Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction
Israel is believed to be the sixth nation in the world and the first in
the Middle East to have developed and acquired nuclear weapons.
For the past forty years, Israel has maintained an ambiguous position
regarding its weapons stockpile, neither confirming nor denying its
existence, however, most experts and non-proliferation analysts agree (1)
that Israel has somewhere in the region of 100 to 200 nuclear warheads.
In addition to this the country is believed to posses a stockpile of
chemical weapons and has an active biological weapons program, which
has developed several weapons agents.
“Israel
follows a policy of what Avner Cohen calls nuclear opacity – visibly
possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence. This has
allowed Israel to enjoy the benefits of being a nuclear weapons state
in terms of deterrence without having to suffer the international
repercussions of acknowledging their arsenal” (2).
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The Israeli bomb: historical
background (3)
Plans for a nuclear research
program had been made within a year of the establishment of the Israeli
state in 1948. Due to Israel’s precarious position in the Middle East,
the bomb was considered a centerpiece of its security against hostile
neighbors.
In 1949 Israeli scientists began exploration of the Negev Desert,
finding low-grade uranium deposits near Beersheba. Meanwhile, promising
students were sent abroad to study engineering and physics at Israeli
government expense.
The Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was secretly founded in 1952
and placed under the control of the Defense Ministry.
It was France, however, which provided assistance to Israel for the
construction of the first nuclear research reactor at Dimona, in the
Negev Desert. Nuclear cooperation between the two countries, initiated
in the early 1950’s, became problematic when France began to pressure
Israel to make the project public and to submit to international
inspections of the site. After French disengagement in the early
1960's, Israel progressed on its own. (Some believe that French-Israeli
cooperation extended to secret nuclear tests (4)
Lacking uranium reserves – Israel's own uranium sources consist solely
of the small phosphate deposits in the Negev – a new collaboration with
South Africa developed and continued through the 1970s and 1980s,
whereby Israel supplied the technology and expertise for the
''Apartheid Bomb'', and South Africa provided the uranium for Israel’s
Dimona reactor.
A nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was suspected
to be a joint South African-Israeli test.
Israel also obtained uranium oxide, known as yellow cake, from West
Germany (5)
and probably from Portugal.
“The United
States has adopted a nuclear double standard in the Middle East,
acquiescing in the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel while
strongly opposing their possession by its neighbors, with Iran being
the most prominent contemporary example” (6).
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The US was, from the very beginning, involved in the Israeli nuclear
program, training Israeli scientists and providing technology including
a small research reactor under the ‘’Atoms for Peace’’ program in 1955 (7).
The United States became aware of Dimona's existence after U-2 spy
planes in 1958 captured the facility's construction. Israel initially
said it was a textile plant; two years later US intelligence identified
the site as a nuclear reactor, the C.I.A. voicing concerns that it was
part of a weapons program.
On December 1960, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion told the Israeli
Parliament that a nuclear reactor was under construction for ''peaceful
purposes'' only.
After refusing to allow regular international inspections, Israel
eventually undertook a commitment with the US to use the facility for
peaceful purposes and to admit an inspection team. These inspections
began in 1962 and continued until 1969, but inspectors reported they
found no evidence of a weapons program. In fact it is now known they
saw only the above ground element of the Dimona complex, the
underground plant was kept hidden during the inspections.
By early 1968, Carl Duckett, head of the C.I.A. directorate of science
and technology, concluded Israel had nuclear weapons, which he
announced in testimony he gave to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
1974. Duckett said his assessment was based largely on conversations he
held with Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, who visited
Israel several times and supported its nuclear program.
In 1969, President Nixon struck a deal with Israeli Prime Minister
Golda Meir: as long as Israel did not go public with its nuclear
weapons program or test weapons openly, the US would stop its
inspections and turn a blind eye to its program.
”Israeli
impunity relies on America for its sustenance and the nuclear question
is a case of point: US law is very clear in banning foreign aid to
countries that either do not sign or fail to obey the NPT, but somehow
more than $ 3 billion in illegal funds gets from Washington to Israel
every year with nary a world of protest on Capitol Hill” (8). |
Finally the proof: the Vanunu revelations
Israel’s sophisticated nuclear
program was revealed for the first time in 1986 by Israeli nuclear
scientist Mordechai Vanunu. The technician dismissed from Dimona
secretly smuggled photographs and scientific data of the complex out of
Israel, and his story was published in the London Sunday Times (9).
His information led to the conclusion that Israel had produced enough
plutonium for 100/200 nuclear devices since it went on line in 1964,
that the Dimona reactor's capacity had been expanded several fold and
that Israel was producing enough plutonium to make ten to twelve bombs
per year.
Vanunu also exposed the system used to conceal the manufacture of
weapons from US inspectors: a false wall had been built to hide
elevators that descended six stories below ground to where plutonium
was refined and bomb parts manufactured.
Shortly before the article was published, a female agent from Israel's
intelligence service lured Vanunu from London to Rome. He was drugged,
kidnapped and brought back to Israel where he was convicted of treason
by a secret security court and sentenced to 18 years in prison, 11 of
which he spent in isolated confinement. Vanunu is now set for release
next month, 21 April 2004, having completed his entire 18 years
sentence. There have been reports that Israeli Prime minister, Ariel
Sharon, has opted to impose restrictions on Vanunu’s freedom of
movement after his release (10).
To find more information about this important affair and support the
campaign for Vanunu’s release, please visit the website:
http://www.vanunu.freeserve.co.uk
“…debating
the nuclear program is taboo. The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission is
one of the country’s most secretive organizations. Its budget is secret
and its facilities are off limits and employees face harsh sanctions if
they talk about its operations. Even the name of the chief of nuclear
security was a secret until two years ago” (11). |
Israel’s
arsenal of mass destruction (12)
“The Israel arsenal of weapons of mass destruction clearly dwarfs the
actual or potential arsenals of all other Middle Eastern states
combined, and is vastly greater than any conceivable need for
deterrence” (13).
Nuclear
Estimates of the Israeli nuclear arsenal range from 100 to 200 nuclear
warheads; some believe that the arsenal may also include thermonuclear
weapons.
Israel’s nuclear program is centered at the Negev Nuclear Research
Center, outside the town of Dimona (14).
The Dimona site has a plutonium/tritium production reactor, an
underground chemical separation plant and nuclear component fabrication
facilities. The reactor has produced plutonium free from international
controls since 1963.
Israel in not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Chemical
There is no confirmed evidence of Israeli production or stockpiling of
such weapons, despite allegations of its possession of a sophisticated
chemical weapons program.
Some reports have suggested an offensive CW program is located at the
Israel Institute for Biological Research in Nes Tziyona.
Production capability for mustard and nerve agents is suspected after
the El Al crash in October 1992 in Amsterdam, led to the discovery of
approximately 50 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate (a widely used
stimulant for defensive research but also a possible precursor of sarin
nerve agent) destined for Tel Aviv.
Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Biological
While there is no indication of a production effort Israel is widely
thought to possess the ability to produce biological weapons.
Reportedly, extensive research in the field is conducted at the
Biological Research Institute in Nes Tziyona.
Furthermore, the Israeli army is alleged to have poisoned Palestinian
water wells with typhoid and dysentery bacteria during the 1948 war,
but proof of such events is difficult to determine (15).
Israel is not a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention.
Missiles
Israel’s arsenal comprises ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) and the Arrow theater defense missile, one of the
only functioning missile defense systems in the world.
Israel has developed two different kinds of nuclear-capable missile:
The Jericho I, capable of delivering a 750-kilogram warhead a distance
of 235-500 kilometers; and the Jericho II, with 1500 kilometer-range,
long enough to reach the southern border of the Soviet Union. It is
most likely that a Jericho III, with 4.800 kilometer-range, is also
already developed.
In addition, Israel’s successful satellite launches using the Shavit
space launch vehicle (SLV), suggest that Israel could quickly convert
the Shavit into a long-range ballistic missile with an intercontinental
capability of up to 7000 Km, depending on the weight of the warhead.
Israel is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, though
it has pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.
Israel and the International
Law on disarmament (16)
Along with Pakistan and India, Israel remains one of only three
countries that have refused to sign the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (17)
(NPT), the global agreement aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear
weapons through inspections and sanctions. The UN General Assembly and
the International
Atomic Energy Agency (18)
(IAEA) General Conference have adopted 13 resolutions since
1987 appealing Israel to join the Treaty, but all have been ignored.
Israel has signed but not ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention (19)
(CWC), which prohibits the development, production or
acquiring of chemical weapons and requires those in possession to
destroy existing stocks and production facilities. The CWC contains a
strict mechanism for verifying compliance by states with the provisions
of the convention.
Israel is not a party to the
Biological Weapons Conventions (20)
(BWC), which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition and transfer of pathogens or toxins in types and quantities
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective and other
peaceful purposes. However, the absence of any formal monitoring
mechanism to ensure compliance, and the possibility to use many
biological agents for non-military uses, have limited the effectiveness
of the BWC.
There is no universal treaty specifically governing the development,
deployment or use of missiles. Nonetheless a
Missile Technology Control Regime (21)
(MTCR) was set up in 1987 to control the export of ballistic and cruise
missile technologies capable of delivering nuclear warheads. It is a
voluntary agreement only, and has no enforcement, administrative or
verification structures (22).
Israel, although not a member, has agreed to keep to MTCR guidelines.
The Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (23)
(CTBT), which bans all nuclear test explosions, for military or civil
purposes, has not yet entered into force. Israel signed the treaty in
1996, but not ratified.
“Possessing
chemical and biological weapons, an extremely sophisticated nuclear
arsenal, and an aggressive strategy for their actual use, Israel
provides the major regional impetus for the development of weapons of
mass destruction and represents an acute threat to peace and stability
in the Middle East” (24). |
Endnotes
(1) Precise assessment of a state's
capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction
programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently.
(2) Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/doctrine/index.html
(3) Avner Cohen “Israel and the bomb”,
1998,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/
Avner Cohen “Most
favored nation”, 1995,
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1995/jf95/jf95Cohen.html
Warner D. Farr “The
Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s nuclear weapons”, 1999,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm
Federation of American
Scientists, 2000,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html
(4) Allegedly, underground tests were
conducted in the Negev in 1963 and at Al-Naqab, Negev, in October 1966.
(5) Reportedly, I n 1964, Israel
obtained 200 tons of yellow cake from West Germany.
(6) Marvin Miller and Lawrence
Scheinman “Israel, India and Pakistan: engaging the non-NPT States in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty”, December 2003
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman.asp
(7) Under a now expired bilateral
cooperation agreement, the US supplied a research reactor to Israel at
the Nahal Soreq Nuclear Research Center. The reactor, which should be
used solely for civil purposes, is under IAEA safeguards.
(8) The Daily Star, 16/07/2003.
(9) London Sunday Times, 12 October
1986.
(10) Haaretz, 27 February 2004,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/398836.html
(11) Dougles Frantz ‘’Israel extends
nuclear weapons capability’’, Los Angeles Times, 11 October 2003.
(12) Monterey Institute of
International Studies
http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm
Nuclear Threat
Initiative (a US-based think-tank)
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_israel_1.html#nuclear
Federation of American
Scientists
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel
Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS)
http://www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html
(13) John Steinbach “Israeli weapons of
mass destruction: a threat to peace”, 2002,
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm
(14) To see a map of Israel’s nuclear
sites click here
(15)
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_israel_1.html; Avner Cohen ’’Israel
and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, deterrence and Arms
Controls“, pp 31-32 http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/83/83cohen.pdf ;
Salman Abu-Sitta ’’Traces of poison’’
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/627/focus.htm
(16) United Nation’s website on Weapons
of Mass Destruction
http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/
(17) The NPT, whose objective is to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to
promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to
further the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament, was
opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
(18) The International Atomic Energy
Agency is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It
has the responsibility to verify compliance of member states with the
NPT and to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear
technology.
(19) The CWC opened for signature on 13
January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997. Significant
non-signing states include Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and
Yugoslavia.
(20) The BWC, which incorporate the
1925 Geneva Protocol banning "bacteriological methods of warfare", was
opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26
March 1975. Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates have signed but
not ratified the Convention.
(21) MTCR membership now consists of
most states capable of developing missiles with a range of over 300 Km.
Notable exceptions include India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and
Pakistan.
(22) For more information, visit
http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/mtcr.html
(23) The CTBT was opened for signature
on 24 September 1996. It will enter into force 180 days after 44
nuclear-capable States, identified in a list annexed to the treaty,
have ratified it.
(24) John Steinbach “Israeli Weapons of
Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace”, March 2002.
Last Updated March 2004 - Palestine Monitor
How to Stop Nuclear Terror
By Spencer Abraham*
Washington Post - Saturday, July 17, 2004; Page A19: The collapse of Soviet communism was the greatest advance for the cause
of freedom in the late 20th century, but it left behind a legacy that
could complicate the 21st century struggle to overcome terrorism. While
the United States and Russia work to dismantle nuclear arsenals,
terrorists and rogue states are seeking to obtain materials -- from
former Cold War armaments and other sources -- to make nuclear weapons
and "dirty bombs."
Securing this nuclear and radiological
material is a top priority for the United States, Russia and many other
nations. While much of it is concentrated in the former Soviet states,
it is also found in other countries around the world. It constitutes a
formidable threat if it falls into the wrong hands.
In the
early aftermath of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation programs were
appropriately focused on reducing and securing nuclear weapons and
weapons material in the former Soviet Union. In 2001 President Bush
broadened and accelerated these programs. Both he and Russian President
Vladimir Putin have made nonproliferation a personal priority. The
United States has developed much better working relationships with our
counterparts in the Russian government, and we have been successful in
bringing other countries into the effort.
President Bush's
most recent budget request for the Department of Energy calls for $1.35
billion for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program -- nearly 75
percent more than the largest budget request of the previous
administration -- and we have shortened the timetables and expanded the
scope of many important nonproliferation programs.
The
Department of Energy has accelerated efforts to secure 600 metric tons
of weapons-usable material in Russia. By the end of this fiscal year,
we will have secured more than 46 percent of this material, and in 2003
and 2004 we will have secured more of it than in any two-year period.
We will finish this work by 2008, two years ahead of the schedule we
inherited.
We have accelerated the recovery of about 10,000
high-risk radiological sources in the United States. We have helped the
Russian navy secure its nuclear fuel and warhead sites much faster than
originally planned, and have accelerated similar work at other military
sites. We are installing nuclear detection equipment at international
ports, airports and border crossings, and are working with the
International Atomic Energy Agency on initiatives to locate and secure
weapons-usable material around the world.
In the spring of
last year, the Energy Department began a new program with Russia to
upgrade security for its strategic rocket forces sites. By the end of
this year, we will have secured two sites, and we are working to secure
the remaining 15 by the end of 2008.
Other U.S. initiatives
include the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction, which President Bush called for and the
G-8 leaders adopted. This 10-year program has brought new resources to
bear and is engaging additional nations in nonproliferation efforts.
The partnership already has secured almost $17 billion in pledges
toward our target of at least $20 billion -- a figure we believe should
be a floor, not a ceiling.
We are moving aggressively
forward with these and many other programs, but we would be fooling
ourselves, and endangering our citizens, to say we have done enough.
This is why, in May in Vienna, the United States proposed the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative to secure, remove or dispose of an even
broader range of nuclear and radiological materials around the world.
Under
this initiative, we will work in partnership with Russia to recover
nuclear fuel of Russian origin from research reactors around the world
and repatriate it to Russia for safe storage or disposition. We seek to
do this not in three years, or five years, or eight but by late next
year. We are also working to repatriate all Russian-origin spent
high-enriched uranium fuel by 2009. At present about four metric tons
of this spent fuel are at 20 reactors in 17 countries.
A
second feature of this initiative is completing the repatriation of
U.S.-origin high-enriched uranium spent fuel from research reactors --
about 40 metric tons in more than 40 locations around the world. This
effort involves a number of diplomatic and legal challenges, but we
believe most of the fuel can be repatriated in four to five years.
A
third feature will be converting the cores of 105 civilian research
reactors that use high-enriched uranium fuel to instead use
low-enriched fuel. About one-third of the reactors are in the process
of being converted or already have been converted, and we expect to
finish another one-third in three to five years. The final one-third
could be more difficult.
While we have developed
low-enriched uranium fuel that works for some reactors, it does not
work for others -- and developing a suitable fuel for these reactors
will take time. Until a new fuel is available, some nations will be
reluctant to give up the use of their research reactors. We have top
scientists hard at work developing a substitute fuel, and they are
making progress. In the meantime, critics who question our pace or
commitment do not understand the technical realities or are choosing to
ignore them.
The final pillar of the initiative is to
identify nuclear materials and equipment not yet covered by existing
programs and secure those materials and equipment as safely and quickly
as possible.
With all these initiatives and other efforts
across the government, President Bush is pursuing the most aggressive
nonproliferation effort in history. Four years ago there was no
comprehensive international effort to address radiological dispersal
devices. Today there is. Four years ago there was no program to place
radiation detection equipment at the world's major shipping ports.
Today there is. Four years ago, there was no formal agreement to return
Russian-origin spent high-enriched uranium reactor fuel to Russia.
Today there is. Most important: Four years ago there was no G-8 global
partnership with $20 billion in commitments for nonproliferation. But
today, those programs are in place.
Securing nuclear and
radiological materials is one of our highest priorities and greatest
responsibilities in the battle against terror. The United States will
continue to intensify its efforts to keep a legacy of the Cold War from
becoming a tool of the enemies of freedom.
* The writer is U.S. secretary of energy.
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