[The Economist, Jerusalem, 17 May] TRIGGER-HAPPY troops set loose? Questions about the response of Israeli soldiers facing Palestinian demonstrators are being asked, and not just by Palestinians. But suspicions about individual behaviour are less relevant than the clear fact that the army, given its head by Ariel Sharon, has made a deliberate decision to take the fight to the Palestinians, even at the risk of escalation and of deepening Israel's international problems.

Palestinian-Israeli bloodletting can be savage, on both sides. But one incident, among several horrifying ones, is revealing of the army's new attitude and tactics. This was the killing on May 14th of five junior Palestinian police guards at a quiet checkpoint on the outskirts of Bituniya, a village that lies on the edge of Palestinian-controlled Ramallah. Two of the policemen were on guard duty. Four others were inside their makeshift hut, either asleep or preparing a simple meal. Israeli forces briefly raked the area with machinegun and sniper fire. Five of the guards died instantly, and the sixth was taken to hospital in shock.

The precise circumstances are still murky. The Israeli army's first account said that the unit saw some mysterious figures "who were where they should not have been" and opened fire. Later, a government official conceded that the unit had been on a deliberate mission seeking out what the army believed was a squad from "Force 17", the Palestinian presidential guard, which the Israelis claim had been using the checkpoint as cover from which to fire on nearby Israeli positions. "We're increasingly having to operate in what is in effect an open battlefield situation, and in hostile zones any unidentified figures are automatically treated as foe with no questions asked," explained the official.

Then, on May 15th, Lieut-General Shaul Mofaz, Israel's army chief, taciturnly told a Knesset committee that "the results of the operation were not as intended". There will be a further army inquiry but, at least at this stage, General Mofaz offered no apology. "When the gloves come off, it seems that the hands become dirty very quickly," observed Chemi Shalev, a well-informed columnist, in Maariv.

The Israeli army, it seems, has blurred its previous distinctions between defence and attack as it redefines the conflict, seeking to wrest the initiative, and to pre-empt Palestinian tactics. This ties in with the admission by Israel's defence minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, two weeks ago that he had given field commanders (even junior commanders) blanket approval in principle to carry out incursions into areas in the West Bank and Gaza that are fully under Palestinian control. They no longer need to seek government approval for such violations of Palestinian territory, said Mr Ben-Eliezer, provided that there was an imediate security need for offensive action.

Military sources confirm that the army has eased some of its stringent regulations. It is also, like many other armies at a time of war, becoming increasingly economical with the truth. A couple of blatant lies were picked up by the international press on May 15th, the date when Palestinians mourn their displacement by Israel's creation 53 years ago. It was a cruel day: four Palestinians were killed, and one Israeli woman, when her car was ambushed in revenge, said a Palestinian organisation, for the death of the five policemen. But bulletins put out by the Israeli army's press office during the day could be seen by journalists to be totally at odds with what was happening on the ground.

Some Israelis are alarmed by the army's new freedoms, seeing them as a recipe for coming disaster. They point out that an Israeli unit, pushing its way violently into a Palestinian city or town, could become embroiled in a tight military situation. Or that the results of such an operation could escalate out of control beyond anything the military commanders might have imagined.

Others worry about the lack of accountability. In the previous intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s any deviant actions by Israeli troops generally led to the soldiers being called to account. But there has been precious little of that during the past seven months.

There is also little public debate about operations that might once have been damned by many Israelis as excessive or errant. This in turn is seen as a product of the prevailing cast of mind: having determined that the Palestinians were solely responsible for the failure of the peace process, Israelis hold them responsible for the ensuing conflict. This remains the consensus. Even so, bubbles of doubt are being expressed at the results of army freedom