The
intense emotions of shock, orphanhood and fear elicited by Ariel
Sharon's exit from the political arena evoked expressions bordering on
kitsch, even from observers otherwise known for their sober approach.
"Parting
from him is like parting from a father: expected, but always
frightening and sad," Yaron London wrote, while Amnon Dankner described
Sharon as "the portrait of a generation: "a figure embodying the split
heart of everyone of us... from yearning to live peacefully to the
necessity to resort to arms."
The similarity between Sharon and
Yitzhak Rabin - and between those two and Moses on Mount Nevo - was
inevitable: "From Moses to Sharon they all saw the land from afar, but
none succeeded in bringing the train to a safe haven," one journalist
concluded.
|
| Advertisement |
|
In
other words, had his sickness not defeated him, Sharon would have
brought us to the promised land - "peace with the Arabs and clear and
recognized borders." The thwarted hope, or illusion, intensified the
sense of loss. Again, cruel fate has robbed us of the chance for peace.
Not our own acts and foibles, but "the angel of death, sharpening his
scythe." But we will not stop pursuing peace and we will increase our
support for Sharon's heirs, who are bound to continue his "heritage."
The
sudden departure of a worshiped leader is always an opportunity to
express his political will as one wishes to express it, not necessarily
on the basis of the departed leader's real goals. The image of the
"cruel general who became a peace hero" - although somewhat tarnished
due to overexposure in describing Rabin - blinded the eyes of many.
They failed to notice that Sharon was very close to the goal he had
been aiming to achieve ever since he became an adult: a goal that has
nothing to do with peace - to remove the Arab demographic threat
unilaterally.
He was a junior partner to the removal of the
demographic threat in 1948, by expelling hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians. And later, when he climbed the rungs of power, his wish
to initiate major historic moves grew.
His "big plan," which led
to the war in Lebanon, attempted to solve the demographic problem by
turning Jordan into Palestine, deporting the refugees from Lebanon,
transferring them from the West Bank, and destroying the Hashemite
kingdom. After this plan failed disastrously, Sharon drafted his canton
plan, and strove to implement it in every post he filled. For many
years he had to resort to underhanded, even illegal means, but he did
not tire, and filled the territories with settlements and outposts.
Becoming
prime minister enabled him to pursue his plan to "remove the
demographic threat" - thus pulling out of Gaza seemed to subtract a
million Palestinians from the demographic balance sheet. The
"separation fence" next created isolated cantons, paving the way to
fictitiously "losing" hundreds of thousands more. Setting up a separate
transportation system, "border passes," and "closures" shattered the
Palestinian community into four or five sub-communities, subjected to
different conditions and gradually losing touch with each other.
On
the eve of his hospitalization, Sharon could have surveyed his
achievements with satisfaction. The moves to deal with the "demographic
threat" gained unprecedented popularity that led him to believe he
would be able to set up a Peronist-presidential regime in Israel. This
regime would silence any criticism over his solving the "problem," by
establishing an apartheid regime. The United States, entangled in Iraq,
has signaled that the canton plan may be seen as the implementation of
the Palestinian state, and the Israeli peace camp, crowning Sharon as
its leader, also agreed enthusiastically.
The donor states agreed to funnel financial aid unequaled since World War II, thus financing Sharon's canton plan.
Indeed,
cruel fate has robbed Sharon of attaining his deepest aspiration, to
eliminate, after 60 years of struggle, the Palestinian demographic
threat. However, there are signs that his illness has spared him the
disappointment he would have suffered had he remained in power. For the
present "big plan" - as it was in the war in Lebanon - is based on
hasty, erroneous assumptions.
The Palestinian Authority's
crumbling is only a matter of time, and donor states' patience is
running out, which will lead to the drying up of the PA's financial
sources, and therefore, a catastrophic economic crisis. The anarchy in
the territories will spin out of control, and the violence directed
internally and at Israelis will raise pressure to "react appropriately."
Extremist
groups in Israel will undermine the "treacherous government," a new
attempt will be made to revive the "Jordan is Palestine" idea and
export the problem to Jordan, since it has no solution in the
territories, or whatever remains of them once the "settlement blocs"
have been stolen from them. The U.S. will be called upon to restore
order, maybe in the style of Bosnia or Kosovo.
Like in the "big
plan" of 1981, the biggest mistake at present is the attempt to solve
the problem unilaterally with dictates and excessive power. Ariel
Sharon is no longer capable of changing his approach, and perhaps he
never was. But those who claim to be continuing Sharon's heritage
should never forget that "heritage" also means learning from his
mistakes and avoiding them. |