"DISASTROUS" AMERICAN INTERVENTION
"Disastrous consequences for the peace process..."

You've got to wonder about these Palestinian "negotiators". What others saw decades ago those who have been most involved are apparently beginning to see only now. What others saw even more clearly at the time of the Gulf War and Madrid the Arafat group of people is only beginning to see now. What the head of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington, Dr. Haider Abdul Shafi, saw at the time of Oslo and thus refused to attend the White House ceremony in 1993, those who head up the "Palestinian Authority" are only acknowledging now after so many wasted years and so much more bloodshed and so many more "facts on the ground".

One must wonder just what this says about the qualifications, intelligence, competence, and self-serving attitudes of these "negotiators" to be the negotiators; certainly Abu Mazen himself, one of the top leaders of the pack, among them. This short article and Abu Mazen's short memo are quite literally just the very tip of the iceberg here. And if there were even minimal accountability, if there were even a semblance of democracy, if there were basic political decency, the entire group of Palestinian negotiators would resign or be removed and those who warned of just this situation long ago would be put in their place, first of all Dr. Haider Abdul Shafi.

PA ABU MAZEN ATTACKS U.S. ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS

By Amira Hass
Palestinian Affairs Correspondent

[Ha'aretz - Jan 22]
American efforts to mediate a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have had "disastrous consequences for the peace process," says a brief memorandum compiled for the Palestinian Authority's peace talks department, headed by Abu Mazen.

The memorandum, prepared by the legal team of the department, was given to the Palestinian negotiating team in Taba. While the document focuses on U.S. failures, it also explicitly criticizes Palestinian policies for not warning about the "false sense of normalcy created because of the ongoing process of negotiations."

Under U.S. supervision, the document continues, "the Palestinian-Israeli 'peace process' has become a goal in and of itself. ... The lack of visible resistance to Israeli occupation from the Palestinian side - except for temporary flare-ups - and Israel's ability to continue negotiations while continuing to build settlements in Occupied Palestinian Territory has created the false impression that the 'process' of achieving peace could substitute for peace itself."

The formulators of the document say "as a result of vaguely-worded arguments ... both parties to the conflict have mistakenly assumed, at different times, that either the Israelis had accepted to end the occupation, or that the Palestinians had agreed to forgo some of their fundamental rights."

"Such ambiguity," the document adds, "made it possible for both sides to sign agreements that they could interpret in diametrically opposed manners to their domestic constituencies ... and has led to very little implementation."

U.S. policy over the past seven years, the document says, has been guided by "the need to help Israel normalize its relations with the Arab and Muslim world at large, as well as with many other nations around the world sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians."

The memorandum says: "Over the last seven years in particular, the United States has become increasingly identified with Israeli ideological assumptions. Dennis Ross, for example, and others have acknowledged having an emotional commitment to Israel, and have said they cannot distinguish between their personal and professional involvement with it."

It says "ignoring the long-term development of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the improvement of the Palestinian quality of life ... Israel's security, including the security of its occupation forces, have been the focus of each agreement, [whereas] the quality of life of Palestinians has continued to decline."

Mid-East Realities

www.middleeast.org

Source: http://www.middleeast.org/articles/2001/1/36.htm