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"The
most honest, most comprehensive, and most mobilizing news
and
analysis on the Middle East always comes from
MER.
It
is
indispensable!" - Robert
Silverman - Salamanca,
Spain
NewsFlash:
Massacre in Iraq! In Fallujah more than 100 Iraqis have been
killed and many
hundreds badly injured since last night by attacking U.S.
Troops. Mosque rocked today, many dead and injured!
THE 9/11
COMMISSION COVER-UP
LIVE ON T.V.s
EVERYWHERE TOMORROW
MORNING FROM CAPITOL HILL
"Notice -- no really
independent
critical investigative journalists,
no
tough-minded critics, and
certainly no FBI Translator who
could
have blown the lid off things if
given just a few minutes to
speak
to the American people."
MER - Mid-East Realities - www.MiddleEast.Org
- Washington - 4/07/2004:
The job of
the Warren Commission in the early 1960s, selected by President
Johnson, was to reassure the public and coverup some major historical
issues including the mob and the Cuban connections.
Indeed, there is a long history of using such "Bi-Partisan"
Commissions, White House selected, not so much to uncover all the
facts and point fingers in the right direction, but rather to cover-up
that which the powers that be do not want to be known.
This Commission too, which the public has only
focused upon in recent days because of the controversy surrounding
Condoleeza Rice's testimony and the President flipflop, fits into this
pattern. Selected by the White House which resisted long and hard
setting it up at all, the Executive Director a long-time friend of non
other than Condoleeza Rice as well as Richard Perle and many of the
neocons, and agreeing to first submit its report to the White House for
'clearance', this is anything but a truly 'independent'
commission.
This transcript of the two co-chairmen of the
Commission interviewed on the NBC Program Meet the Press last Sunday should
be read carefully in that context. Pay special attention to
the bolded section where the 'smoking gun' provided by the
whistleblowing former FBI Translator is so easily dismissed by both the
moderator and the Commissioners. Of course Tim Russett
himself is very much a 'Washington insider' and the NBC Network is
owned by the General Electric Corporation, one of America's greatest
multinationals and armaments makers.
Notice -- no really independent critical
investigative journalists, no tough-minded critics, not even a
follow-up skeptical panel, and certainly no FBI Translator who could
have blown the lid off things if given just a few minutes to speak to
the American people. So far the corporate American media has
pretty much become complicitous in diminishing her significance and
covering her up. Only The
Independent in the U.K. has seriously reported her story,
revealed her own top-secret three hours of testimony before the
Commission, interviewed her at length, and let her speak her mind.
A former FBI translator told the 9/11
commission that the
bureau had detailed
information well before Sept. 11, 2001,
that terrorists were
likely to attack the U.S. with airplanes.
"They're
pushing everything under the blanket of secrecy."
"Especially
after reading National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
where
she said, we had no specific information whatsoever of domestic
threat
or that they might use airplanes. That's an outrageous lie.
And
documents can prove it's a lie."
|
BBC News - MEET THE PRESS - Sunday, April 4, 2004
GUESTS:
Former Gov. Thomas Kean (R-N.J.), chair of 9/11 commission; former Rep.
Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), vice chair of 9/11 commission; former Bush
adviser Karen Hughes.
MODERATOR/PANELIST: Tim Russert - NBC News
MR.
TIM RUSSERT: Our issues this Sunday: Bush and Cheney, Clinton and Gore,
and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will all now appear
before the September 11 Commission. Could the attacks have been
prevented? When will the commission issue its final report? With us,
the chairman and vice chairman of the 9-11 Commission: former
Republican Governor of New Jersey Tom Kean and former Indiana
Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton.
Then, the Bush-Kerry
presidential race with Karen Hughes, the former counselor to the
president, who left the White House to return home to Texas. She now
has a new book, "Ten Minutes from Normal."
Kean, Hamilton and Hughes: only on MEET THE PRESS.
And we are joined by the chairman, Tom Kean, the vice chairman, Lee
Hamilton, of the September 11 Commission.
Gentlemen, welcome, both.
FMR. GOV. THOMAS KEAN, (R-NJ): Good morning.
FMR. REP. LEE HAMILTON, (D-IN): Hi, Tim.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Chairman, on Thursday, Dr. Condoleezza Rice will
testify in public under oath. What do you expect?
MR.
KEAN: Well, we expect it to be very exciting, because we want to know
so much. We want to know about her work in the transition. We want to
know about what happened and what the differences were between the Bush
policies and the policies of the Clinton
administration. We want to
know what she heard and what she knew and, of course, what differences
there may be between her, Mr. Clarke, and a number of other people
we've heard.
MR. RUSSERT: When she testified in private on
February 7, only about half the commissioners showed up. Do you expect
all of them to be in attendance on Thursday?
MR. KEAN:
Absolutely. That was late on a Saturday afternoon. There may have been
some other problem, but they all read the transcripts and they're all
going to be on hand.
MR. RUSSERT: How long do you expect her to testify for?
MR.
KEAN: I think we've got her scheduled for about two and a half hours,
which would be, actually, the longest session--as long a session as
we've had with any witness.
MR. RUSSERT: Also, before I talk a
little bit more about that, Vice President Cheney and President Bush
are scheduled to appear. Is there a date yet?
MR. KEAN: Yeah.
We've got a date, but we haven't--we honestly haven't revealed the
dates of any of our witnesses who testify in private, so we haven't
talked about that one, either.
MR. RUSSERT: Will it be within the next few weeks?
MR. KEAN: Yes.
MR. RUSSERT: But they will appear together. Why?
MR.
KEAN: That's their request, and we didn't see any problem. We're going
to ask the same questions, whether we get them together or apart. So
that was a White House request and part of a package deal we put
together to get the testimony and allow all 10 commissioners to come
in, and we didn't see any problem with it.
MR. RUSSERT: Will President Clinton and Vice President Gore appear
together?
MR. KEAN: No. No, they're appearing separately.
MR. RUSSERT: Why a different standard for them?
MR.
KEAN: Because we had already scheduled our appearances with former
President Clinton, and all our other witnesses have appeared
separately. But this was the White House request, and we didn't have
any problem with it.
MR. RUSSERT: Clinton-Gore in the next few weeks as well?
MR. KEAN: Yes.
MR. RUSSERT: Isn't it better to have people separately so that you can
judge them independently as to their veracity?
MR.
KEAN: I think it's a matter of judgment. All things considered, maybe
we would have rather had them one at a time, but we don't see any
problem with it, really. We'll ask each of them individual questions.
They've promised us to give us the time we needed to get our questions
answered, and if we have any problems, as you do, we'll have follow-ups.
MR.
RUSSERT: And one last question on this: Why won't President Bush, Vice
President Cheney, former President Clinton, former Vice President Gore
be put under oath?
MR. KEAN: It's, I gather, sort of a
tradition, practice. No president, I gather, has ever been put under
oath. And so, because of precedent in this town, we're not putting them
under oath.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Hamilton, let me refer to a couple
of the things that have been said by people before your commission or
in the public domain. Richard Clarke, the chief of counterterrorism,
testified on March 24 to your commission and said this: "All of the
things that we recommended in the plan or strategy...back in January
[2001] were those things on the table in September [2001]."
And Dr. Rice wrote in The Washington Post last week, "No al Qaeda plan
was turned over to the new administration."
We seem to have a discrepancy here.
MR. HAMILTON: Well, that...
MR.
RUSSERT: What is your sense? Based on what you've heard and read and
learned, was there a plan that was given by the Clinton administration
to the Bush administration about al-Qaeda?
MR. HAMILTON: I don't
think I'm going to try to make a judgment about that at this point. You
get into a lot of word games here. There was an agenda, there was a
plan, there were options, and an awful lot of this is subjective. What
has been impressive up to this point, despite all of the media play, is
that there's been a remarkable agreement with regard to the facts.
Whether you call something a plan and how far along that plan was, you
can get different judgments about, but the factual agreement through
the Clinton administration, through the early months of the Bush
administration, remarkable agreement on the facts, not complete but
remarkable.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Clarke also said this: "I believe
the Bush administration in the first eight months considered terrorism
an important issue but not an urgent issue. ... There was a process
underway to address al Qaeda. But although I continued to say it was an
urgent problem, I don't think it was ever treated that way." Dr. Rice,
"The seriousness of the threat was well understood by the president and
his national security principals. ... The president wanted more than a
laundry list of ideas simply to contain al Qaeda or `roll back' the
threat. Once in office, we quickly began crafting a comprehensive new
strategy to `eliminate' the al Qaeda network." There seems to be a
difference of fact there.
MR. HAMILTON: Well, I'm not sure that
it is. Let's take the question raised by Mr. Clarke's testimony. He
said that the Bush administration put an important priority on al-Qaeda
and terrorism but not an urgent one. Well, how do you draw that line
between important and urgent? That's a very subjective kind of a
judgment and it can easily be colored by your own biases, by your own
position, if you would. That's very typical, it seems to me, of the
kinds of differences we confront here.
MR. RUSSERT: Governor
Kean, one of the things that your staff has released are staff reports,
which I have read, and they're quite...
MR. KEAN: Yeah.
MR. RUSSERT: ...comprehensive...
MR. KEAN: Yes.
MR.
RUSSERT: ...and quite interesting and quite revealing. "Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence [John] McLaughlin told us he felt a great
tension -especially in June and July" --"between the new
administration's need to understand these issues and his sense that this
was
a matter of great urgency. Officials, including McLaughlin, were also
frustrated when some policymakers, who had not lived through such
threat surges before, questioned the validity of the intelligence or
wondered if it was disinformation, though they were persuaded once they
probed it." A sense that the new team was a bit skeptical of some of
the threat assessments of al-Qaeda, is that fair?
MR. KEAN: I
think that's probably fair and probably right, but I think they were
skeptical about a number of things at that point. No question, there
was a period in the summer when people refer to it as their hair being
on fire, there were so many threats of one kind coming in, but most of
them, in all honesty, were not threats to this country, they were
threats to things abroad. And we put a barricades around our United
States embassies. We tried to protect our American citizens over there.
We did a number of actions in that area. Did we do enough at home? No,
but I think to your question, there was some skepticism, no question
about it.
MR. RUSSERT: The Washington Post wrote this in May of
last year: "On July 5 of [2001]...the White House summoned officials of
a dozen federal agencies to the Situation Room." 'Something really
spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon',"
said "Richard Clark," the terrorism czar. "The group included the
Federal Aviation Administration"--"the Coast Guard"--the--"FBI, Secret
Service"--"Immigration and Naturalization Service."
"Clarke directed every counterterrorist office to cancel vacations,
defer nonvital travel, put off
schedule
exercises and place domestic rapid-response teams on much shorter
alert. For six weeks [in the summer of 2001], at home and overseas, the
U.S. government was at its highest possible state of readiness - and
anxiety - against imminent terrorist attack."
Congressman
Hamilton, it sounds like people in the White House really expected
something big to happen and really did ring the alarm bell.
MR.
HAMILTON: Yes. I think they did and especially Mr. Clarke at that.
That's kind of a high watermark in the summer when the chatter on the
intelligence lines was very high, a lot of reports coming in at that
moment about possible terrorist activity. And there wasn't any question
that there was a sense of urgency at that point and may have been the
high watermark prior to, of course, September 11 in terms of the
government being keyed up, ready to go and ready to act.
MR.
RUSSERT: It says they were on high alert for six weeks, canceling
vacations, the whole bit. And then, did we let our guard down before
September 11th?
MR. KEAN: We did a bit, because the threat level
went down. All these tremendous things that were coming over stopped
coming over, and we weren't getting the level of threat that we got,
and as that threat level went down and people had been sort of at the
ready all along, they did let down their guard a bit. There's no
question about it. We were not at the state of readiness on September
11th that we'd been back in August.
MR. RUSSERT: Why do you think that is?
MR.
KEAN: I think when the chatter went down, when they didn't hear all
these people talking to each other so much, there were other priorities
out there. You can't keep people sort of at the ready constantly, day
after day after day after day, and I think gradually they had a plan.
They had a meeting, as you know, just before September 11th. They
thought they were operating on some of these things, but the actual
tension relaxed as the chatter relaxed.
MR. RUSSERT: In
December, Governor, you said that you were surprised that some midlevel
officials at the FBI and in the federal immigration agencies had not
been removed from their jobs, given errors before September 11th
attacks that may have allowed the hijacking plot to go undetected: "It
surprises me that if there were serious mistakes, there haven't been
any consequences of those mistakes."
Has anyone been let go yet?
MR.
KEAN: Not to the best of my knowledge. What I was referring to was, you
know, the fact we've now documented, I guess in the commission
hearings, that people got into this country with improper travel
documents, that there were people in the FBI who obviously sounded the
alert and then got stuck somewhere midlevel in the bureaucracy, that
there were people in the airlines who were not put on the watch list,
so that there were two people we knew about, and those kinds of
mistakes. No, I don't know of anybody who's been let go.
MR. RUSSERT: Are you surprised?
MR. HAMILTON: That no one has been let go?
MR. RUSSERT: Yeah.
MR.
HAMILTON: Not really. First of all, government's not very good at that.
not just this government but many governments, in holding people
strictly accountable. Secondly, I think the problem is really more
systemic in nature. The more I look at it, the more I see kind of
systemwide problems rather than individual responsibility. That doesn't
mean the commission will not make criticism. We may make criticisms--I
don't know--of individual people. But what I'm quite sure is, we will
find somewhere along the line that there were a lot of problems. A
government has to manage huge amounts of data, not all of it in
English. Millions and millions of bites of data come into the
government all the time, and analyzing those, collecting them and
disseminating--very, very tough job, and it takes systems analysis and
management to an extraordinary degree.
MR. RUSSERT: There's a
report in a British newspaper, The Independent, about a former
translator for the FBI with top-secret security clearance, says she's
provided information to the panel investigating the attacks which
proves senior officials knew of al-Qaida's plan to attack the U.S. with
aircraft months before the strike happened. Sibel Edmonds is her name.
She said she spent more than three hours in a closed session with the
commission and provided information that was circulating within the FBI
in the spring and summer of 2001 suggesting an attack using aircraft
was months away, that terrorists were in place. Is she credible?
MR.
KEAN: We've had all her testimony. It's under investigation. I can't
say--we're certainly not there that she's credible or uncredible yet.
MR. HAMILTON: We've talked to
her.
MR. KEAN: Yeah.
MR.
HAMILTON: We've talked to people she has identified. We've looked at
documents. Look, the commission gets leads by the dozens, every day. I
had a dozen of them last week. And we do our level best to follow up on
all of them. In this case, and several others that have been prominent
in the European press, we have been very, very careful in our research.
We're not totally completed with it, as the governor has mentioned.
MR. RUSSERT: Governor, you also said this in December: "I do not
believe it had to happen." Why? Why do you believe that?
MR.
KEAN: Well, I got some criticism for that at the time, but what we've
found now in the commission has not changed our belief. Because there
were so many threads and so many things, individual things that
happened, and if some of those things hadn't happened the way they
happened--for instance, if we had been a little earlier in what we
found out about Moussaoui, if we had...
MR. RUSSERT: Moussaoui being the so-called 20th hijacker...
MR. KEAN: Yes. Yes, that's right.
MR. RUSSERT: ...in Minnesota who was actually arrested.
MR.
KEAN: Absolutely right. If we had been able to put those people on the
watch list for the airlines, the two who were in this country; again,
if we'd stopped some of these people at the borders, if we had acted
earlier on al-Qaeda when al-Qaeda was smaller and just getting started
even before bin Laden went to Afghanistan, there were times we could
have gotten him, there's no question. Had we gotten him and his
leadership at that point, the whole story might have been different.
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman, you think September 11th could have been
prevented?
MR.
HAMILTON: Well, there's a lot of ifs. You can string together a whole
bunch of ifs. And if things had broken right in all kinds of different
ways, as the governor has identified, and many more, and, frankly, if
you'd had a little luck, it probably could have been prevented. But
we'll make a final judgment on that, I believe, when the commission
reports.
MR. RUSSERT: The widows and widowers of the victims of
September 11 have been a driving force in the creation of this
commission and its investigation. Kristen Breitweiser testified in
September of 2002 and posed some questions. And I'd like to play her
testimony and come back and talk about it.
(Videotape, September 18, 2002):
MS.
KRISTEN BREITWEISER (9/11 Widow): One thing remains clear from this
history. Our intelligence agencies were acutely aware of an impending
domestic risk posed by al-Qaeda. A question that remains unclear is how
many lives could have been saved had this information been made more
public. How many victims may have taken notice of these Middle Eastern
men while they were boarding their plane? Could these men have been
stopped? Could the devastation of September 11 been diminished in any
degree had the government's information been made public in the summer
of 2001?
(End videotape)
MR. RUSSERT: That was before the
Congressional Joint Inquiry. Her question: Should the information that
the government knew and heard in those July briefings, when the
government was put on full alert, vacations being canceled--should that
information have been shared with the American people?
MR. KEAN:
Well, there was an awful lot of information there that was somewhere in
the bureaucracy. It hadn't even reached the highest levels of the
administration yet and didn't before September 11, and that's one of
the problems: a lack of coordination both between intelligence agencies
and actually a lack of coordination inside the FBI. That was one of the
major problems. But I'll say about Kristen and the rest of those
families, that those kind of questions and a number of other questions
they've given the commission have been extraordinarily helpful. And we
don't have a hearing that we don't get questions from the families that
we as commissioners can pose to witnesses that are helpful to our work.
Mr. HAMILTON: There's a...
MR. RUSSERT: Should the American people have known more?
MR.
HAMILTON: Well, of course they should have known, in retrospect; no
doubt about it. But there's a huge gap between just saying to the
American people, "We've got a big threat out there, al-Qaeda's coming
after us," and saying, "It's coming after a certain airplane at a
certain airport on a certain day." In other words, the officials
constantly want, understandably, what they call actionable
intelligence. That is intelligence on which you can act. So moving from
a general threat to a very specific threat is the toughest part of
intelligence. And what we got through the summer of 2001 was general
intelligence, quite a bit of it. Clearly something was afoot. But
moving then to specific targets is a huge jump in the intelligence
business, and we have not yet perfected that.
MR. RUSSERT: And
it should be said, those of us in the media did not focus on al-Qaeda
in the summer of 2001. In fact, in the 2000 presidential election, I
believe terrorism was mentioned twice in the presidential debates. So
everyone had a much different mind-set pre-September 11.
MR.
HAMILTON: And it's very important that the commission keep that in
mind. That is to say, we have to try to put ourselves into the place of
the policy-maker back then facing not one, but dozens of threats at
that time, and try to understand whether or not they acted reasonably
under those circumstances; not the circumstances now, when we're
looking back, and it's so very clear.
MR. KEAN: One of the
things, by the way, we're looking at is congressional oversight, and
just to add to what you said, there were no hearings from the
congressional intelligence committees on terrorism for a long time. I
mean, it just--for the nation as a whole, we didn't have it on our
plate. We weren't looking at it. We weren't looking at it the way we
should.
MR. RUSSERT: When Mr. Osama bin Laden left Sudan,
refueled in Qatar before he went to Afghanistan, there seem to have
been several opportunities for us to snatch him at that time.
MR. KEAN: Yeah.
MR.
RUSSERT: But we seemed reluctant because we did not have the legal
basis to do such. In hindsight, will you be asking former President
Clinton, former Vice President Gore, President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, about those opportunities?
MR. KEAN: Yeah. We'll be
looking at all those opportunities. Not only those, but when we
actually saw bin Laden on the ground, using the Predator or other
means, did we have what they called, the congressman, actionable
intelligence? Should we have sent a cruise missile into a site where he
was at that point? I think those early opportunities are clear. We had
him. We saw him. I think maybe we could have done something about it.
Later on, it's a little bit fuzzier. I mean, the decision of whether to
take--nobody wanted to invade Afghanistan at that point. American
people probably wouldn't have stood for it. But could we have sent a
team in? Could we have sent a cruise missile in? Could we have gotten
him and his leadership at some point? That's a very important question
the commission's going to be addressing.
MR. HAMILTON: And a
very tough capability, I might say. It's very easy to see a television
monitor showing a shadowy figure that looks like Osama bin Laden--not
for sure, but looks like him--and say, "OK, we've got to knock that
fellow out." You may even, if you have actionable intelligence,
bringing the operational capabilities there quickly while he's still
there, within a matter of hours, a lot harder than it looks when you're
talking about a country 10,000 miles from here.
MR. RUSSERT:
Some of the widows have raised a very sensitive issue. This was in Joe
Conason's column. It's along--"The widows are watching." "What troubles
them most at the
moment is the role of Philip Zelikow, the
commission's executive director. During the first Bush administration
he served on the National Security Council staff, happens to be a
longtime confidant, collaborator and friend of Condoleezza Rice, with
whom he authored a book on German reunification in '95 and whom he
advised on the restructuring of the National Security Council during
the Bush transition in 2000. Richard Clarke has testified that, as a
member of the Bush transition team, Zelikow had been extensively brief
on al-Qaeda terrorism by the outgoing Clinton national security
officials. When the widows learned of that and of his presence at the
terrorism briefings, they were `outraged.'
`As executive
director, he has pretty much the most important job on the commission,'
said, Mindy Kleinberg," who's a widow of one of the victims of 9/11.
"`He hires the staff, he sets the direction and focus, he chooses
witnesses at the hearings.' She and her friends fear that even with the
best of intentions, Zelikow's connections to the Bush White House will
`taint the validity' of the commission's final report." Mr. Chairman?
MR. KEAN: He was part of the transition team for a month. Because he
was one of the best
experts
on terrorism in the whole area of intelligence in the entire country,
the same--they asked him to help the same reason we asked him to help.
We haven't found, I think, either Vice Chairman Hamilton or myself, any
evidence to indicate in any way that he's partial to anybody or
anything. In fact, he's been much tougher, I think, than a lot of
people would have liked him to be. In addition, he's recused himself
under the standards we all set for ourselves. Anything any commissioner
or staff member has been involved in before, they've taken themselves
out of that part of the investigation. He's taken himself out of the
investigation involving the whole transition. I understand what they've
said. Respectfully, I would disagree. I think Phil Zelikow is the best
possible person we could have found for the job.
MR. HAMILTON: I
fully agree with the governor. He's a very serious scholar. He knows
this field. He's played it right down the line. I found no evidence of
a conflict of interest of any kind, and I do not think his management
of the staff will taint the report. Indeed, I think it'll let him prove
the report.
MR. RUSSERT: But, Governor Kean, you on Tuesday said
this: "The earlier we finish it," the report, "the earlier we're going
to submit it to the White House. We believe that they will expedite the
process for clearing it so we can get it out to the public."
I
think many people are surprised that an independent commission has to
submit your findings, your report, to the White House for vetting
before it's released to the public. How can that be considered
independent?
MR. KEAN: I was surprised, too. I come from outside
of Washington. A lot of things have surprised me in this commission.
But that did. But anytime you're dealing with any kind of intelligence,
even if you write a memoir after you've served in government, you've
got to submit that to the same process. And they go through it line by
line to find out if there's anything in there which could harm American
interests in the area of intelligence.
MR. RUSSERT: Who? Who goes through it?
MR.
KEAN: I gather it's a team from--involving FBI, CIA people, but under
the direction of the White House, because the president is, after all,
in charge of all those areas.
MR. RUSSERT: Does that trouble you?
MR.
HAMILTON: It's the law. It's troubled me for many years because I come
from the legislative branch. But the fact of the matter is, under our
system of government, the president of the United States controls
classified information. There is a procedure in the Congress by which
you can declassify, but I'm not sure it's ever been used. So we have to
abide by the law. Now, we're not going to let them distort our report.
We understand that this has to go through them and we already have in
place a process by which this will be done. We're going to roll these
chapters out and give them to the White House. But I don't think the
White House here is going to make a judgment about the report. What
they're going to make a judgment about is whether this line or that
line may reveal sources and methods or something of that kind.
MR.
RUSSERT: Well, you remember when the congressional joint inquiry report
was submitted to the White House in December of 2002, it was not made
public until July of '03. If you submit your report in July of 2002,
can you guarantee the American people that they will see it and read it
before the November election, 2004?
MR. KEAN: I have no
guarantees, but everybody is planning on that, including the White
House. They've set up a special team under Andy Card which is going to
look at the report in an expedited manner and try to get it out just as
fast as possible. Nobody has any interest in having the report sitting
around Washington during the election period and pieces of it leaking
out. Nobody has an interest in this thing coming out in September or
October in the middle of the election. So I think it's in the White
House's interest, our interest, everybody's interest, to get this out
in July, and I believe they will.
MR. RUSSERT: But you're absolutely convinced the American people will
have the benefit of your report before the election?
MR. KEAN: That's my belief, yes.
MR.
RUSSERT: And to your point, Congressman, as you know, the White House
did not allow information regarding Saudi Arabia in the congressional
joint inquiry to be published. It was all redacted. Why was that?
MR.
HAMILTON: Well, I can't tell you why it was. I wasn't part of that
process. But I hope we've learned from that and I think we have. We do
not want to put out a report with heavy
redactions in it. We think a
lot can be improved here by the manner in which you write the report,
by the manner of consultation with the White House before the report
goes in. And I
think we can work through this, but the chairman and I are very
concerned about this. This
is one of the big remaining obstacles for us to get the report
declassified.
MR.
RUSSERT: The hijackers sent messages to some clerics in Saudi Arabia.
If the White House comes back and says, "We can't jeopardize our
relations with Saudi Arabia, we really can't make that public," how do
you respond? Do you have a counterdocument you would present to the
American people?
MR. HAMILTON: Well, there may be other ways we
can word it which will get our point across. At the end of the day, we
want to fulfill our mandate--tell the story of 9/11, make
recommendations to the American people. We think we can do that and
we're going to try our level best to make just as much public as we
possibly can.
MR. RUSSERT: Before we go, Chairman Kean, do you think the American
people will be surprised by a lot of what you've found?
MR.
KEAN: Some of it, yes. I've been surprised by some of what we found,
and I think, yeah, we will have things in our report on two
ends--first, the report itself; secondly, the recommendations. We've
got some very serious recommendations to make, and I think they'll be
something of great value to the American people, also to hopefully make
the country safer. We thank you both for your time and joining us and
sharing your views. And I hope you'll come back in July with the
report...
MR. KEAN: Yeah.
MR. RUSSERT: ...in its full form and share with the American people.
MR. KEAN: All right.
MR. RUSSERT: Tom Kean, Lee Hamilton, thanks very much.
Coming
next, one of President Bush's closest advisers, Karen Hughes, on the
Bush-Kerry race and her new book, "Ten Minutes from Normal." She is
next right here on MEET THE PRESS.
(Announcements)
MR.
RUSSERT: The race for the White House and her new book, former
counselor to the president, Karen Hughes, after this station break.
(Announcements)
MR. RUSSERT: And we are back. Former counselor to President Bush,
author, Karen Hughes, welcome.
MS. KAREN HUGHES: Still surprises me when I hear that "author."
MR.
RUSSERT: Before we get to the book, let me talk about some political
and policy issues. You just heard our discussion with the chairman and
vice chairman of the September 11th Commission. Many observers will
point to the fact that the president and vice president resisted or
discouraged the creation of the commission. They had to be threatened
with subpoena in order to provide documents and Dr. Condoleezza Rice
for weeks refused to testify in public under oath. Why such resistance
and reluctance to cooperate fully with the commission?
MS.
HUGHES: Well, Tim, I'm not sure that I characterize it that way,
because what I've heard the president say is he wants all the facts to
come out, he wants the commission to be able to report fully to the
American people. After all, he and his national security team are
responsible for preventing another attack. But I've been in the White
House and I've seen the competing pressures there. There are a lot of
factors at work when you're the president of the United States. He has
to worry about protecting the lives of the confidential informants that
we're relying on, sources and methods and human intelligence workers
who are out there around the world. You know the consternation that was
created when the name of Valerie Plume was leaked as being a CIA
operative. Rightly so. That was wrong, that someone leaked her name and
jeopardized her career. But the president has to worry about protecting
those intelligence methods and sources.
The president also has
to worry about important constitutional principles. I remember being
there in the East Room of the White House and holding up my hand and
taking that oath to defend the Constitution, which calls for a
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of
government. I'm very glad and I know the president is glad and so is
Dr. Rice that they were able to find a way to balance that important
principle of the Constitution with letting her testify in public under
oath, because I think it's important for the American people to hear
the facts. And actually, the debate about this has obscured the fact
that the White House has given an unprecedented level of cooperation to
this investigation.
MR. RUSSERT: But now in hindsight the president believes the
commission's a good idea.
MS.
HUGHES: Well, I think, Tim, I don't know if the president ever opposed
the creation of the commission. What he did was try to balance and look
at all those different things.
Remember, our first and foremost
priority right now has to be to prevent the American people from
another attack, and he wanted to make sure in a thoughtful way--you
know, this process tends to value speed as opposed to thoughtfulness.
If you're not for something the minute somebody asks about it, then you
must not be for it, as opposed to taking a thoughtful look at it in a
way to have a commission process that didn't jeopardize intelligence
sources or methods, didn't jeopardize the ability of our team that
we're relying on to prevent a -- to protect us every day from ongoing
attack.
MR. RUSSERT: But the history is clear. Here's the
headlines. "The 9-11 Commission could subpoena Oval Office files
because the White House was resisting. Bush opposes independent
commission to investigate September 11th." Vice President Cheney, on
this program said, "I did actively discourage the notion, for example,
of a national commission." There had been opposition; there's no doubt
about it.
MS. HUGHES: There were concerns about what impact it
might have on our ongoing foremost priority, which again, is to protect
the American people from attack. But that said, Tim, once the
commission has been created, I mean, unprecedented cooperation. The
president has turned over thousands of documents; 800 administration
officials have been interviewed. The presidential daily briefs, one of
the most highly secret sensitive documents in all of government -- I
never saw one and I'm viewed--I was there in the Oval Office almost
every morning; I never saw a presidential daily brief. Six members of
the Commission, four members and two staff members, have seen that, and
tapes of the president's conversation with foreign leaders.
Our
intention and the president's direction all along was that he wanted to
cooperate and to make sure that the commission had all the information
it needed to do its important work.
MR. RUSSERT: David Broder,
who works for The Washington Post, the columnist, wrote a very strong
column on Thursday, which I want to read and share with our viewers and
to you and give you a chance to react: "When the effort to shoot the
messenger failed to halt the political erosion, Bush did what he never
should have done: He threw Rice to the commission. And, worse, he
failed to do what he could have done long before: Offer the American
people and the world a clear, coherent and detailed account of his own
activities and state of mind in the months leading up to the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Instead of acting as the man
in charge and saying to the commission, `No, you may not put my
national security adviser on the mat, but I will answer to the public
for what happened,' he did just the opposite. He gave up Rice and then
turned on his heel and walked out of the briefing room even as
reporters were trying to ask him questions. At a time when the American
people--and the world--desperately need reassurance that the government
was not asleep at the switch, Bush has clenched his jaw and said
nothing that would ease" these "concerns."
MS. HUGHES: Well, Tim, I respect David Broder, but I think there's a
lot of bitterness in that
column, and I remember being surprised when I read that because I just
disagree with that.
Again,
as we've discussed, the president has fully cooperated with this
commission in an unprecedented way. The White House has given
information to a commission that is set up by the legislative branch of
government. He has been very forthcoming. Dr. Rice wanted to testify
because she felt that some of the facts that were presented to the
commission during testimony last week were somewhat distorted, a
distorted picture. I mean, you just heard the chairman of the
commission talk about the fact that the executive director of that
commission, Mr. Zelikow, was recruited by the administration to brief
us during the transition because he was the foremost, one of the
foremost experts in the world on al-Qaeda.
I think that is a
reputation of Mr. Clarke's assertions in itself. That we were concerned
enough that we recruited one of the foremost experts to brief the new
administration about the threat of al-Qaeda.
MR. RUSSERT: Richard Clarke testified on March 24, and this is the way
he began his testimony to the commission. Let's watch:
(Videotape, Testimony to 9/11 Commission):
MR.
RICHARD CLARKE: I also welcome the hearings because it is finally a
forum where I can apologize to the loved ones of the victims of 9/11.
To them who are here in the room, to those who are watching on
television, your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting
you failed you, and I failed you.
(End videotape)
MR. RUSSERT: Do you believe President Bush failed the American people
on September 11?
MS. HUGHES: I believe al-Qaeda committed an act of war against our
country, Tim, and one of
the things--I remember sitting at my house in Austin, Texas, and I was
watching that testimony on television, just like much of America was,
and I remember thinking at the time this is wrong. And I understand,
and all of us mourn and share the sense of sorrow felt by the victims.
We all--I lost a friend. I'm sure you lost friends. We all share that
sorrow. But I don't believe--and what I worry about what Mr. Clarke
said is it creates a misplaced sense of responsibility.
I don't
believe that anyone in the Bush administration--and I'm not an advocate
of the Clinton administration but I'll even include them in this--I
don't believe that anyone in the Clinton administration, either, could
have put together the pieces before the horror of September 11. I don't
think we could have envisioned it and done anything to have prevented
it. If we could have in either administration, either in the eight
years of the Clinton administration or the seven and a half months of
the Bush administration, I'm convinced we would have done so. And I
think that the problem with what Mr. Clarke did is it created a sense
of misplaced responsibility, as if it's someone in our government was
somehow responsible. I think it's very important that we understand
al-Qaeda was responsible. Al-Qaeda declared war on our country and
al-Qaeda continues to plot against our country.
MR. RUSSERT: You don't think any apology is necessary?
MS.
HUGHES: I think that, obviously we need to--what we need to do is learn
everything that we can, and that's why the work of the commission is so
important and why the president has directed Dr. Rice to go before the
commission this week and testify in public.
Because we need--our
whole goal should be to try to prevent another attack, not to look
backward and say, "Well, in hindsight had we known." I was thinking as
I watched earlier, I don't agree with what the two gentlemen who were
here previously have said. I just don't think, based on everything I
know, and I was there, that there was anything that anyone in our
government could have done to have put together the pieces before the
horror of that day in a way that would have possibly prevented that day.
MR.
RUSSERT: In your book you talk about September 11. You always traveled
with the president. This time you didn't, because it was your wedding
anniversary on September 10 and you stayed home and had dinner with
your husband. Went to the White House the next day, tried to contact
Air Force One, and the White House operator told you...
MS. HUGHES: "Ma'am, I'm sorry, we cannot reach Air Force One."
MR. RUSSERT: What did you think at that moment?
MS.
HUGHES: You know, I remember saying a prayer that nothing had happened
to the president, because in many ways that was one of the most
chilling moments of the day for me. I'd been on Air Force One. I'd seen
the elaborate communications equipment that is on that airplane. I
couldn't imagine. And Mary Matalin had relayed to me that there had
been a threat, we thought, at the time. It later turned out to have
been a misunderstanding of the use of the code name for the plane. But
we thought at the time there had been a threat against the plane. And
so, you know, we--I didn't know what to imagine, and I just, you know,
hoped and prayed that the president was all right.
MR. RUSSERT:
Later that day you went to the FBI building and became the first major
White House official to address the nation. Let's watch some of those
words and come back and talk about it:
(Videotape, September 11, 2001):
MS.
HUGHES: I'm Karen Hughes, counselor to President Bush, and I'm here to
update you all on the activities of the federal government in response
to this morning's attacks on our country.
(End videotape)
MR. RUSSERT: What was going through your mind at that moment?
MS.
HUGHES: I felt a very profound sense of duty, that I was obligated to
be a reassuring presence. And it was really probably the hardest thing
I think I've ever done in my career, Tim. I had been at the bunker in
the White House. I was taken out under armed guard. The Secret Service
agents surrounding me had their guns drawn. They took me to the Justice
Department because they had determined that the White House was not
safe for the press to come back in. But I was also very concerned about
what I'd been--I'd been at home, as you said, because I'd stayed home
for my wedding anniversary. And I'd seen the reports on the television
of the White House being evacuated, and they thought there was a car
bomb at the State Department. And I realized that it appeared to the
public that the government was shutting down.
I had been at the
emergency operations center seeing a very different picture, how
efficiently and effectively the government was coordinating the
response to these attacks. And so I felt an enormous sense of
responsibility to try to convey that sense of calm and decisionmaking
that I had witnessed to the American people.
MR. RUSSERT: You just heard the chairman and vice chairman say they
will submit their
commission report to the White House in July. Can you guarantee to the
American people
that the White House will release that commission report before the
November election?
MS.
HUGHES: Well, I no longer speak, as you know, on behalf of the White
House, but I certainly believe it is their intention and hope to do so,
and I would strongly urge that they
are able to do so, again, with
the understanding that they are responsible for guarding America's
national security and for making sure that there's no information
disclosed that could risk the life of an intelligence operative
somewhere or disclose methods that we're relying on to protect us from
further attack. You know, all of us who work in government -- my book
was reviewed for national security material, and that sort of gets the
implication -- I've seen a couple of media reports that I somehow had
it cleared. Well, they asked me to take out two phone numbers and an
address. That was all that was changed. So I think it is important that
experts review it to make sure that we protect sensitive sources of
information. But I have no reason to believe that--I know the White
House would share the commission's interest in getting the report out
as quickly as is humanly possible.
MR. RUSSERT: And you think that's important that the American people
have the benefit of it before they vote.
MS. HUGHES: I do think that's important. I think it's important that
the American people see the report, yes.
MR.
RUSSERT: Do you think it's appropriate for the president's re-election
campaign to use September 11? There was a lot of discussion about the
flag-draped coffin being used in one of his campaign commercials.
MS.
HUGHES: Tim, I think September 11 is not only a--you know, it's not an
event that happened in the past. It is really a defining moment for the
future of our country. It's one of the most defining moments of our
lifetimes, and it will shape American policy for years to come. I
remember Condoleezza Rice saying to me, "Karen, September 11 was an
earthquake across the international security environment. If our oceans
no longer protect us, it changes the way we have to look at
everything." So, of course, I think it's one of the big issues, if not
the biggest issue. I know for my own family and for families across
America, the national security of this country is probably the biggest
issue at stake in this election. The economy is very important, and job
creation; those--the economy is always an important issue. But I think
this time, in the aftermath of September 11, it's the most important
issue. And I think the tasteful use of the image in the president's ad
was perfectly appropriate. And it--that day is going to be a part of
our national debate for many days and many years to come.
MR.
RUSSERT: You just heard the chairman suggest that he would prefer that
the president and vice president testify separately before the
commission. Why did the White House insist that they appear together?
MS.
HUGHES: I'm not sure what the rationale specifically was, but I think
the White House believes that it is an effective use of their time.
This is really quite extraordinary for a sitting president to go before
a commission of this nature. The most famous other commission I can
remember in my lifetime was the Warren Commission, investigating the
assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. And President
Johnson, my understanding is, did not appear before that commission. He
said, "Presidents just don't do that." Well, in this case, this
president is doing this because he feels, again, this is such an
extraordinary circumstance.
Many times, President Bush and Vice
President Cheney were in the room together during much of the events,
much of the briefings, much of the lead-up that the commission is
looking at. And so I think it's appropriate that they appear together
and discuss how they saw the events leading up to September 11.
MR.
RUSSERT: We're going to take a quick break and come back and talk more
to Karen Hughes, counselor to the president, wife, mother, the woman
who left the White House to
put family first and moved back to Texas. "Ten Minutes from
Normal"--that's her new book--
right after this.
(Announcements)
MR. RUSSERT: And we are back.
Iraq--still a lot of discussion in our country about that. A year ago
May, this was the scene
when the president landed on the USS Lincoln and you'll see the banner:
Mission
Accomplished. At that time, there were 138 deaths in Iraq. There are
now 602. There were
685
injured and wounded; there are now 3,466. John McCain said on Friday
that the president--or he criticized the president "for failing to
prepare Americans for a long involvement in Iraq, saying, `You can't
fly in on an aircraft carrier and declare victory and have the deaths
continue. You can't do that.'" McCain, feeling very strongly for some
time, "We need more troops in Iraq." Was the president premature by
landing on that carrier deck and do you regret it now politically?
MS.
HUGHES: Well, Tim, I think you have to look at what the president said
when he landed there, and what he said was major combat operations. And
I think it was important for him to acknowledge the extraordinary work
that members of our military and that the sailors on that carrier had
performed in a swift and a very successful initial operation.
Now,
you probably remember the reports before we went into Baghdad; there
was going to be a lengthy, bloody battle that lasted for months over
Baghdad, that the Republican Guard were these elite troops. And
actually, the United States military, the men and women of our
military, performed their duties in an extraordinary way, very
successfully. And that's what the president was celebrating. I hired
the person who worked with the crew on that shop in developing that
banner, and I worked with the White House speech writers on the text of
that speech. And in the text of that speech, he said, "We still have
very difficult days ahead."
And so I would disagree with the
characterization that he did not acknowledge that, because he clearly
said that there would still be many difficult days ahead, as there have
been.
MR. RUSSERT: And will continue to be.
MS. HUGHES:
And will continue to be. It's hard. The work of building a democracy is
never easy. It was not easy in our own country, but it's absolutely
right. I remember having a conversation with Condoleezza Rice as we
prepared to challenge the world to face up to the threat that was posed
by Saddam Hussein, and she told me, she said, "Karen, this is going to
be really hard and a lot of people aren't going to agree with us," and
I said, "But is it right?"
And she said, "Absolutely."
MR.
RUSSERT: The fact that we have not found weapons of mass destruction,
will that be an issue directed toward the president's credibility in
this campaign?
MS. HUGHES: Well, I think it's an issue for all
of us, and it's an issue, it's the reason the president set up a
commission to look into the whole issue. It's important, whoever the
next president is--it's important that we know why. And it wasn't just
we, the Bush administration, who felt there were weapons there. Let me
say a few words about that.
First of all, there were some in
Washington who would disagree with David Kay's assessment, wrong about
the weapons. They say we don't know yet, that we may still find them.
But I think it's important that the American people hear the second
part of what David Kay said. I worry that they only heard the first
part. He said he felt we were wrong about the weapons but that we were
absolutely right about the war because the situation in Iraq was even
more dangerous, even more unstable than we had felt going in there.
And, again, 15 years of accumulated American intelligence, not just the
Bush administration, but President Clinton, former Vice President Gore,
U.N. Security Council, every credible intelligence agency in the world,
after all, felt that Saddam Hussein had those weapons. He'd used them
in the past, and we knew that he had used them against his own people.
MR.
RUSSERT: You know the president well. He's been in the White House now
for a thousand days. What do you think his biggest mistake has been and
how has he learned from it?
MS. HUGHES: Tim, I don't know that I think in those terms. What I think
in terms of is the
extraordinary
leadership that he provided our country in the aftermath of September
11. I remember standing with him in New York, the Friday after
September 11 and watching him
grab that bullhorn and speak to those
rescue workers who couldn't hear him and he said, "Well, I hear you,
and the world hears you. And the people who knocked down those
buildings are going to hear from all of us soon." I think he is--you
know, I'm his friend and I'm his advocate, and I don't look at him that
way. What I look at is the extraordinary leadership he provided our
country in a very, very difficult time.
MR. RUSSERT: You do write that you are surprised that he has not been
able to change the tone in Washington.
MS.
HUGHES: I am disappointed by that. That's true, and I think that he
worked hard to do so. I remember when we moved here and he had
Democrats come to the White House and meet with him. He worked with
Senator Ted Kennedy on the education bill. He invited the leadership to
come to meetings. But I had seen in Texas, where he worked very
effectively with the Democratic lieutenant governor and Democratic
speaker in an atmosphere of trust, and unfortunately, it seems to be
very hard to create that atmosphere of trust in Washington.
MR. RUSSERT: Both sides are at fault?
MS.
HUGHES: On both sides. The special interests pushed both parties to the
extreme. I think the competitive nature of the news cycle tends to make
the debate even more strident, you know, that the most strident quote
is the one that ends up on the evening news or in the next morning's
newspaper. And so there are a lot of pressures forcing stridency and
division here in Washington, and it is polarized and I think that's
unfortunate. We all have to work on that.
MR. RUSSERT: You left Washington 22 months ago. Any regrets?
MS. HUGHES: No, none at all. I really feel very privileged to have done
what's right for my
family in moving home to Texas, and we enjoy being there, and I've
enjoyed being there. I
had
time to teach my son to drive last year, which was a wonderful
experience. I would have never have been able to do it had I worked at
the White House, because I, you know, I didn't get home till late at
night and it was dark and you do not want to teach a teenager to drive
in the dark.
MR. RUSSERT: This is Robert the great baseball player?
MS. HUGHES: This is Robert the great baseball player, that's right.
MR. RUSSERT: August 15th you're going to come back and travel with the
president through the November election?
MS.
HUGHES: I promised the president when I left the White House that I
would travel with him for the last few months of his re-election
campaign as I always have during his campaigns, because I think it's
important for my family and for all the families of America, that he be
re-elected. The stakes in this election are huge right now, and I think
we need...
MR. RUSSERT: If he's re-elected, will you come back to the White House?
MS.
HUGHES: I don't expect to, Tim. I've remodeled my house in Austin,
Texas. Jerry Hughes is very happy in Austin, Texas. So is Karen Hughes
and you know, I--if the president of the United States ever asks you to
do something, you always have to consider it, but I'm very happy in
Austin, Texas.
MR. RUSSERT: Karen Hughes, we thank you for joining us. The book, "Ten
Minutes from Normal." The title comes from?
MS.
HUGHES: The campaign trail. We were on a train coming into a little
town in Illinois, and the conductor came over and said, "Ladies and
gentlemen, we are 10 minutes from Normal," and I said, "If I ever write
a book, that's the title," because that's how I feel, being a normal
person whose boss ran for president and then became the president of
the United States, and that's thrilling, but it's still pretty
surprising for a pretty normal person.
MR. RUSSERT: We thank you for sharing your views.
MS. HUGHES: Thank you so much.
MR. RUSSERT: And we'll be right back.
(Announcements)
MR. RUSSERT: That's all for today. We'll be back next week. If it's
Sunday, it's MEET THE PRESS.
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