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IRAQ TEETERS
Preparations for escalating conflict underway
Struggle for Iraq now beginning anew

"The war was fought to weaken Iraq permanently, and
if possible to break it up into separate 'statelets', so as
to prevent it ever again challenging Israel or US oil and
strategic interests in the Gulf."

"The struggle for power in Iraq is only just beginning.
The Shiite community is still feuding over who will
represent it; the Sunnis, who have ruled the country from
its beginnings, are not prepared to accept second-class status
and have shown their teeth in Fallujah and elsewhere; Kurdish
ambitions are more extravagant than any Arab can accept.
There is plenty of scope here for future conflict."


Mid-East Realities - MER - www.MiddleEast.Org - 15 July 2004:

The American chosen and enthroned 'interim Prime Minister' of Iraq, Iyad Allawi, is already sounding, and looking, more and more desperate by the day. His language is beliggerent, his style semi-Western despite his Iraqi origins, his huge assembly of on-edge body-guards distinctinctly non-Iraqi. No doubt Allawi has both the job, and the style, as a result of half a lifetime living in exile and working closely with British and U.S. intelligence. But for Iraqis the images are already beginning to wear badly as the days pass and as Iraq continues to teeter and frizzle. As the long-promised, but likely to be further 'delayed', date for elections approaches in a few months, the whole situation is likely to become even more tense and Allawi's grip slips to one even more tenuous.

The overall situation in the Iraq, and indeed throughout much of the Middle East, now teeters in tandem with the political fortures of those in power in both Washington and London. Even as the Bush and Blair regimes struggle to retain credibility and authority in view of what they did to bring about the invasion/occupation of Iraq, the boiling Middle East caldron now interacts with their fate more than ever before.

Patrick Seale writes from the U.K. more astutely than any establishment American commentator. And the old shrunken Christian Science Monitor continues to cover the affairs of the region with more depth and honesty than any of the major American newspapers.


Sadr's militia regrouping, rearming
Iranian agents are working to train forces loyal to the firebrand
cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in the holy city of Najaf.



The Christian Science Monitor - 15 July 2004: Hundreds of militiamen loyal to rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are rearming in their sanctuary in the Shiite holy city of Najaf in possible preparation for a new offensive, say US and Iraqi officials here.

As many as 80 Iranian agents are working with an estimated 500 Sadr militiamen, known as the Mahdi Army, providing training and nine 57-mm Russian antiaircraft guns to add to stocks of mortars, antitank weapons, and other armaments, according to Iraqi and US intelligence reports.

"They are preparing for something, gathering weapons; people are coming in buses from other parts of Iraq," says Michael al-Zurufi, the Iraqi security adviser of Najaf Province. "The most important are the Iran- ians. The Iranian people are trying to reorganize Sadr's militia so they can fight again."

At the same time, heavily armed Sadr militiamen are waging fear tactics, kidnapping local Iraqi police and family members, occupying buildings, and arresting Iraqis deemed critical of Sadr or in violation of Islamic law, residents and officials say.

Signs that the Sadr militia is regrouping after heavy losses in April and May come even as Iraqi leaders are attempting to nudge the firebrand cleric into the political arena. Uncertainty remains over whether the militia activity is unified and sanctioned by Sadr or primarily the work of factions of his lieutenants, the officials say. Both Iraqi and US officials are concerned about signs of significant Iranian influence with Sadr's forces.

"Sadr's the wild card," says Maj. Rick Heyward, operations officer for the 25th Infantry Division's I-14 battalion in Najaf.

In response, US and Iraqi commanders are fine-tuning contingency plans for possible attacks in the city, while bolstering newly recruited Iraqi police and national guard units with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. "Last week we bought $6,000 worth of heavy machine guns, RPG-7 rounds, AK-47s and ammunition," Najaf Province Gov. Adnan al-Zurufi said Wednesday. "We feel that this will help eliminate the threat."

Still, the governor and other Najaf officials readily admit they seek to avoid a confrontation with the Sadr militia now if possible. "We need to build ourselves, our police, our prisons," says Mr. Zurufi, who had only 10 police on duty when he took office in Najaf on May 5. "We have nothing here in Najaf now," he says as the lights flicker on and off in his downtown office, heavily guarded by Iraqi and US forces.

After Iraqi forces fled or joined Sadr's militia during the April uprising, Zurufi's administration had to rebuild them from scratch. Today, the province has 2,500 police, 800 Iraqi National Guard [ING] troops, and thousands of Iraqi guards. Still, many are poorly trained. "The police have a weak spirit, but they do their duty," admits Col. Amer Hamza, chief of staff of Iraqi police in Najaf.

Meanwhile, even their basic roles remain undefined. ING commander Akyl Khalil Bruhan complains that 500 of his 800 men are dispersed at different checkpoints, leaving only 300 as an active fighting force. "There are so many checkpoints, we don't have enough forces to control the area," he says.

Confusion over security roles led to a friendly-fire incident in Najaf earlier this week, when an ING patrol reported 80 Sadr militia had taken over a local hospital. ING and police surrounded the building and exchanged fire with forces at the hospital, only to learn that they were from Iraq's Facilities Protection Service.

Meanwhile, Sadr militia pressure local forces in Najaf as well as the nearby Shiite cities of Karbala, Hilla, and Diwaniya. "They are still trying to muscle the local security forces and set up illegal checkpoints," says Capt. Sean Stinchon, intelligence officer for the 1-14 battalion.

Negotiation, not confrontation

Shortfalls in Najaf's fledgling forces are one reason Governor Zurufi has taken a conciliatory stance toward aggressive moves by the militia.

For example, about 60 Sadr militiamen moved back into their office at an old movie theater in Diwaniya this week, painting it with graffiti saying "Death to the occupiers" and "the new Iraqi government is a puppet." Local officials gave them a deadline of midnight Tuesday to leave, but did nothing when the militia continued to visit the building.

Two weeks ago, after the militia captured about 10 Iraqi police following a hours-long firefight at the police station near the Imam Ali shrine, Zurufi negotiated a prisoner swap.

US commanders view such appeasement as setting a dangerous precedent - not only for Najaf but for all Iraq. Yet they have few options other than to follow the lead of their Iraqi counterparts. "The night the governor decided to exchange the prisoners was a hard night for the American soldier," says Col. Richard Longo, the 1st Infantry Division commander who oversees US forces in the region.

Only two weeks ago, US soldiers were seeking to kill or capture Sadr, who faced an arrest warrant issued by an Iraqi court for murder. "The government has to decide what they're going to do with Sadr and his group now," says Colonel Longo.

For his part, Gov. Zurufi makes it clear he has no intention of arresting Sadr now, preferring to delay action until after Iraqis elect a government. "I haven't received any order from Baghdad about arresting him, and I think it's a bad idea," Zurufi says. "Moqtada is a very simple person. he's not a leader who can control a million people, but we are making him a big shot."

As for Sadr's militia, US commanders believe it is using its sanctuary in Najaf either to project power outward to Baghdad's Sadr City and other Shiite centers around the country, or to regroup and wait for a call to arms. "We know what they are doing in there [the exclusion zone] but we can't do anything about it," says Longo. "They are trying to draw the Iraqi security forces into a fight."

Popular - and feared

Sadr's forces are operating in two large "exclusion zones" on either side of Najaf: the Najaf cemetery and Imam Ali shrine, and the nearby district of Kufa. They are storing weapons in the guarded cemetery, a maze of crypts and catacombs that offers endless hiding places and fighting positions. Near the shrine, they operate from unfinished buildings. US forces do not enter the zones, which are only sporadically policed by Iraqi security.

Posters of Sadr are plastered around the zone, an indication of his popularity, especially among young people. Still, many others live in fear under the shadow of the militia's heavily armed enforcers.

"They kidnapped me and my 5-year-old son. There's no law, no government. I've complained to the police but they don't do anything about it," says Bdour Kathem Jabar, who lives in Kufa. "The militia doesn't let us say anything bad about Sadr. They walk around in groups, sitting down at shops or cafes and setting their guns everywhere to make the people afraid."

Militia men often "arrest" residents and take them before an Islamic court that the government had sought to outlaw. Crimes include "criticizing Moqtada, selling movies and CDs, listening to music," says Michael al-Zurufi. "Even if you only swear at the militia they will arrest you and beat you up with cables and big sticks."

Many residents admit in low voices that they don't like Sadr. "Overall, I'm not happy with Sadr. We want to live in a secure, stable environment. Obviously he's shooting everywhere, attacking people, destroying things," says wheat farmer Abdul Sada Jasem.

"Sadr will win by using politics, not by picking up weapons and fighting again," says Qassam Rasoul Abd, who works in the Najaf engineering and planning department.

The fighting in Najaf has caused an economic downturn. Pilgrims who were flooding in illegally at the rate of 10,000 a day have been turned away because they lack visas - also because the governor is concerned about the influence in Najaf of Iranians, some of whom have been captured among the Mahdi Army. "Security is more important" than the lost revenues from pilgrims, he says. "I believe the tourist companies were the face of Iranian intelligence."



The 'New' Iraq and the U.S. will clash further
Can Iyad Allawi deliver security for all in Iraq?

By Partrick Seale

25-06-2004 - With five days to go before the transfer of sovereignty on June 30, every observer of the Iraqi scene agrees that security is the number one priority. Without security in Iraq there can be none of the benefits the United States promised to confer when it overthrew Saddam Hussain 15 months ago. The 138,000 American and the 10,000 British soldiers have not managed to quell the insurgency.

There is no respite from the daily car bombs, ambushes, mortar attacks, hostage taking, and from the killing of prominent Iraqis associated with the occupation.

Can Iyad Allawi, the new prime minister, deliver security? He certainly seems to stand a better chance than his predecessors. The key to the new strategy, agreed by both the Coalition and the interim Iraqi government, is that Iraqis will in the coming months take over prime responsibility for security from the Coalition. Instead of western forces fighting the insurgents, Iraqis will be set to fight Iraqis. In a word, this means reconstituting the Iraqi army. Eventually, Allawi would like a force of 250,000 men with its own tanks, missiles, heavy guns and aircraft. But any such programme is anathema to Israel and its American friends. It is widely rumoured that it was under Israeli pressure that Bremer dissolved the Iraqi army in the first place.

In the minds of men like US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the main architect of America's war in Iraq, and his neo-conservative colleagues, the war was fought to weaken Iraq permanently, and if possible to break it up into separate "statelets", so as to prevent it ever again challenging Israel or US oil and strategic interests in the Gulf. To accept the formation of a new Iraqi army, essentially a revival of Saddam's army, would be to deal a death blow to these neo-conservative hopes.

Allawi's ambitions

Not surprisingly, therefore, disagreements surfaced between Allawi and Wolfowitz at the talks in Baghdad, during the latter's four-day trip last week, over the size and armament of the new force. Wolfowitz wants to put a ceiling on the new Iraqi army and equip it only with light weapons.

The US dilemma is that, although it cannot itself restore security in Iraq, it is reluctant to see the re-emergence of a strong Iraqi army at the service of a strong central government in Baghdad. Yet, the US has no real choice. If it is to achieve some measure of stability in Iraq before the US presidential elections next November, Allawi is its only hope.

Allawi has been chosen to head the new government because he is known to be tough and ruthless, and to have considerable knowledge of security matters. Aged 58, with close ties to British and US intelligence, he was brought up in the hard school of Iraqi Baathism, but broke with Saddam in the 1970s, when he fled abroad and spent 22 years in exile. Colleagues who knew him as a medical student in Iraq say that he always carried a gun. He suffered severe wounds and spent a year in hospital after a would-be assassin, believed to be an Iraqi agent, attacked him in bed with an axe. If Allawi is to do the job expected of him in Iraq, the US may have to accept a lot more than the re-armament of Iraq. It may have to forget about democracy and human rights. To quell the insurgency, Allawi will have to rebuild Iraq's once-fearsome intelligence and security services and revert to other well-tried methods of Saddam's regime – some of which the Americans themselves adopted in their struggle to bring the country under control.

The US may have to make still further concessions. For the new Iraqi premier to win acceptance from a wide segment of the Iraqi population, he will have to insist on an American withdrawal, if not this year then next. But Wolfowitz, as he told the House Armed Services Committee this week, envisages that the US may have to keep troops in Iraq for several years. Clearly, he has not entirely abandoned the neo-conservative war aim of turning Iraq into some sort of a US client state once the insurgency is defeated.

The struggle for power in Iraq is only just beginning. The Shiite community is still feuding over who will represent it; the Sunnis, who have ruled the country from its beginnings, are not prepared to accept second-class status and have shown their teeth in Fallujah and elsewhere; Kurdish ambitions are more extravagant than any Arab can accept. There is plenty of scope here for future conflict.

The Iraqi army has a long nationalist tradition. Once it is rebuilt, its newly-confident officer corps may well make its own bid for power to "save the country". This is a time-honoured tradition which Egypt, Syria and several other Arab countries experienced at different times over the past half century - not least Iraq itself.



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