- as many traditionally have -- but will operate covertly in their target countries. These officers will be "NOCs," which means they are there under "non-official cover," and subject to arrest as spies if they are caught.

Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), chairman of the House intelligence committee, suggested that Congress should be "prepared to triple the budget for intelligence" if needed. "We will answer the issue of resources," he said.

In a separate presidential directive -- also issued Nov. 18 and released yesterday -- Bush gave the attorney general 90 days to provide plans for the creation of a "specialized and integrated national security workforce" within the FBI.

That directive builds upon reforms set in motion by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, who announced in June that he was creating a "directorate of intelligence" aimed at improving the collection and analysis of intelligence information within the FBI.

The president also signed an order calling on the national security agencies to study whether to expand the types of covert operations undertaken by the military, activities that are now largely handled by the CIA's paramilitary division.

Bush set a 90-day deadline for that study as well.

The Sept. 11 commission recommended that the Pentagon assume all paramilitary activities, including those in which the hand of the U.S. government is to remain secret. None of the recent intelligence reorganization bills contained that provision, however.

The Defense Department has been studying and experimenting with new ways to use military forces to collect intelligence and conduct other covert operations. In this realm -- technically called "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" -- some skeptics view the department as inching into covert actions.

This is controversial, in part because it would mean that if soldiers involved in a covert operation are captured, the government would not admit they are U.S. military personnel. CIA operatives sign up for this risk. Military personnel do not, except when they agree to be temporarily transferred to the CIA.

Staff writer Dan Eggen contributed to this report.